Performing critique: towards a non-representational theatre in Britain by Papaioannou, Spyros
 1 
 
Performing Critique: 
Towards a Non-Representational Theatre in 
Britain 
 
 
 
 
 
Spyros Papaioannou 
 
Department of Sociology 
 
Goldsmiths, University of London 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD  
 
July 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Declaration 
 
 
 
 
I, Spyros Papaioannou, declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own. 
 
 
 
 
Signature: 
 
 
Date:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Abstract 
 
The thesis traces the conditions of possibility for what we came to understand as 
‘non-representational’ approaches to performing critique. In assessing different 
theatrical practitioners in Britain (in the form of case studies) that have challenged 
a politically prescriptive theatre, the thesis elaborates upon ideologically 
‘incomplete’ ways of performing, in order to rethink the staging of critical practice 
beyond its subjection to mimesis, abstract significations and transcendental 
politics. Ways of rethinking theatre as a space in which politics is not 
transcendentally transmitted, but rather emerges within the performance-event, as 
well as questions of spectators’ emancipation from systems of power that have 
rendered them passive and immobile watchers of a spectacle are examined and 
challenged. In doing so, the research resonates with many ongoing discussions 
about the function and performance of critique, placing questions of spectatorship, 
de-objectification and representation at the heart of its analysis.  
Considering political theatre as a plateau on which critique can be actualised as a 
‘becoming’ in the ‘here and now’ of the event, the thesis explores the question of 
non-representational performance along three broad theoretical axes. First, it 
unfolds and critically exposes the limits of interactivity within performance 
practices, by considering dialogical processes of performing not as ends-in-
themselves, but as starting points of challenging the problem of representation in 
political theatre. Secondly, the thesis examines ‘incomplete’ and fragmentary 
performances, suggesting that non-representational approaches to theatre are, in 
effect, a critique of teleological outcomes and determinate meanings; therefore, 
theatrical incompleteness is theorised as a tool of critical practices that become 
non-representational. Thirdly, in destabilising the problematic opposition between 
conditioning the spectator as object or subject, the thesis argues that the power 
relations in performance need to be destratified and transformed into productive 
variations, as a way to endorse a politics of presence in political theatre. 
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I. Thesis’s overview 
This is a thesis about the politics of theatre and performance. Inevitably, this 
means that it is also a thesis about the politics of representation and its relation to 
the possibilities of critique; that is, it makes sense to suggest that a study of political 
theatre can by no means afford to ignore the past and present discourses on 
representation, in the same way that it cannot fail to take into account the 
theoretical discussions of the function of critique. It is perhaps unfortunate, in 
research terms, that this proposition does not work both ways; that is, it often 
seems merely a ‘question of choice’ (which is often an aesthetical or a 
methodological one) whether one should pay attention to questions of theatre and 
performance when examining the politics of representation and the possibilities of 
critique. Of course, the point is not to think of this intersection in terms of 
imperatives. After all, the integration of questions of representation and critique in 
a research of theatre and performance is not a matter of regulation or obligation. 
It is however a matter of need.  
While this introduction is not the place to elaborate on this argument further (I 
provide a more thorough discussion of this issue in the first chapter), I wanted to 
begin this thesis by highlighting this problem in order to clarify that my 
understanding of the politics of theatre and performance cannot be thought 
 9 
outside discourses of representation and critique; in the same way that, I suggest, 
such discourses cannot be radically current and politically forceful if they are not 
informed by questions of performance, spectatorship, theatricality and so on. In 
other words, I want to make clear that my intention in this thesis is to consider 
both questions of theatre and performance, and the discourses on representation 
and critique, as belonging to one broad spectrum of thought that could be 
described as the ‘politics of performing critique’; not as a way to unify, totalise or 
generalise the analytical particularities of each area, but rather in an attempt to 
emphasise the commonalities of their theoretical scopes.  
This thesis is an attempt to trace and examine the conditions of possibility for a 
political theatre beyond ideological dogmatism and mimetic representation. By 
assessing different ways in which critique has been embedded in theatrical 
performances, the thesis focuses on theories and practices that challenged 
representational modes of staging political discourses. Most of all, I consider such 
theories and practices as critical responses to the political implications of the 
normative and prescriptive ways of mimetically representing texts, identities, 
histories, ideas, cultures and conflicts. These implications or problems include: the 
normalisation of discourses that compress critique’s radical potentialities in 
performance, and its subsequent typification in the name of a certain 
commonsense; the production of self-identical meanings, the dissemination of 
prescriptive ideas and the use of politically dogmatic ways of engaging with 
audiences – in a word, the political ‘evangelism’ of Western theatre; the 
transcendental approaches to political action, that is the perpetuation of meanings 
and values that are always absent from the ‘here and now’ of a performance; and, 
finally, the resulting hierarchisation or stratification of the relations between the 
constituent (human and non-human) elements of a theatrical process.   
I suggest that by properly analysing what makes these issues problematic in 
theatre and performance contexts, and, most importantly, by examining the 
intellectual and practical processes that have confronted them, we can obtain a 
thorough understanding of the ‘non-representational’ possibilities of political 
theatre. Of course, it is worth mentioning that the thesis does not consider the 
problem of representation as a dominant ‘predicament’, of which every other 
problem in theatre and performance is merely a side-effect; rather, I understand 
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all the aforementioned implications as important problems that can be studied in 
their own right, while belonging to representational systems of theatrical practice. 
Thus, the task of the thesis is not to theorise a theatre that could be labelled as 
non-representational, but rather to highlight and attribute significance to the 
processes that challenged the entire domain of representation in Western theatre, 
by understanding it as a system of power that restrained the potentialities of 
critique in performance. 
Although the objective of the thesis is to undertake a critical analysis of the 
structural problem of representation in Western theatre as a whole, I give 
particular focus to British theatre directors and collectives – in the form of 
analytical case studies – examining their different approaches to the politics of 
performance, critique and representation in the 20th century. I consider the 
history of British political theatre (especially in the second half of the century) as a 
useful context of research that invites a thorough analysis of radical approaches to 
theatre and performance. On one level, the historical tradition of British theatre, 
and the richness of its multifaceted development throughout time, provide a 
platform on which discussions of the politics of performance are always justifiable 
and important. On a second level, the contradictions that have emerged in this 
tradition make the British theatrical paradigm a very interesting object of analysis, 
precisely because the clash of these contrasts has marked a polemics whose 
elements have been enacted and re-enacted continuously: from aristocratic or 
bourgeois adaptations of Shakespeare to music hall and melodramas, and from 
Victorian or neo-Victorian burlesque to street theatre, agit-prop and the 
iconoclastic interpretations of classical plays, British theatre has always been 
subject to radical theatrical ‘conflicts’ and sharp dramatic contrasts. Thus, I 
understand British theatre as a framework within which the juxtaposition of 
experimental practices and their challenges to normative modes of representation 
acquire a unique radical character; and, therefore, I suggest that their analysis can 
offer insightful perspectives in understanding the multiplicity of critical possibilities 
that political theatre proposes and endorses. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the thesis considers specific instances of 
popular theatre that have theoretically conceptualised and practically affirmed a 
politicised performance process in their experimental practice. The case studies 
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have been conducted on the basis of researching and exploring questions that 
have been brought to the fore by theatre directors and collectives whose 
performances were widely acclaimed by audiences and critics at the very time in 
which they were active. I suggest that the rationale behind this specification of my 
research objects provides an insightful way of understanding and problematising 
political theatre’s non-representational potentials within performance contexts 
that might be retrospectively considered ordinary or even conventional – 
especially when compared to other more avant-garde theatre practices. I argue 
that such theatrical projects – that have been regarded as ex post facto mainstream – 
manifest prolific possibilities of mapping radical challenges to political theatre’s 
representational function. Thus, by examining political theatre practices that have 
addressed a broad audience (or have attempted to do so), while simultaneously 
confronting the normative function of representing political discourses on stage, 
the thesis argues for a popular/political notion of performance as emancipated 
from dogmatism and mimesis. Of course, this is not to say that I place popular 
theatre in a somewhat qualitative antithesis to more experimental performance 
practices; such a hierarchical positioning would stand in opposition to the 
theoretical scope of the thesis. In this sense, the point of this specification has 
nothing to do with notions of performance efficacy or aesthetic preferences. 
Rather, the choice of cases has been made on the basis of acknowledging the 
potential of certain popular theatre instances to create a shift in the ‘politics of 
performing critique’, with view to unravel their non-representational direction and 
radicalise their resonance.   
The theoretical scope through which my analysis is implemented is largely 
based on Gilles Deleuze’s ontological explorations. Although Deleuze’s 
relationship to questions of theatre and performance is often considered as limited, 
there are number of ways that his theoretical project can be linked to and 
embedded in discourses of theatre and performance studies (see Murray, 1997; 
Cull, 2009). Deleuze is important for this thesis for many reasons. I will briefly 
outline some of them as a way to also substantiate his contribution to discourses 
and practices of performance – a contribution that resonates with his ‘micro-
political’ approach to critical practice. First, Deleuze’s attack on the authority of 
representation remains at once current, rigorous and radical, while leaving ‘open’ 
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spaces for extended analyses of the possibilities of critical practice understood as 
mobile and creatively incomplete. He considers the function of representation in 
art, politics and philosophy as a transcendental site that privileges fixed and 
teleological imitations of identities, cultures, ideologies, histories, theories and so 
on. Thus, his critique takes the form of a productive encounter with non-
representational ways of being, moving, acting and performing. Second, Deleuze’s 
recurring calls for understanding and experiencing politics and art in terms of 
‘processes’ and ‘becomings’ is of key importance for the thesis, as it is an approach 
that draws many parallels to questions of performance, while proposing a 
rethinking of critique as an ‘operation’ that becomes possible through 
‘subtractions’, ‘variations’ and ‘minor becomings’ (Deleuze, 1997 [1979]). A 
Deleuzian way of thinking the ‘political’ favours mobile processes rather than 
static conditions, becomings rather than predetermined theorems, ‘ruptures’ 
rather than presets. Third, Deleuze’s attack on stratification and fascistic 
organisation in regards to systems of power provides a platform on which one can 
theorise revolutionary concepts and practices as concrete political mappings without 
resting on utopian or ultra-idealist directions of thought (although Deleuze is often 
accused of developing these). Finally, on a more general note, Deleuzian theory 
provides the thesis with tools and ideas that go beyond a description of ‘what is the 
problem’, of ‘what makes this problem possible’, offering ways of thinking about 
‘what needs to be done’ (though in the least didactic and determinate manner). As 
Foucault notes in the preface of Anti-Oedipus, ‘[Deleuze’s and Guattari’s] questions 
[…] are less concerned with why this or that than with how to proceed’ (Foucault, 
2004 [1972]: xiv; original emphasis). Of course, this does not mean that I consider 
the conditions of possibility for the problem of representation, and their thorough 
analysis, as less significant for my research. On the contrary, it is on the basis of a 
careful understanding of these conditions that ways of ‘how to proceed’ become 
apparent and justifiable.  
It is also important to point out that the thesis takes on a Deleuzian analysis, 
without however being ‘dictated’ by a supposedly strict Deleuzian ‘line of politics’. 
While my discussion is informed and inspired by Deleuze’s theoretical project, my 
task is by no means to understand this project as a fixed academic category in 
which every part of the thesis should essentially and unconditionally fit. My 
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analysis is also informed by Artaud’s deconstructive use of language and body, 
Derrida’s attack on mimetic representation, Foucault’s notions of critique and 
power, as well as by many questions posed by performance studies and theatre 
studies. 
 
II. Performance as a challenge to representation  
Let us now initiate the discussion and contextualise the questions that will be 
examined in the thesis. One of the most groundbreaking transformations that the 
20th century theatre world experienced was the ‘turn to performance’. This 
important shift became possible in the latter half of the century, bringing forth a 
radical questioning of established theatrical and dramatic forms. Performance, 
and performance studies as an emergent field of analysis, widened the ways of 
experiencing and analysing theatrical acts infusing them with qualities that were 
parallel to the ‘performative turn’ of social sciences. Although I further expand on 
both the emergence of ‘performance studies’ as a discipline and the important role 
of ‘performativity’ within theoretical plateaus in the first chapter of the thesis, it is 
important to make some points that are useful to this introduction. The advance 
of performance studies, as initiated by the intersection of the works of the 
director/professor Richard Schechner (1977; 2002) and the anthropologist Victor 
Turner (1982; 1986) spawned an immense analytical interest in sociocultural 
practices, claiming that ‘everything can be studied “as” performance’ (Schechner, 
2006: 38-9). Social enactments, rituals, politics, media appearances, gender 
manifestations and so on, became objects of performance analysis by many 
theorists, as a way to substantiate the cultural importance, as well as the political 
possibilities of ‘showing doing’ (Schechner, 2002: 22). This form of analysis came 
forward partly in parallel to the academically emergent concept of 
‘performativity’, an interdisciplinary term that encompassed the capacity of 
individuals to transform their ‘being’ into ‘doing’ with the use of language, speech 
or other non-verbal forms of expression (see Austin, 1975 [1962]; Butler, 1993).  
The first question that I want to address in this introduction is the ways in 
which the ‘turn to performance’ contributed to a certain destabilisation of the 
politics of representation in theatre and performance contexts. It is widely 
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acknowledged that the ‘postmodern condition’, which manifested itself in a range 
of cultural and artistic practices, and the emergence of poststructuralist theory in 
France were directly linked to the advance of performance art and the 
development of performance-discourses. One of the key questions that this 
intersection brought to the fore was a rethinking of the ways in which theatrical 
sense is produced. Processes of interpretation, reception, subjectivity and 
conveyance were placed under serious scrutiny by many practitioners and 
academics of performance. As Jon Mckenzie points out in a more general tone, 
‘between 1955 and 1975 and across a wide range of cultural practice and 
research, there was an attempt to pass from product to process, from mediated 
expression to direct contact, from representation to presentation, from discourse 
to body, from absence to presence’ (Mckenzie, 2001: 38).                
In the theatrical context, this radical attempt to break with normative systems 
of signification and to affirm the ‘live’ qualities of theatrical events resulted in a 
creative decomposition of traditional forms of performing and engaging with 
audiences. In this period (from the late 1950s to the early 1970s), theatrical plays 
began to acquire non-linear and more ‘micropolitical’ narratives, while 
introducing a radical sense of ephemerality to the act of performing and engaging 
meaning. The previously uncontested authority of the dramatic text, the power of 
speech and the supremacy of the author’s and the performer’s intentions were 
more than useful points of debate; they became areas of theoretical confrontation 
amongst practitioners and academics of performance. The historical instances that 
can serve as politically radical insights for the thorough exploration of this 
questioning are many and diverse. For example, Auslander reminds us of the 
experimentation of a non-fictional, non-representational theatre that was devised 
by companies such as The Living Theatre, The Open Theatre and The 
Performance Group back in the 1960s: ‘Whereas it is usually supposed that the 
function of actors is to represent fictional beings, the performers in the radical 
theatres of the 1960s were often present as themselves’ (Auslander, 2004: 109). 
Also, James Loxley highlights Artaud’s response to a Balinese ritual dancing that 
the latter attended in Paris: ‘[this performance] could produce something directly 
striking and meaningful precisely because it was not either given over to narrative 
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or ideas or consumed in producing images of a world that was forever elsewhere’ 
(Loxley, 2007: 146).  
The list of performance artists, directors and collectives whose practice can be 
placed within this confrontational context is long and probably endless. Without 
any intention to hierarchise or even categorise the multiplicities of performance 
projects, I suggest that this list would include: Antonin Artaud, Bertolt Brecht, 
Jerzy Grotowski, Julian Beck, John Cage, Richard Foreman, Peter Brook, Robert 
Wilson, Allan Kaprow, Laurie Anderson, Marina Abramovic, Forced 
Entertainment, Punchdrunk, Richard Schechner amongst many others. In very 
different ways, such artists either created the conditions for or directly contributed 
to a subversive rethinking of theatre’s traditional use of representation and power. 
It is therefore crucial to note that the emergence of a ‘postmodern’ politics of 
theatre (which in effect was largely a challenge to the mimetic function of 
representation on stage) became possible through the radical discourses of 
performance, while resonating with the poststructuralist attacks on the totalising 
and teleological ways of constructing subjectivity and agency.  
Thus theatre and performance practices obtained a postmodern and 
poststructuralist polemics that ‘distrust[ed] claims to authenticity, originality, or 
coherence’ and ‘deflat[ed] master narratives and totalising theories’ (Reinelt & 
Roach, 1992: 1). According to Jill Dolan, ‘a postmodernist performance style’ can 
be understood as one that ‘breaks with realist narrative strategies, heralds the 
death of unified characters, decentres the subject, and foregrounds conventions of 
perception’ (Dolan, 1989: 60). The conditions of possibility for what Marvin 
Carlson calls a ‘resistant performance’ were created in the form of polemical 
responses to the hegemony of dramatic representation and the dogmatism of self-
identical meanings (Carlson, 1996). Of course, the development of such resistance 
was by no means simple and untroubled, since the problem of representation had 
to be found at the very core of performances’ function. As Carlson notes, ‘[u]nable 
to move outside the operations of performance (or representation), and thus 
inevitably involved in its codes and reception assumptions, the contemporary 
performer seeking to resist, challenge, or even subvert these codes and 
assumptions must find some way of doing this ‘from within’’ (ibid: 172). According 
to Carlson, this intricacy is always characteristic of the ways in which postmodern 
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performances attempted to counter their somewhat inherent mimetic and 
normative elements. Echoing Auslander’s postmodern theatrical theory, Carlson 
suggests that the development of resistant performance becomes possible always as 
a result of the interplay ‘between complicity and critique’ (as cited in Carlson, 
1996: 174). 
What I suggest is important here is that one of the most radical motivations of 
such performances was ‘to engage in a decidedly political resistance to narrative 
closure’, that is, in a decomposition of the representational ways of signifying 
meanings that were absent and external to the performance-event (Kaye, 2000 
[1994]: 276). In other words, the stimulus for resisting and subverting the function 
of mimetic representation in theatre and performance was rooted in the desire to 
challenge ‘the ‘unification’ and ‘simplification’ of mimesis and its ability to 
represent reality as an external and universal constant’ (Murray, 1997: 2). As Kaye 
argues, while commenting on Karen Finley’s Constant State of Desire, ‘[t]he effect of 
such a resistance is not to be found in a particular import or articulation of a point 
of view, but occurs as a destabilising of that which is ‘assumed’, of that which 
would appear to the audience as something which is already ‘known’’ (Kaye, 2000 
[1994]: 276). I argue that it is by virtue of this general destabilisation that 
postmodern performance practice substantiated its confrontation to the 
implications of mimetic representation; and it is on the basis of this longing for 
theatrical presence, for the creative possibilities of the ‘here and now’ of the event 
that such a practice ‘resists the attempt to divorce its ‘meanings’ or political value 
from its immediate contexts’ (ibid). The 1982 essay of Josette Feral Performance and 
Theatricality: The Subject Demystified, is a key instance of scholarship that examines 
and justifies performance’s rejection of mimetic representation. In analysing the 
specificities of the performance genre and the renewed possibilities of experience 
that performance has offered, Feral argues that ‘[p]erformance is the absence of 
meaning’ (Feral, 1997 [1982]: 292). By referring to the performances of The 
Living Theatre and to the theatres of Robert Wilson and Richard Foreman, she 
clarifies this argument: ‘[p]erformance does not aim at a meaning, but rather makes 
meaning in so far as it works right in those extremely blurred junctures out of 
which the subject eventually emerges’ (ibid: original emphasis).  
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Indeed, the question of the ways in which meaning is constructed in 
performances has been of key importance in discussions of the theatrical politics of 
representation. In particular, the traditional relationship between text (or 
language) and the actual event of performance has been rendered problematic by 
many cultural theorists. Raymond Williams argued that ‘drama’ should be ‘put at 
some relative distance from ‘literature’’ (Williams, 1983: 5), being understood as 
‘writing in performance’ (Regan, 2000: 49). The emergence of ‘[n]ew kinds of 
text, new kinds of notation, new media and new conventions’ that Williams 
discussed in his essay Drama in a Dramatised Society contributed significantly to this 
end (Williams, 1983: 11). At the same time, non-linguistic performance mediums 
came to be considered as non-representational ‘texts’ or non-semiotic ‘languages’. 
For instance, Theodor Adorno’s 1956 essay Music and Language: A Fragment, and 
Roland Barthes’s 1972 essay The Grain of the Voice are two of the most notable 
analyses of the possibility of ‘music-as-language’ to deconstruct normative 
processes of signification and representation in performance. For Adorno, ‘[m]usic 
creates no semiotic system’, since its performance is experienced in the form of 
what he calls ‘recurring ciphers’ (Adorno, 1998 [1956]: 1-2). It is in a similar way 
that Barthes suggests the notion of the ‘geno-song’ (elaborating on Kristeva’s idea 
of ‘geno-text’) to describe these musical melodies that have ‘nothing to do with 
communication, representation (of feelings), expression’, but rather work through 
volume and intonation (Barthes & Heath, 1972: 182). The main focus of these 
discourses was to reveal the productive potential of performances in the process of 
creating, rather than representing, meaning. In the words of the anthropologist 
Edward Bruner,  
‘performance does not release a preexisting meaning that lies dormant in the 
text […] Rather, the performance itself is constitutive. Meaning is always in 
the present, in the here-and-now, not in such past manifestations as historical 
origins or the author’s intentions’ (Bruner, 1986: 11).  
Bruner argues for the always-performative and ‘active’ aspect of texts, criticising 
their supposedly ‘silent’ and absent qualities that ‘haunt’, rather than critically 
engage, meaning. In a sense, this view simultaneously echoes and criticises the 
idea of deconstructive semiotics, ‘that performance is always more than the text’ 
(Reinelt, 1992: 113; my emphasis); that is, it contends that the question of 
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emancipating performance from textual and representational authority, is not only 
a question of ‘addition’ but also a question of ‘presence’. As Tim Etchells argues 
while describing the thrust of his work with Forced Entertainment, this question is ‘[a] 
concern with language not as text […], but as an event’ (Etchells, 1999: 105). 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the role of feminism in discourses and 
practices of theatre, and the emergence of feminist performances have been 
pivotal in the development of challenges to mimetic processes of representation 
and signification. The polemics of attempting to subvert the mis-representations of 
women on stage, and the radicalism of introducing agency to women performers 
and spectators, was fundamental in creating the conditions for critiques of the 
entire domain and function of representation in theatre. As Carlson notes, 
‘[m]aterialist feminism has generally sought to utilise the postmodern decentring 
of the subject, not to reverse Lacan and to create a new ‘subject’ position for 
women, but to encourage both performers and spectators to think critically about 
the whole traditional apparatus of representation, including in particular the 
subject/object relationship’ (Carlson, 1996: 170). What feminist critique brought 
to performances was, crucially, a destabilisation of a transcendent politics of 
identity as represented on stage. As Elin Diamond suggests, it managed to break 
with the fixed and self-identical positioning of women (and also of other mis-
represented communities) creating spaces for more ‘unstable identifications’ in 
performance (Diamond, 1997: 36). This feminist focus on variations of identity 
positions and mobile subjectivities contributed significantly to challenging 
normative significations and ‘mapping discontinuities in representation’ (Case, 
1990: 9). Sue-Ellen Case’s (1990) Performing Feminisms (edited collection of essays), 
and Diamond’s (1997) Umaking Mimesis are two of the most extended analyses of 
the impact of feminist performances to the politics of representation.      
 Thus, all these discourses that challenged the invariability of meaning, the 
political limits of mimesis and the essentialism of binary positioning in theatre and 
performance created renewed conditions of performing that rethought theatrical 
processes beyond their submission to representation and text. Hans-Thies 
Lehmann’s (2006 [1999]) Postdramatic Theatre is a very comprehensive study of a 
certain movement in theatre that, from the 1980s onwards, pushed the boundaries 
of the use of ‘texts’ in performances in order to emancipate the stage and the 
 19 
auditorium from the production of fixed dramatic representations. Lehmann 
focused on the virtue of theatrical fragmentation, suggesting that,  
‘[postdramatic theatre] renounces the long-incontestable criteria of unity and 
synthesis and abandons itself to the chance (and risk) of trusting individual 
impulses, fragments and microstructures of texts in order to become a new 
kind of practice. In the process it discovers a new continent of performance, a 
new kind of 'presence' of the 'performers' (into which the 'actors' have 
mutated) and establishes a multifarious theatre landscape beyond forms 
focused on drama’ (Lehmann, 2006 [1999]: 56-7).        
The impact of Lehmann’s conceptualisation of the ‘postdramatic paradigm’ has 
been important and useful in theatre and performance discourses that looked for 
contemporary ways to articulate vocabularies, terminologies and general 
frameworks to encapsulate the complexity of theatre’s growing distrust of 
representation. Questions of post-linear and immersive performances have been 
widely addressed and thoroughly analysed, as a way to affirm a renewed 
Artaudian and ‘happening-like’ recognition of performances as destratified mise en 
scènes; as spaces in which the multiple elements of performance (performers, 
spectators, lights, sounds, texts, space, technology and so on) were considered as 
equally significant for a politics of present experiences – for a politics of the event 
(see Kaye, 1994; Case, 1996; Kozel, 2000; Bay-Cheng et al, 2010). Susan Kozel’s 
(2000) account of post-linear performance is characteristic of the way in which the 
‘political’ has been transformed in theatrical contexts. She argues that this type of 
performance produces creative interruptions and gaps in which the engagement 
between the play and the audience becomes political:  
‘Through post-linearity gaps are provided for us to insert our views, our 
experiences, or for us to self-consciously chart our own course through 
material based on our likes, dislikes, or habits […] In this sense, post-linear 
performance can be called generative performance. If a distopia is presented 
(for example racial prejudice or sexual abuse) it is rarely presented as fatalistic 
and unchangeable. Instead, it is presented as a strident revelation: ‘look at this 
– did you know this is happening?!’ followed by an implicit: ‘do something 
about this!’ […] It is political, but it avoids being prescriptive’ (Kozel, 2000: 
260).  
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From this perspective, post-linear performance is a critique of theatrical 
representation’s capacity to signify a teleological and transcendental politics. 
Kozel makes this clear when she argues that post-linear performance is political 
‘by engineering a confrontation between the present and the absent, the visible 
and the invisible’ (ibid: 261).   
Now, it is important for this thesis to clarify the way in which I will approach 
the, often oppositional, terms ‘theatre’ and ‘performance’. For many performance 
theorists, the radically changing politics of representation, along with the 
emergence of postdramatic and postlinear narratives, constituted a basis on which 
a sharp contrast between theatre and performance was justified (see Schechner, 
2002; Carlson, 2007; Reinelt, 2002). For example, in Performance and Cultural Politics 
(1996) Elin Diamond describes this dissimilarity in a quite unconditional way:  
‘In brief, theatre was charged with obeisance to the playwright’s authority, 
with actors disciplined to the referential task of representing fictional entities 
[…] Performance, on the other hand, has been honoured with dismantling 
textual authority, illusionism, and the canonical actor in favour of the 
polymorphous body of the performer’ (Diamond, 1996: 3). 
Other theorists, like Josette Feral, have understood this contrast between the two 
terms as a ‘blurred’ relation, specifically while examining practices ‘belonging to 
the limits of theatre’ (Feral, 1997 [1982]: 290). Moreover, for performance studies, 
theatre is mostly understood as a subcategory of the much more broad and open 
field that the term performance embodies (Reinelt, 2002; Cull, 2009). My 
intention in this thesis is to use the terms theatre and performance almost 
interchangeably – not only as a way to emphasise what I believe is a needless 
rigidity in separating them; but also to insist upon a rethinking of theatre’s 
performance potentials, as well as of performance’s continuous relation to 
theatrical processes. In other words, I am more interested in what unites these two 
terms (even through their differences), rather than in what divides them. Having 
said that, it makes sense to restate my primary objective in the thesis, which is to 
examine the non-representational potentials of political theatre and performance, 
by considering their political disposition neither as a fixed label, nor as, in the 
words of Alan Read, ‘[o]utmoded forms of reference’ that ‘limit thought to 
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partitioned realms’ (Read, 1993: 1-2); but as a productively incomplete process of 
critique, an always ‘becoming-present’ theatrical operation.               
 
III. The question of the spectator: Why is it a bad word?   
In concluding the fourth section (Poetics of the Oppressed) of Theatre of the Oppressed 
(2000 [1979]), Augusto Boal writes:  
“Spectator’ is a bad word! The spectator is less than a man and it is necessary 
to humanise him, to restore to him his capacity of action in all its fullness. He 
too must be a subject, an actor on an equal plane with those generally 
accepted as actors, who must also be spectators. All these experiments of a 
people’s theatre have the same objective – the liberation of the spectator, on 
whom the theatre has imposed finished visions of the world’ (Boal, 2000 
[1979]: 154-5).   
Boal’s theatrical model, as described in Theatre of the Oppressed, with its focus on 
process, on the dialogical exchange between the on stage action and the audience, 
and with its Marxist lines of thought and critique, still echoes as one of the deepest 
explorations of the problem of audience’s passivity and inaction. In particular, 
Boal’s ‘Forum Theatre’ is a theatrical technique that allows the audience to 
intervene (with a guidance of a facilitator – a Joker) in the plays and develop 
alternative ways of resolving a specific conflict that involves oppression and 
inequality. Boal’s theatre, along with his proposal for engaging with ‘spect-actors’, 
has been a polemical critique (a theatrical manifesto) of bourgeois representational 
theatre that resonates with many initiatives of political theatre that followed. 
Indeed, the question of the spectators’ de-objectification and the enabling of their 
agential possibilities are directly connected to the problem of representation in 
Boal’s theory. He writes:  
‘And since those responsible for theatrical performances are in general people 
who belong directly or indirectly to the ruling classes, obviously their finished 
images will be reflections of themselves. The spectators in the people’s theatre 
(i.e. the people themselves) cannot go on being the passive victims of those 
images’ (ibid: 155). 
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Before proceeding to specify the way in which the thesis addresses the question 
of ‘spect-actor’, it is useful to first outline two broad theatrologies that had a 
significant impact on the development of responses to spectators’ submission to 
the power of representation – that played a crucial role in creating the conditions 
for the ‘spect-actor’.  
The first one, as developed by Erwin Piscator and Bertolt Brecht, is epic 
theatre; that is, a political form of theatre that focused on the critical and rational 
engagement of the audience with the play (see Piscator, 1980 [1929]; Brecht, 
1964). Having obvious Marxist references and showing an emphasis on the 
performance’s capacity to make the spectators think critically – and not 
emotionally – about the subject matter and the staging conditions, epic theatre 
made use of important socio-historical events in order to enhance the political 
perception of the audience. Brecht’s ‘alienation effect’ became one of the most 
important techniques of political theatre that focused on performance as a critical 
engagement beyond illusion and transcendence. Brechtian theatre pushed the 
boundaries of critique to a point in which the representational faculties of the 
audience, their capacity to let themselves be illusioned by abstract significations, 
were almost ‘forbidden’. This ‘alienating’ process was facilitated by means of 
interruptions of and contradictions in the narrative of the performances. Brecht’s 
understanding of representation is interestingly portrayed by Walter Benjamin in 
Understanding Brecht:  
‘The task of epic theatre, Brecht believes, is not so much to develop actions as 
to represent conditions. But ‘represent’ does not here signify ‘reproduce’ in 
the sense used by the theoreticians of Naturalism. Rather, the first point at 
issue is to uncover those conditions […] This uncovering (making strange, or 
alienating) is brought about by processes being interrupted’ (Benjamin, 1998 
[1966]: 18; original emphasis).       
Brecht believed that interruptions and contradictions could de-objectify the 
spectators, transforming them from passive objects of representation into critical 
agents of the performance. He notes that ‘artistic appreciation’ is ‘quite a different 
matter from being required to observe not a representation of the world but the 
world itself in a critical, contradictory, detached manner’ (Brecht, 1964: 146). 
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Theatre directors whose work has a direct Brechtian influence include Joan 
Littlewood, Augusto Boal, Dario Fo, Heiner Muller amongst many others.  
The second theatrology that challenged the representational mode of engaging 
with audiences is the one developed by Antonin Artaud: the theatre of cruelty. 
Although I further expand on Artaud’s theatrical philosophy in the first chapter of 
the thesis, it is important to note here that the impact of the theatre of cruelty was 
fundamental in rethinking audience engagement through desire, magic and 
sacredness beyond their representational imitations. Artaud talked about a theatre 
in which the spectator is present in the ‘blazing centre’ of the mise en scène, 
intoxicated with unpredictable emotions that function in tangible rather than 
transcendental ways. Unlike epic theatre, the theatre of cruelty argued for the 
necessity of magic, illusion and emotional engagement in so far as the performers 
and the audience were immersed in a non-representational theatrical plane. 
Artaud writes:  
‘We want to make out of the theatre a believable reality which gives the heart 
and the senses that kind of concrete bite which all true sensation requires […] 
And the public will believe in the theatre’s dreams on condition they take 
them for true dreams and not for a servile copy of reality; on condition that 
they allow the public to liberate within itself the magical liberties of dreams 
which it can only recognise when they are imprinted with terror and cruelty’ 
(Artaud, 1958: 85-6).   
Jerzy Grotowski, Eugenio Barba and Peter Brook are three of the most notable 
directors whose practice was inspired by Artaudian theatre; a theatre that 
Christopher Innes calls the ‘primitivist’ avant-garde (Innes, 1993).  
It is the relation between the impacts of these two theatre modes that gave rise to 
a postmodern conception of active spectatorship. It is their difference that created 
the conditions for problematising the question of audience de-objectification in the 
most radically political ways. If Brechtian theatre was ‘consistently secular’ in its 
political rationale, then the theatre of Artaud became an attempt to rediscover the 
‘mythopoeic’ and sacred processes that redefined a politics of experience in 
performance (Michelson, 1974: 57). As Peter Brook would say, the difference 
between Brecht and Artaud is a difference between a ‘rough’ and a ‘holy’ theatre 
(Brook, 1990 [1968]).  
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Now, returning to the notion of ‘spect-actor’, it is important to note that Boal’s 
theatre was largely a Brechtian, or rather, a post-Brechtian theatre of which 
Artaud would have lots of questions to ask. In other words, the ‘theatre of the 
oppressed’ is a model that was inspired by the questions that Brecht posed, but in 
the end, was unable to satisfy the answers that Artaud was looking for. One of my 
intentions in this thesis is to place the question of the spectator at the centre of a 
non-representational approach to theatre and performance. At the same time, my 
analysis is informed on one hand by a longing for emancipating the spectator from 
political prescription and dogmatism; and on the other hand, by the need to 
understand interactive and participatory theatrical techniques not as ends in 
themselves, but as starting points of problematisation and critique. In this sense, 
Artaudian thought is given particular attention (elaborating on it through Derrida 
and Deleuze). It is worth mentioning however, that I do not aim to theorise an 
Artaudian theatre in the same way that I do not intend to depart from everything 
that Brecht or Boal have proposed. Rather, I want develop a critical analysis of 
the ways in which the non-representational potentials of theatre practice connect 
with a rethinking of the problem of audience’s passivity.   
Boal argues that spectator is a bad word. This bold statement echoes a 
significant body of critique that has highlighted the need of making the audience 
agents of meaning and active subjects in performances. From Raymond Williams 
who argued that, ‘[w[atching itself has become problematic’ (Williams, 1983: 11); 
to Baz Kershaw who maintained that, [t]he totally passive audience is a figment of 
the imagination, a practical impossibility’, inactive spectatorship has been 
rendered one of the most important problems not only in theatre, but also in the 
entire realm of cultural politics (Kershaw, 1992: 16). But why is spectator a bad 
word? And, most importantly, what are the assumptions that need further analysis 
in the act of de-objectifying and emancipating spectators from a condition of 
passivity and inaction?  
Recently, in The Emancipated Spectator (2011 [2009]), Jacques Ranciere gives an 
account of the complexity inherent in the problem of spectatorship that is very 
useful here; particularly if seen as a response to these forms of theatre and 
performance that understand audience participation as a teleological solution of 
this problem. Interestingly, Ranciere also uses the adjective ‘bad’ to describe the 
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condition of traditional spectatorship, whilst formulating what he calls ‘the 
paradox of the spectator’: 
‘there is no theatre without a spectator […] But […] being a spectator is a 
bad thing for two reasons. First, viewing is the opposite of knowing: the 
spectator is held before an appearance in a state of ignorance about the 
process of production of this appearance and about the reality it conceals. 
Second, it is the opposite of acting: the spectator remains immobile in her 
seat, passive. To be a spectator is to be separated from both the capacity to 
know and the power to act’ (Ranciere, 2011 [2009]: 2).  
In problematising this contradiction, Ranciere underlines the need to subvert the 
power of representation as projected from the spectacle to the spectators, by 
focusing on the ways in which knowledge becomes possible. He argues for ‘a 
theatre without spectators, where those in attendance learn from as opposed to 
being seduced by images; where they become active participants as opposed to 
passive voyeurs’ (ibid: 4). In describing the problem, Ranciere’s critique is at first 
glance compatible both to Brecht’s anti-illusory theatre and to Boal’s opposition to 
the bourgeois spectacle-performances. However, I suggest that it is in his critical 
analysis of ‘how to proceed’ that his differentiation from Brecht and Boal becomes 
evident and his contribution to the discourse on spectatorship is most useful.  
Ranciere does not advocate a Brechtian theatre in which the spectator occupies 
a rational position of watching the on stage action from a relative distance. He is 
critical of this distance in so far as it maintains an opposition between knowledge 
and ignorance. By pointing out that, ‘[t]he spectator must be removed from the 
position of observer calmly examining the spectacle offered to her’ Ranciere, 
echoing Artaud, argues that ‘she will exchange the privilege of rational observer 
for that of the being in possession of all her vital energies’ (ibid). Thus, on one level 
Ranciere’s argument stresses the importance of breaking with a notion of 
spectatorship conceived as a passive condition of attending, viewing or witnessing 
something that exceeds his/her reach. On a second level, and this is where his 
account can be seen as critical not only of Boal’s theatre but of participatory 
theatres in general, Ranciere identifies important problems in the processes of de-
objectifying spectators. He argues that those who ‘intend to teach their spectators 
ways of ceasing to be spectators’ assume a different form of subjection that has to 
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do with the distance between knowledge and ignorance (ibid: 7-8). To make his 
point, Ranciere uses the example of the distance between a schoolmaster and a 
pupil, an ignoramus (borrowed from his 1991 work The Ignorant Schoolmaster) which 
is maintained not because of the pupil’s inability to understand but because of 
his/her continuous inaccessibility to what the schoolmaster knows. He notes that,  
‘[the schoolmaster] can only reduce the distance on condition that he 
constantly re-creates it. To replace ignorance by knowledge, he must always 
be one step ahead, install a new form of ignorance between the pupil and 
himself’ (ibid: 8).  
Thus, Ranciere goes on to argue that the capacity to know, and consequently the 
power to act, is not a matter of quantity of knowledge (of how much one knows or 
does not know), but a position. In other words, he makes clear that what is at stake 
is not giving the spectator or the pupil the opportunity to know more (since the 
director or the schoolmaster will always know even more), but destabilising the 
fixed subject-positioning that produces subjection and creates hierarchical 
conditions in theatrical performances or learning processes. He suggests that,  
‘[e]mancipation begins when we challenge the opposition between viewing 
and acting; when we understand that the self-evident facts that structure the 
relations between saying, seeing and doing themselves belong to the structure 
of domination and subjection. It begins when we understand that viewing is 
also an action that confirms or transforms this distribution of positions’ (ibid: 
13). 
Ranciere’s critique is a very helpful introductory point for the way in which the 
thesis discusses the question of spectator alongside the non-representational 
possibilities of theatre and performance. It paves the way not only for a 
destabilisation of the problematic opposition between activity and passivity in 
performance contexts, but also opens the discussion to the non-hierarchical 
possibilities of critical practice by emphasising the need to thoroughly 
problematise spectatorship. Although the thesis focuses more on the critical 
possibilities of what we can understand as ‘experience’, rather than knowledge, 
Ranciere’s emphasis on the limits of participatory models and his critique of 
hierarchical positioning are important elements that will prove central to my 
analysis of non-representational approaches to theatre and performance.  
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IV. The chapters 
As a way to conclude this introduction and begin the main body of the work, it 
is useful to briefly outline the chapters that structure the thesis and frame its 
arguments. The five chapters to follow are interconnected and inform one 
another, maintaining at the same time what I believe is a necessary possibility to 
be read independently as autonomous parts.  
The second chapter offers a review of some of the ways in which the 
intersection between theatre and theory has been thought within academic 
scholarship. Focusing on the notions of dramaturgy, theatricality and 
performativity, the chapter critiques the conventional relation between the 
‘theatrical’ and the ‘theoretical’, suggesting that theory and critique need to be 
transformed from abstract and transcendental representations, or methodological 
tools, to radical actualisations in the ‘here and now’ of the performance-events. 
Accordingly, the chapter goes on to examine two discussions between theatre and 
theory: Artaud and Derrida, Bene and Deleuze. I consider these two ‘meetings’ as 
crucial theoretical instances that enrich the arguments of the thesis and prepare 
the reader for the case studies to follow. 
The third chapter initiates the thesis’s critical analysis of specific theatre 
directors in Britain that experimented extensively with challenging representation 
in performing critique. The case of Joan Littlewood is of particular importance as 
her post-Brechtian approach to popular theatre is, in a way, characteristic of 
political theatre’s development in 20th century Britain. For this reason, this case 
study is the most historical of the three, following Littlewood’s radical theatre 
practice from her agit-prop projects (that were inspired by her communist 
background) to her postmodern ideas on space and interactivity. The chapter 
presents a critical analysis of Littlewood’s political theatre as expressed through 
ensembles (with Ewan McColl), focusing on her simultaneous influence and 
disparity from Brecht, raising the question of the ‘popular’ in political theatre and 
examining Littlewood’s contribution to the emancipation of theatrical expression 
and reception from teleology and mimetic representation.     
Partly in keeping with the questions explored in the preceding chapter, the 
fourth chapter discusses the possibility of a ‘pre-cultural’ theatre. Focusing on the 
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Artaudian expression of Peter Brook’s theatre, this case study examines Brook’s 
attempt to theorise and practice a theatre that bypasses linguistic normativity and 
representation, by creating affective conditions of direct contact with audiences. 
The chapter is divided into two subsections: The first one considers the theoretical 
significance of The Empty Space, paying particular attention to what Brook calls a 
‘holy theatre’, in order to examine the non-representational way in which he 
understands metaphysics in performance. In a more particular manner, the 
second subsection of the chapter provides a critical analysis of Orghast, a 
performance that was devised in an invented (neologismic) language, considering 
the processes of onomatopoeia and glossopoeia as critical possibilities of a non-
representational approach to theatre and performance. 
The fifth chapter examines the promenade theatre of the London-based 
collective Punchdrunk. In this final case study of the thesis I discuss the impact of 
the postdramatic paradigm in political theatre, with a view to examining 
contemporary challenges to mimetic representation and ideological teleology. 
Considering Punchdrunk’s immersive approach to theatre-making, I examine the 
framework and the work process of this theatre collective especially in relation to: 
their ideas concerning space and installation, their use of masks for the spectators 
(on which I elaborate to suggest a critical view of voyeurism), the use of dancers as 
opposed to actors, and the political significance of their fragmented and 
incomplete narratives. For the implementation of this case study and the 
enrichment of its analysis I have conducted interviews with members of the 
directorial and the managerial team. These interviews helped me capture the 
theatrical ‘philosophy’ of Punchdrunk and discuss some important points directly 
with the group. Furthermore, my work with the group over a period of three 
months, during which I had the opportunity to observe their rehearsals for the 
staging of The Duchess of Malfi (2010), gave me unique insights into their 
performance practice.  
Building on the analysis of the preceding case studies the last chapter of the 
thesis presents the arguments and explores in more depth the concepts that, I 
suggest, are crucial for the discussion and development of a non-representational 
approach to theatre and performance. My intention in this sixth chapter is to 
further elaborate on those ‘lines of thought’ that conditioned and radicalised 
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critique in performance, discussing the  ‘non-representational’ as a political 
‘becoming’, rather than a static condition, and clarifying the theoretically obscure 
notion of ‘incompleteness’ in theatre and performance contexts. Finally, the 
chapter concludes by critiquing the traditional processes of de-objectifying 
spectators, emphasising the need for destratification of the power relations in 
political theatre.  
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Introduction  
The role that theatre and performance has taken in theoretical writing has 
certainly been a very important one. In particular, from the 1960s onwards, 
theatrical terminology has become embedded in discourses whose mode of 
analysis entails either a ‘turn to performance’, or a dramatisation of theoretical 
narratives and methods. As Maria Minich Brewer argues in her 1985 essay 
Performing Theory, ‘[m]etaphors of the theatre such as mise-en-scène, staging, 
performance, production, play, and act pervade the major discourses of 
contemporary theory’ (Brewer, 1985: 13; original emphasis). Also, as Kelleher and 
Ridout note, ‘the practices of theatre and philosophy have for so long worked 
hand in hand (or wrestled arm against arm) over similar questions (representation, 
human nature, truth, illusion)’ (Kelleher & Ridout, 2006: 4). The reference to the 
theatre as a theoretical tool was promoted especially by French critical thought, 
giving rise to discourses that problematised the politics of representation in 
different ways. Timothy Murray notes that, ‘[r]egardless of the particular school 
or method being advanced, whether feminism, psychoanalysis, deconstruction, or 
ideology critique, French theoreticians invariably reflect on the structural and 
epistemological status of mimesis (imitation)’ (Murray, 1997: 1). Michel Foucault, 
Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Ranciere are only a few amongst 
many French theorists who drew extensively from ‘theatrologies’ as a way to 
suggest renewed critiques of representation and to account for a new – broadly 
conceived – ‘politics of performance’ (see Foucault, 1997 [1977]; Derrida, 2001 
[1978]; Deleuze, 1997 [1979]; Ranciere, 2011 [2009]). From Greek tragedy to 
Shakespeare, and from the plays of Moliere to Artaudian fragments, theatrical 
languages have been valorised by postmodern critical theory both for their 
potential to provide methodologies with performative directions, as well as for 
their capacity to describe cultural conditions of enactment and ‘social 
performances’.  
While considering the use of theatrologies as methodological mediums, this 
chapter takes on a critical analysis of the relation between theory and theatre from 
a different perspective. It examines the ‘meeting’ of theatre and theory (that is, the 
actual performance of theory) by looking at the possibility of theatre to challenge 
the mimetic and representational mode in which theory functions. Thus, the 
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chapter addresses the following question: What can theory become within the 
micropolitical ‘sphere’ of a theatrical performance? My intention is to account for 
the possibility of theory to become theatre – that is, to be performed without being 
imitated or conveyed through theatre as a transcendental representation or an 
absent abstraction; but rather, by being actualised as a mobile and essentially 
incomplete becoming in the ‘here and now’ of a theatrical performance.  
The intricacy of this task lies primarily in the attempt to understand theatre as 
a space in which the process of representation can be subtracted or decomposed. 
Considering the strong relation between performance (as conceptualised mainly in 
Occidental theatre) and signification of meanings (as expressed through dramatic 
texts, theory, ideology and ethics) whose substance is non-existent within the 
performing act, this chapter examines the conditions for the destabilisation of this 
connection as a means to discuss ‘lines of escape’ from mimetic representation. 
Thus, the objective of the chapter is not to define or theorise a mode of 
performance that stands in direct opposition to representation as such; but rather, 
in highlighting what is politically at stake in understanding and experiencing 
theatre predominantly as a representational medium, the chapter suggests a 
rethinking of the relation between theatre and theory that challenges mimesis and 
abstract significations of meaning. In order to do so, I will examine the extent to 
which the performance of theory can be experienced as a critical process that 
emerges ephemerally, without essentially corresponding to any external 
transcendental significations beyond the theatrical event. In this sense, the 
question of how theatre can create the conditions of possibility for what Bryan 
Reynolds calls ‘productively agential’ subjectivities, whilst critiquing 
representational systems of performance, is one of the tasks of this chapter as well 
as of the thesis as a whole (Reynolds, 2009: 2). In discussing this challenge, I want 
to focus on the capacity of performance to be a non-teleological, incomplete 
process that draws its political force from its own variations, rather than from 
stratification and ideological coherence.  
In the first section of this chapter, I will encounter some of the reasons that 
explain the lack of scholarly attention to the problematic coexistence of theory and 
theatre. By addressing diverse theoretical frameworks within the latter half of the 
20th century, as well as by taking into account the ‘postdramatic shift’ in theatre, I 
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will suggest that the question of performing theory needs to be re-posed and 
thoroughly problematised. I will argue that theatre is a space in which theory 
becomes critique; and it is by virtue of this ‘becoming’ that theory relates to 
theatre in a politically relevant, as well as radical, way. It is in this way that theory 
emancipates itself from producing self-identical and fixed images of meaning, 
acquiring the potential of becoming a non-representational process and practice. 
At the same time, I will argue that a significant part of theatre and performance 
studies have not been able to break with a bold dichotomy that separates 
academic theory and performing; resulting in theory’s refusal to acknowledge 
theatrical performances as critical spaces within which meaning can be produced, 
extended and performed.  
Furthermore, I intend to theoretically contextualise what I consider to be two 
useful starting points for the thesis’s arguments. First, by examining Derrida’s 
discussion of Antonin Artaud in The Theatre of Cruelty and The Closure of Representation 
(2001[1978]), I will inquire into the Derridean idea of presence as a non-mimetic 
re-presentation; and, second, by analysing Deleuze’s discussion of Carmelo Bene 
in One less Manifesto (1997 [1977]), I will look at the possibility of performing 
critique as destratified process of variation – as a becoming-minor theatrical 
process. 
It is crucial to note at this point that, in this chapter, theatre theory (the theory 
produced within the discipline of theatre studies) is ‘treated’ in the same way as 
any scholarship that is ‘imported’ in the theatrical realm from other disciplines 
(e.g. philosophy, sociology, cultural studies and so on). Despite the claims that 
theatre theory should distinguish itself from other disciplines as a means to 
empower its influence upon them, I argue that this sort of territorial classification 
and its resulted demarcation prevents, rather than animates, a critical discussion 
of the role of theory in theatrical practice. In contrast to this aspired sense of 
‘belonging’, I suggest that theory should always be understood as mobile and 
incomplete – as a process that simply does not ‘belong’, but is rather constantly 
negotiated, even interterritorially and interdisciplinarily, according to present 
conditions.   
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I. Theory and theatre: dramaturgy, performativity, 
theatricality and the postdramatic shift  
 
(a) Dramaturgy and the ‘linguistic turn’  
The lack of scholarly attention to the possibility of theory’s performance in 
theatre practice is by no means unsurprising. In a sense, it partially explains the 
problematic relationship between theatre and theory both in textual 
representations, as well as in performance practices. A significant body of social 
theory in the 20th century has been approaching theatre and performance mainly 
complementarily, as an ‘add-on’ tool to methodological design or philosophical 
narratives and, therefore, the use of dramaturgy in theory as such has somehow 
diminished the study of theory’s potential to be performed. In other words, the 
study of theory’s capacity to become theatre, to be staged as an event of 
performance has been marginalised in favour of the dramaturgical perspectives 
that have been instilled in social and cultural analysis.  
Instances of this type of theatrical valorisation as a tool of theoretical 
scholarship are many and significant. For example, Erving Goffman’s 1959 
breakthrough work The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life marked a very 
important turn to our understanding of social relations as performances (as role-
playing interfaces), and thus redefined the study of symbolic interactionism 
through the notions and processes of theatre (Goffman, 1959). Goffman’s work 
was influenced by the American philosopher Kenneth Burke who was one of the 
first theorists to use dramaturgy to describe human motives and experiences by 
creating the model of dramatism. Dramatism suggested a pentad of terms that 
explained the conditions of human interaction; these were, ‘Act, Scene, Agent, 
Agency, Purpose’ (Burke, 1969 [1945]: xv). Also, in the late 1960s, and in a similar 
vein to that of Goffman’s, the cultural anthropologist Victor Turner attempted to 
find a creative intersection between performance and anthropological research. 
Through acknowledging ‘the [continuous] power of symbols in human 
communication’, Turner stressed the importance of enacting rituals in social life, 
by proposing ‘a unit of description and analysis’ for social theory, which he termed 
‘social drama’ (Turner, 1982: 9).  
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Whether similar or not in scope, such theoretical explorations share a common 
characteristic, or objective, which is their focus on drawing elements from theatre 
by elaborating dramaturgical perspectives in their analysis. Although the 
significance of such theoretical accounts has proved central to the development of 
social theory and philosophy, I argue that, at the same time, the use of 
dramaturgy as a methodological tool has limited the possibility of studying the 
relation between theatre and theory in its own right. As Brewer argues, ‘[t]heory’s 
theatres have many stages, but what they have in common is that they are 
imaginary theatres, theatrical fictions that are staged as a by-product of or 
supplement to the stated methodological goals of theory’ (Brewer, 1985: 14).  
Furthermore, the so-called ‘linguistic turn’ in theory of the late 1960s, that was 
initiated by theorists such as Saussure, Lacan and Levi-Strauss, occurred during a 
period when theatre and performance research pushed the boundaries of 
language towards non-linguistic conceptions of performing (see Fortier, 1997; 
Lehmann, 1999; Buse, 2001). The study of language and its relation to the politics 
of truth, to the new ways of constructing and performing subjectivity, human 
agency and the possibilities of critique, marked a very important theoretical 
territory – i.e. structuralism – that partly contrasted with the explorations of 
theatre and performance practices at the time. Grotowski’s non-linear theatre, 
Kaprow’s happenings and ‘assemblages’, Brook’s experimentation with non-
verbal expression are only a few of such practices. Thus, one of the emerging 
questions was to what extent could the new theoretical frameworks account for the 
non-verbal aspects of expression and interaction that avant-garde performances 
endorsed.  
In his important 1997 work Theory/Theatre: An Introduction, Mark Fortier argued 
that all theory is at great risk of becoming exclusively literary theory. Suggesting that 
the study of the real theatrical experience should not be excluded from theoretical 
accounts of subjectivity and agency, Fortier accused this linguistic orientation of 
narrowing the lens of theory, and by extension, of limiting its possibilities. He 
writes: ‘To treat everything as language or as dominated by language seems a 
distortion of the nature of theatre as rooted in the physical and the sensual, as 
much as it is in words and ideas’ (Fortier, 1997: 3-4). Also, in Drama+Theory: 
Critical Approaches to Modern British Drama (2001), Peter Buse underlined the same 
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problem arguing for an autonomisation of drama and theatre, and their 
emancipation from being ‘subsumed again as mere genres of literature’ (Buse, 
2001: 4). Buse argued that, giving a ‘special status to language could only mean a 
narrow focus on the dramatic text at the expense of the performed event’ (ibid).  
 
(b) Performativity  
Indeed, theory eventually turned to the study of performance in an attempt to 
widen the scope of its sociocultural discourses. The so-called ‘performative turn’ 
resonated in a wide part of academic theory during the last two decades of the 20th 
century and was taken up by philosophers and cultural scholars such as Jacques 
Derrida, Judith Butler and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick. The origin of this shift in 
theory, however, derives in part from the 1960s, and more particularly from the 
work of the British philosopher J. L. Austin. In How to do Things with Words (1975 
[1962]), Austin attempted to subvert the traditional philosophical notion of self-
identical statements, by introducing the concept of ‘performative utterances’ as a 
new way to understand statements that are performed by being uttered (Austin, 
1975 [1962]: 2). Derrida elaborated Austin’s analysis in his 1977 essay Signature 
Event Context (1988), considering it as a starting point to discuss the enabling of 
communication through citational acts of language. The widely debated concept 
of performativity has thereafter played an important role in discourses of 
subjectification, power, language and gender.  
Judith Butler was particularly instrumental in postmodern conceptualisations of 
performativity. She described performativity as the ‘reiterative power of discourse 
to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains’ (Butler, 1993: 2). 
According to Butler, the process of subject formation should be understood as 
occurring exclusively within regulatory norms and ritualistic repetitions of 
sociality. She argued that each subject ‘performs’ its formation by ‘doing’ its 
identity, not by ‘being’ something prior to this ‘doing’. Therefore, as Geoff 
Boucher remarks, Butler’s ‘theory of performativity seeks to explain how the 
subversion of power emerges within a dialectical relation between constraint and 
agency’ (Boucher, 2006: 112-3).  
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Although Butler rarely focused her analyses on theatrical performances,1 it can 
be argued that the subversive potentials that she identified in the notion of 
performativity can be also thought in theatrical terms. For example, I would argue 
that theatrical normativity becomes apparent through certain performances that 
occur between constraints and privileges that take the form of repetitive rituals: 
e.g. a spectator is constituted on one hand by performing-clapping, performing-
laughing or performing-silence, and on the other by not-performing noise, 
interruptions or interventions. Therefore, a spectator is constituted as a subject in 
theatre by performing certain rituals and by not performing others (because even 
the constraints of a performance can take the form of rituals when they occur – 
rituals of non-performance). Just like the Butlerian ‘subject’, the spectator of 
Western theatre exists in the borderline between constraint and agency – in the 
interrelation of the two – and this is why s/he is in a position to potentially 
challenge the theatrical power relations and the authority of performance. At the 
same time, whereas Butler’s concept of performativity has opened up the ways in 
which we came to understand the complexity of subject-formation, recent 
critiques insist that her account focuses exclusively on the individualistic process 
that occurs within a subject, giving less weight to contextual issues (spatial or 
temporal), as well as to the contingent possibilities of a performative event (see 
Lloyd, 1999).  
Furthermore, even though the notion of performativity gave rise to revised 
questions of embodiment and subjectivity, I argue that theory’s ‘refusal’ to 
thoroughly explore the concept’s possibilities within the context of theatre 
sustained – rather than bridged – the preexisting distance between academia and 
performance art. Theatre was detached from theory, being considered as an 
external aesthetic site rather than as an opportunity to actualise critique and 
political intervention. As Brewer comments, ‘theory often invokes theatre as if it 
had no specific features, attributes or effects’ (Brewer, 1985: 14).   
 
 
                                                
1 An interesting exception is Butler’s book Antigone’s Claim: Kinship between life and death (2000), in 
which she reconceptualises Antigone’s revolutionary potential (drawing on Sophocles’s Antigone), 
arguing for a reconsideration of incest’s relation to kinship.  
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(c) Theatricality  
At the same time, many French theorists had integrated in their research the 
concept of theatricality, which was considered to signify or embody the liminal space 
between theory and performance. While the concept has been used to describe 
stagings and re-stagings of thought in social life, less attention has been paid to the 
role of theatricality as a process or medium of performing thought in theatre itself. 
In particular, theatricality was used extensively in anti-textual and anti-
representational critiques of modernism. For example, in his essay Baudelaire’s 
Theatre, Roland Barthes describes theatricality as a ‘theatre-minus-text’ condition, 
an ‘ecumenical perception of sensuous artifice – gesture, tone, distance, substance, 
light’ (Barthes, 1972: 26). Similarly, in Theatrum Analyticum (1977), Phillipe Lacoue-
Labarthe uses the concept of theatricality to discuss a deconstructed emancipation 
of the text from its absolutist projections in sociality. Further, in his essay The 
Psycho-analytic Reading of Tragedy (1979), André Green discusses theatricality’s 
capacity to function as the medium that constitutes the author, the performers and 
the spectators as the objectified ‘Others’ of performance.  
More recent accounts of theatricality are examined in Brewer’s 1985 essay 
Performing Theory, in Murray’s 1997 edited collection Mimesis, Masochism and Mime: 
The Politics of Theatricality in Contemporary French Thought, in Theatricality (2003), a 
collection of case studies edited by Davis and Postlewait and in Samuel Weber’s 
(2004) Theatricality as Medium. Brewer finds in theatricality the desire ‘to erase and 
to reinscribe the relation of interpretation to contextual and situational frames’, by 
positioning its projections in the ‘critical space between theory and practice’ 
(Brewer, 1985:14; original emphasis); while Davis and Postlewait ‘totalise’ the 
paradoxical function of theatricality, arguing that, ‘[i]t is a sign empty of meaning’ 
while being, at the same time, ‘the meaning of all signs’ (Davis & Postlewait, 2003: 
1). Moreover, Murray is interested in the ‘masochistic’ and self-reflexive potential 
of theatricality. He argues that, ‘[w]hat lies at the heart of theatricality […] is the 
ambivalent pathos evoked by the divisions of mimesis and their profound turn of 
subject and socius against themselves’ (Murray, 1997: 14). Thus, it is the ‘plastic’ 
way in which the concept of theatricality can be used that provides fertile 
conditions for theory to be thought as theatre. As Herbert Blau argues in his essay 
Ideology and Performance, theory can be understood as theatre when it is restaged or 
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reinterpreted (Blau, 1983). He notes that this process of re-signifying, ‘transforms 
the real only as the theatre can, by producing meanings in the act of performance’ 
(ibid: 457).  
However, I argue that by focusing more on privileging the idea of ‘as if it were 
theatre’, what most theories of theatricality finally achieved was to draw from 
theatre the necessary elements that would enable a critique of representation and 
validate the capacity of reinterpretation to create meanings within social 
interaction. The possibility of considering theatre as a site of performing theory – 
and not as a representational podium – was fundamentally overlooked. In other 
words, I argue that while the concept of theatricality was instrumental in the 
‘displacement of pictorial metaphors by scenic ones’, the idea, as well as the 
importance of metaphors (of symbolisation) remained, to a great extent, intact 
(Brewer, 1985: 15).  
 
(d) Performance studies 
Of course, to accuse only social theory or philosophy of not paying enough 
considered attention to theatre, without taking into account theatre scholarship, 
would be to address the issue in a biased manner. There is, indeed, another 
parameter that complicates the problematic relationship between theatre and 
theory even more: that is, the weakness of Western theatre and performance 
studies to conduct a critique of the dichotomy between theoretical frameworks 
and performing itself. I argue that the failing to account for a renewed relationship 
between theatre and theory through blurring the boundaries that demarcate 
them, was also a result of postmodern models of performance; or, to be more 
precise, it was a side effect of the polemical response to modernist theatre as 
initiated by performance studies as a discipline, and by the ‘postdramatic’ 
theatrical streams that flourished within postmodernism.  
Performance studies emerged in the late 1960s as a distinctive field within 
cultural analysis, introduced through the collaborative work of director Richard 
Schechner and anthropologist Victor Turner. Schechner in particular, was 
instrumental in the gradual development of performance studies as an academic 
discipline, as he was one of the founders of the first department of performance 
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studies in the Tisch School of the Arts, New York University. Schechner 
approaches performance as, 
‘a ‘broad spectrum’ or ‘continuum’ of human actions ranging from ritual, 
play, sports, popular entertainments, the performing arts (theatre, dance, 
music), and everyday life performances to the enactment of social, 
professional, gender, race, and class roles, and onto healing (from shamanism 
to surgery), the media, and the internet’ (Schechner, 2006: 2).   
Schechner positions performance as an umbrella-term that includes but is not 
limited to theatre. He goes on to argue that performance studies is a broad, widely 
inclusive plateau of analysis, to which theatre ‘belongs’ as an expression of 
performance. At the same time, other theorists tend to differentiate performance 
art from theatrical plays. For instance, Marvin Carlson notes that practitioners of 
performance art ‘do not base their work upon characters previously created by 
other artists, but upon their own bodies, their own autobiographies, their own 
specific experiences in a culture or in the world, made performative by their 
consciousness of them and the process of displaying them for audiences’ (Carlson, 
1996: 6). Carlson argues, therefore, that whereas in theatre one can observe a 
process of embodying the ‘other’, performance art is a more self-reflexive 
operation through which the body enables dialogue with the ‘other’ (ibid). This is 
one of the reasons that performance studies have insisted on privileging questions 
of interculturalism, in pursuit of a productive interzone between theatre and 
anthropology. The political ethnographies of Dwight Conquergood and the 
theoretical work of Patrice Pavis are some of the most important attempts to 
merge intercultural discourses with performance.  
Furthermore, Diana Taylor has studied performance from a Latin American 
perspective, raising questions of agency and mnemonic enactment. For Taylor, 
what performance studies brought to the academic world is a platform in which 
memory can be studied in the form of embodiment. As she notes, ‘[a]nalysing 
enactment became crucial in establishing claims to cultural agency’ (Taylor, 2003: 
7). Also, Bryan Reynolds has attempted to expand the influence of performance 
studies in other academic disciplines, by introducing a hybrid form of analysis 
(merging performance theory, history, and critical methodology), known as 
‘transversal poetics’ (Reynolds, 2009).  
 41 
The evident anti-finality of performance studies, and its proponents’ claim that 
‘everything can be studied ‘as’ performance’, is what makes this field both 
challenging and contested (Schechner, 2006: 38-9: original emphasis). The most 
frequent critical objections towards performance studies focus on the incapacity of 
the field to have integrity as a discipline, and claim that although its project seems 
to be post- or inter-disciplinary, it is in fact anti-disciplinary (Napoleon, 1995). I 
suggest that what is at stake here, in relation to performance studies, is the birth of 
an interesting paradox. On one hand, the field of performance studies seems to 
have avoided a direct encounter with theatre practice in favour of combined forms 
of cultural analysis, by compressing theatre in order to fit into the categorisation of 
performance. On the other hand, the ‘performance paradigm’ that was promoted 
by performance studies and theories of theatricality and performativity has 
signalled a shift in the mode of analysis, by regarding what is being analysed as a 
process, a practice or an event, rather than an object – and this turned out to be a 
crucial input in devising and implementing theatrical performances (Schechner, 
2006: 2). It signalled the age of postdramatic theatre; a non-linear, less-teleological 
practice of theatrical art within the so-called postmodern condition.  
 
(e) Postdramatic theatre  
In 1999, the German theatre scholar Hans-Thies Lehman attempted to 
capture this new ‘language’ of the emerging theatre forms by introducing the 
notion of the ‘postdramatic paradigm’ in his seminal Postdramatic Theatre. As Karen 
Jurs-Munby notes in the introduction, ‘[despite the delayed English translation 
(2006)], Postdramatic Theatre has already become a key reference point in 
international discussions of contemporary theatre’ (Lehmann & Jurs-Munby, 
2006: 1). Indeed, Lehmann’s socio-historical analysis of an ‘incomplete’ theatre 
that strived to escape normative classifications and conformist interpretations has 
played a significant role in understanding, let alone justifying, the possibilities of 
theatrical expressivity in postmodernism. In a clarifying tone, he writes:  
‘The adjective ‘postdramatic’ denotes a theatre that feels bound to operate 
beyond drama, at a time ‘after’ the authority of the dramatic paradigm in 
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theatre. What it does not mean is an abstract negation and mere looking 
away from the tradition of drama’ (Lehmann, 2006 [1999]: 27).   
Thus, the new theatre that spawned mainly from the 70s avant-garde and the 
performative orientation of theory was, for Lehmann, an important ‘turning away’ 
from the dominance of the dramatic text – not a wholesale rejection of its qualities 
and possibilities. Lehmann continues:  
‘Similarly, one can speak of a ‘post-Brechtian theatre’, which is precisely not a 
theatre that has nothing to do with Brecht but a theatre which knows that it is 
affected by the demands and questions for theatre that are sedimented in 
Brecht’s work but can no longer accept Brecht’s answers’ (ibid).   
At the same time, in drawing and assessing the topography of the 
‘postdramatic’, Lehmann makes an argument that has become commonplace in 
postmodern accounts of theatre and performance: While acknowledging that 
“theory’ […] invade[s] art to a previously unknown degree’, he argues that its task 
‘is to articulate, conceptualise and find terms for that which has come into being, 
not to postulate it as a norm’ (ibid: 25). In making this claim, Lehmann 
predetermines the way he positions theory in relation to postdramatic theatre – he 
presupposes theory as a reflection of practice, without taking into account theory’s 
possibility to be performed or actualised in practice. In other words, I argue that, 
in setting his aim of analysis, Lehmann is actually narrowing the potentials of 
theory within the postdramatic field. In a similar vein, the New York theatre critic 
Elinor Fuchs (1996) introduces her critical project in The Death of Character: 
Perspectives on Theatre after Modernism. In relating theatre and performance to 
postmodern streams of thought, she points out that she is ‘in search of language in 
which to describe new forms that have appeared both in actual theatres and in the 
theatricalised surround of our contemporary public life and discourse’ (Fuchs, 
1996: 1).  
 
(f) Theory as critique?  
Both Fuchs and Lehmann identify the potential of theory in its capacity to 
generate terms – in short, to produce language. However, it is worth noting that 
language as a medium has the power to normalise practice while conceptualising 
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it. Language wields the power to become the authority that categorises what does 
not essentially belong to any given category. It also has the power to create 
categories for that which is yet unclassified. At the same time, a significant part of 
the new theatrical streams that flourished within postmodernism endorse a 
critique of categorisation itself, and, therefore, to group them in boldly defined 
‘territories’ is to normalise their political potentials in ways that cancel the prefix 
‘post’ from their intellectual projects.  
Thus, I suggest that understanding theory as an ‘immobile’ authority that is 
used exclusively to explain and clarify practice in theatrical performances should 
be rendered problematic. If the task of theory is conceived as driven merely by the 
need for understanding and, by extension, by the need for representing practices 
through language, then it becomes necessary to ask: Are there no other needs and 
desires that might constitute the use of theory as an important process of 
experiencing theatrical practice? To pose the question differently, what is the 
relation between theory and critique within the analytical aims of postdramatic 
thought and scholarship? Could we think of the role of theory as an active, 
productive and mobile plateau of expression and intervention in this context? 
Could we think of theory as critique within performance events?   
According to the leading Marivaux scholar Patrice Pavis, ‘theory must be 
distinguished from critical discourse’ (Pavis, 1992: 77). Coming from a more 
‘performance-studies’ perspective than Lehmann and Fuchs, Pavis argues that,  
‘[critical discourse] demands an immediate, committed, evaluative reaction 
that cannot often be verified by the performance; it allows for the right to 
error, correction and polemic; it involves a judgement that is not only 
aesthetic, but also ideological and moral’ (ibid).  
Inherent in this conceptualisation of critique is the elevation of theory to a state of 
self-identical pureness and ideological transparency. In other words, Pavis draws a 
bold distinguishing line between what he implies to be an established ‘pureness’ of 
theory and the, often ‘invalid’, polemical dissidence of critical discourse. In 
presupposing that theory should utilise a neutral language, emancipated from 
ideology and subjectivist morality, Pavis is not taking into account that language 
can be always already ideologically informed and morally loaded. As Catherine 
Belsey reminds us in Critical Practice (2002), ‘[w]hat we do when we read, however 
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natural it seems, presupposes a whole theoretical vocabulary, even if unspoken, 
which define certain relationships between meaning and the world […] The 
transparency of language is an illusion’ (Belsey, 2002: 4). Pavis seems to imply that 
theory, in contrast to critical discourse, should not be considered as a process of 
trial and error; in other words, he excludes the possibility of theory being 
considered as an active experimentation of conceptual positions, that not only 
explains, but is also in direct contact and continuous negotiation with present 
social reality. I argue that, in effect, such an approach puts unnecessary limitations 
both to the possibility of performing theory, and also to a rethinking of theory as 
an open and productively incomplete critical process.          
Thus, in considering the ways in which theatre and performance scholars have 
approached the role of theory – and its relation to critique – it is justified to argue 
that it follows three essential directions: (1) Theory is detached from theatrical 
practice, functioning either as its reflection (production of knowledge after 
practice), or as its animation (practice that corresponds to theory); (2) The relation 
between theatre and theory is based on the ‘traditional’ capacity of the latter to 
make the former available for understanding, and by extension, to produce 
knowledge about theatre; (3) Critique occupies an interzone between theory and 
theatre, operating mostly as a polemical tool whose validity depends on the extent 
to which it is sustained through theory. In other words, theory wields the power to 
subjugate critique, even if the object of critique is theory itself.  
I suggest that it is crucial to discuss the possibility of destabilising this normative 
relation between theory, critique and theatre. Taking into account intellectual 
mappings that aim to emancipate critique’s accountability to theory, I want to 
suggest that theatrical plays are sites of political engagement that enable a 
performance of critique as a challenge of mimetic representation; as a mobile and 
productively incomplete process. In other words, I argue that what is missing from 
the role of theory is its capacity to ‘expand’ its function towards critique. I suggest 
that this ‘expansion’ can take place in the context of theatre and performance. In 
a word, I argue that theory becomes critique when it is performed as a becoming; 
that is, when it is does not signify self-identical truths, transcendental meanings or 
theoretical abstractions, but rather when it becomes open to present variations, 
contingencies and differences.        
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At this point, it is worth noting that in examining a function of theory that 
challenges its own representation on stage, I intend to include dramatic texts in 
the wider theoretical realm of theatre and performance. I suggest that the extent 
to which dramatic texts operate as immobile self-identical scripts within a 
performance, they can be studied as theoretical inputs of theatre. In as much as 
they correspond to the rules of authorship, to the elements of power, and to the 
capacity of performing subjects to mimetically represent their content, dramatic 
texts are ideologically predetermined events. Thus, the critical analysis offered 
throughout the thesis is largely a critique of the way in which textual 
representations have dominated the theatrical stage. I suggest that, we can 
consider theory as emancipated from its fixed academic categories, examining the 
use of dramatic scripts not only as fiction or as poetry, but also as carriers of 
theoretical positions – as ideological texts. 
 
(g) The problems and the questions  
To sum up the analysis, I have thus far considered the multiple ways in which 
diverse streams of academic theory have significantly overlooked the political 
potentials of staging critique in performance. In short, I argued that, despite their 
academic significance, the ‘dramaturgical perspectives’ that were instilled in social 
theory utilised theatrologies in a way that diminished a potential ‘staging’ of 
theory in live performance. Further, by taking into account the linguistic 
orientation of theory in the 1970s, I went on to endorse the objection of theatre 
and performance studies in regards to the possibilities of non-verbal aspects of 
expression and production of meaning. At the same time, I argued that although 
the concepts of performativity and theatricality – as embedded in theoretical 
discourses – provided new lines of thought to reconceptualising questions of 
subjectivity and agency in relation to performance, they did not address theatrical 
processes directly; and, as a result, these concepts did not create the conditions for 
a substantial critique of mimetic representation in performance. Finally, by 
examining the inclusive mappings – as well as the limits – that the field of 
performance studies has offered to postmodern theory and theatrical practices, I 
suggested that postdramatic scholarship needs to rethink the convergence of 
theory and critique as a possibility of actualising politics in a theatrical space.     
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In keeping with these debates, the following sections of the chapter elaborate 
on the non-representational possibilities of performing critique through examining 
two theoretical ‘discussions’ between Derrida-Artaud and Deleuze-Bene. I 
consider these discussions as very useful starting points for the thesis, as by 
challenging the politics of representation in theatre, they suggest a more directly 
informed relationship between theory and performance. Before proceeding to do 
so however, I want to specify the problems and the questions that lie behind the 
analysis to follow; that is, I want to map out the ‘space’ of inquiry in which 
Derrida’s and Deleuze’s accounts intervene.    
 One of the most important implications of mimetic representation in theatre 
and performance is the problem of hierarchy in regards to power relations. I argue 
that the function of textual representations as transcendental significations 
produces a stratified theatrical process by means of centralising the multiplicity of 
its elements. In other words, the power of Text – whether dramatic or theoretical 
– becomes the central substance of the performance endorsing a hierarchical 
systematisation of performing-signifiers that correspond to a self-identical content 
by means of codification of language and gestures. At the same time, the extent to 
which these performing-signifiers (actors, directors, designers, light etc.) represent 
the text as such depends on their capacity to act as predetermined subjects. Their 
agential possibilities are provided by their ability to associate their performance to 
the text, and, therefore, their capacity to perform depends on the extent to which 
they are subjected to an absent meaning. From this perspective, these theatrical 
subjects perform a critique of absence; that is, they imitate a transcendental 
critique by maintaining a distance between them as signifiers and what they 
signify, as well as between them and the spectators. The question is: How can 
these performing subjects perform a critique that becomes possible within the 
presence of the event? In what ways can they perform a critique that becomes 
non-representational by being actualised in and through the event – and to what 
extent this ‘critical operation’ (as Deleuze puts it) potentially challenges our 
experience of performance as a condition of completeness?  
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II. Artaud through Derrida: Re-presentation and 
metaphysics in theatre  
       
In a significant part of his theoretical work, Jacques Derrida has employed the 
politics and metaphysics of theatre as a narrative of analysis. His 1978 essay The 
Theatre of Cruelty and The Closure of Representation is a theoretical contribution that 
places the questions of representation and spectatorship at the heart of a 
rethinking of metaphysics in political theatre. Derrida’s discussion of Artaud’s 
theatre of cruelty is a very useful theoretical instance here for two reasons: first, it 
considers the problem of representation as rooted in the entire underlying 
structuration of Western theatre; and secondly, his analysis departs from a 
hegemonic or fictional manner of approaching theatre and performance – aiming 
at a direct relation between the ‘theatrical’ and the ‘theoretical’.      
Drawing from Antonin Artaud’s writings and dramatic practice, Derrida 
attempts to offer ways of challenging normative and mimetic representation in 
Western theatre. As he notes, ‘more than any other art, [theatre] has been marked 
by the labour of total representation in which the affirmation of life lets itself be 
doubled and emptied by negation’ (Derrida, 2001 [1978]: 295). Indeed, what 
Derrida identifies as problematic with representation in theatre and performance 
is the act of signifying something absent from the event, as a mimetic image of 
thought or action; the act of symbolising transcendental ideas, texts, or ‘messages’ 
to be conveyed, whose reality is external to the performance itself. According to 
Derrida, this external reality functions as a self-identical presence, as an 
underlying substance of the play, as the hypokeimenon of a theatrical performance. 
Thus, one of the problems of mimetic representation, as Derrida understands it, is 
that it sustains the fixed condition of theatrical meanings and ensures the static 
character of theatrical forms. In other words, representation creates the conditions 
for the invariability of both theatrical matter and manner, functioning as a 
stratified ‘organism’ within a performance. This insistence on static forms and 
fixed images of meaning is for Derrida what confines creation within Western 
theatre. In discussing the nature of the author in theatre, Derrida points out that 
he ‘creates nothing, [he] has only the illusion of having created, because he only 
transcribes and makes available for reading a text whose nature is itself necessarily 
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representative’ (ibid: 296). It is worth noting that although Derrida is distrustful of 
theatre’s historical attempts to revolutionise the relation between author and 
performance, between stage and auditorium (as he believes that they occurred 
within ideological or sociopolitical conditions in which the structure of 
representation was always considered to be an invariable theatrical domain), he 
identifies a unique possibility to challenge theatrical representation and its 
implications in the Artaudian proposal for a theatre of cruelty. 
 
(a) Cruelty as life  
The theatre of cruelty is Artaud’s radical theory and practice of performance. It 
is a non-representational challenge to theatrical normativity. Artaud’s concept of 
cruelty refers to a sequence of unmediated actions that are rooted in what he 
terms as ‘cruel’ foundations of the self. ‘Everything that acts is cruelty’, notes 
Artaud in The Theatre and Its Double, insisting that ‘[i]t is upon this idea of extreme 
action, pushed beyond all limits, that theatre must be rebuilt’ (Artaud, 1958: 85). 
In other words, Artaud understands cruelty as a dynamic process through which 
every human or non-human element of the performance acquires an agential 
drive as a result of its exposure to the centre of the event. The shocking 
implications of this exposure constitute, for Artaud, a cruel, yet utterly essential 
step away from the complacency he felt existed in Western theatre.  
According to Artaud theatre ‘requires expression in space’ (ibid: 89; original 
emphasis); highlighting that this can be accomplished through the organic 
synthesis of ‘the magical means of art and speech’ (ibid). Pushing the boundaries of 
theatre towards a non-representational approach, Artaud’s theatre of cruelty 
rejects the transcendence of a dominant author and the existence of a ‘static’ 
dramatic text, offering a renewed expression to what activates a performance; that 
is, life itself, perceived not as the hypokeimenon or the substrata of a theatrical 
event, but rather he suggests an immanent idea of life as cruelty and magic: ‘I 
have therefore said ‘cruelty’ as I might have said ‘life’ or ‘necessity’, because I 
want to indicate especially that for me the theatre is act and perpetual emanation, 
and that there is nothing congealed about it, that I turn it into a true act, hence 
living, hence magical’, writes Artaud (ibid. 114); and Derrida responds that,  
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‘[t]he theatre of cruelty is not a representation. It is life itself, in the extent to 
which life is unrepresentable. Life is the nonrepresentable origin of 
representation’ (Derrida, 2001 [1978]: 294; original emphasis).  
Thus, Derrida understands mimetic representation as a limitation of life – a 
cultural limitation that prevents an experiencing of its nonrepresentable origin. In 
the poetics of Artaudian cruelty, life is not simply an origin, a point of departure 
or even a destination; it is a ‘becoming’. For Artaud, life creates and is created by 
life itself, and Derrida continues by stating that,  
‘[t]his life carries man along with it, but it is not primarily the life of man. The 
latter is only a representation of life, and such is the limit – the humanist limit 
– of the metaphysics of classical theatre’ (ibid: 294-95).  
 
(b) The ‘end of Man-as-God’: a non-theological theatre  
Both Artaud and Derrida wanted to break with an abstract and finite idea of 
Man. As Artaud argues, ‘[t]heatre was never meant to describe man and what he 
does’, thereby emphasising that the aim of theatre is to create and not to describe or 
symbolise abstractions (Artaud, 1989: 171). According to Artaud and Derrida, the 
idea of Man – as the author of the Text, as the actor who represents and as the 
ultimate narrator and ‘designer’ of theatrical space – is conceived as a messianic 
manifestation of Western theatre and for Western theatre; both its origin and telos; 
in short, Man is transformed into a God.  
Derrida argues that, ‘[t]he theatre of cruelty expulses God from the stage’, but 
without constructing a platform for a ‘new atheist discourse on stage’ (Derrida, 
2001 [1978]: 296). This may seem paradoxical, but it is precisely within this 
paradox that Derrida’s inquiry into a new metaphysics of theatre resides. For 
Derrida, the theatre of cruelty does not announce the death of God. Rather, it 
challenges Western theatre’s logocentricism, in so far as the latter becomes 
transcendental, authoritative and, therefore, theological. He argues that, ‘[t]he 
theatrical practice of cruelty, in its action and structure, inhabits or rather produces 
a nontheological space’ (ibid; original emphasis). Derrida is therefore looking for a 
vocabulary that renders a space nontheological, emphasising that such a space is 
not essentially a non-sacred one. From this perspective, thinking ‘nontheologically’ 
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is not the opposite of sacredness, or magic, in so far as one perceives sacredness, or 
magic as presence. It is, however, the opposite of thinking theologically, in as much 
as the latter is dictated by speech, by the transcendental Logos that becomes the 
authoritative power that transforms performance into mimesis.  
It is worth noting here that, for Derrida, the careful selection of language is 
crucial in order to disrupt normative patterns of meaning. ‘I am writing from within 
the substance of the French language’, he notes in The Secret Art of Antonin Artaud, 
pointing out his object of deconstruction within cultural discourses (Derrida et al, 
1998: 66; original emphasis). Therefore, for Derrida, the critique of ‘theological 
space’ in theatre, and thus critique in general, becomes possible as a process of 
cautious scrutiny of vocabularies that need to be interrupted and deconstructed.  
Through Artaud, Derrida proposes a metaphysics of theatre, a process of 
sacred presence that changes the theatrical stage emancipating it from the 
domination of speech. He suggests that the theatrical stage should break free from 
its subjection to the author, the speech and the text, transforming itself into a 
space in which magic is experienced not as an absence, but as a presence. He 
argues for a stage in which the actors themselves are truly emancipated from a 
given identity or position as ‘interpretive slaves’ of the author and the director 
(Derrida, 2001 [1978]: 296). For Derrida, the poetics of cruelty urge the actors to 
act, rather than execute; to create rather than represent. This approach also 
reshapes the relationship between the performance and the audience. In his 
critique of the conditions that create a passive spectator, Derrida argues that, ‘the 
theological stage comports a passive, seated public, a public of spectators, of 
consumers, of ‘enjoyers’ – as Nietzsche and Artaud both say – attending a 
production that lacks true volume or depth, a production that is level, offered to 
their voyeuristic scrutiny’ (ibid: 296-7). He thus describes the nontheological stage 
as a space in which the passivity and submissiveness of the audience are forcefully 
deconstructed; a space in which the spectators are rather immersed in the 
experiencing of the event, than merely watching it. As he notes, ‘[i]n the theatre of 
cruelty, pure visibility is not exposed to voyeurism’ (ibid: 297).2   
                                                
2 In different ways, both Derrida and Ranciere (2011 [2009]) attack the notion of spectatorship-as-
voyeurism in their discussions about theatre. While my critique unfolds in a parallel line of 
thought, in chapter 5 I discuss the capacity of Punchdrunk performances to redefine the critical 
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(c) The mise en scène: a sacred stage without ‘Speech’    
Thus, Derrida understands the theatre of cruelty as a theory and practice that 
destabilises the existence of a ‘pure’ reality that exists outside of the event. As 
Artaud wonders, ‘why not conceive of a play composed directly on the stage, 
realised on the stage’ (Artaud, 1958: 41). In Artaud’s theatre, Derrida sees a 
possibility of creating and experiencing a different kind of theatrical space; a more 
inclusive and autonomous space that is not constructed in relation to exteriorities, 
and does not function through representational binaries (i.e. subject-object, 
performance-audience, stage-auditorium). He argues for the reconstitution of the 
mise en scène, as Artaud theorised it. The mise en scène is, for Artaud, the sacred 
space that needs to be reconstituted in order for the art of performance to be 
reinvented. It is an open synthesis or an assemblage of the elements that exist, act 
and create experience and meaning within the event – the experiencing of lights, 
colours, sounds, props, actors, spectators, stage etc. Artaud writes: ‘it is the mise en 
scène that is theatre, much more than the written and spoken play’, (ibid: 41; 
original emphasis); and Derrida continues:  
‘Released from the text and the author-god, mise en scène would be returned 
to its creative and founding freedom. The director and the participants (who 
would no longer be actors or spectators) would cease to be the instruments 
and organs of representation’ (Derrida, 2001 [1978]: 299, original emphasis).  
In the Artaudian conception of the mise en scène, Derrida identifies a potential 
of performance to produce a present which will be impossible to be reiterated; that 
is, to be imitatively re-presented. He argues that, ‘[t]he stage, certainly, will no longer 
represent, since it will not operate as an addition, as the sensory illustration of a text 
already written, thought, or lived outside the stage, which the stage would then 
only repeat but whose fabric it would not constitute’ (ibid; original emphasis). 
Thus, Derrida describes a performance-event without a prescriptive content, a 
transcendental origin or an eventual catharsis.  
In a letter to Benjamin Crémieux (Paris, 15 September 1931), Artaud writes 
that, ‘the theatre, an independent and autonomous art, must, in order to revive or 
simply to live, realise what differentiates it from text, pure speech, literature, and 
                                                                                                                                 
possibilities of the voyeuristic act as emancipated from subjection to the power implications of 
watching and gazing.   
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all other fixed and written means’ (as cited in Artaud, 1958: 106). In making this 
argument, Artaud is not trying to denounce speech and language as such. Rather, 
he wants to subordinate the authoritative importance that speech is given in the 
structure of Western theatre. As Derrida comments accordingly, ‘speech and 
writing will be erased on the stage of cruelty only in the extent to which they were 
allegedly dictation’ (Derrida, 2001 [1978]: 302; original emphasis); understanding 
‘dictation’ as a fixed relation that exists between a subject-author of the ‘real’ and 
an object-interpreter of the ‘virtual’. Therefore, the theatre of cruelty does not 
suggest a mute performance, but an event, a mise en scène that functions not 
through words, but before words. Speech and writing, Derrida suggests, ‘will once 
more become gestures; and the logical and discursive intentions which speech 
ordinarily uses to ensure its rational transparency, […] will be reduced or 
subordinated’ (ibid). This notion of language-prior-to-words will function ‘as the 
visual and plastic materialisation of speech’ (Artaud, 1958: 69). It is, thus, a 
reinvention of language – or a ‘glossopoeia’3 as Derrida calls it – in theatre 
through intonations, visuality, movements and gestural contact. Artaud describes 
this potential of language in Mise en scène and Metaphysics:    
‘To make metaphysics out of spoken language is to make language convey 
what it does not normally convey. That is to use it in a new, exceptional and 
unusual way, to give it its full, physical shock potential, to split it up and 
distribute it actively in space, to treat inflections in a completely tangible 
manner and restore their shattering power and really to manifest something; 
to turn against language and its basely utilitarian, one might almost say 
alimentary, sources, against its origins as a haunted beast, and finally to 
consider language in the form of Incantation’ (Artaud, 1958: 46; original 
emphasis).  
Thus, Artaud is calling for a transformation of prescriptive language into a 
destratified glossopoeia. One instance of such an approach to language is Artaud’s 
1947 censored radio broadcast To Have Done with the Judgement of God, in which 
Artaud’s voice gets much closer to music than to ordinary speech. In this radio 
play, he expresses his thoughts using a destratified voice; a voice that resembles 
weep, laughter, a song or animal talk, through continuously changing language’s 
                                                
3 I examine this concept more thoroughly in chapter 4 while looking at Peter Brook’s Orghast. 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pitch, intonation and content. As Nicholas Ridout notes, ‘[w]hat Artaud is 
proposing is a use of sound for its material, vibratory qualities as much as for its 
organization into musical form’ (Ridout, 2008: 229). Thus, Artaud does not 
denounce language. He rather activates its potential to be ‘concrete’ in ‘an actual 
spatial sense’, in as much as he attempts to break with the immobile semantics of 
the keimenon, i.e. the codified substrata of language (Artaud, 1989: 123). As Laura 
Cull clarifies, ‘[i]t is not language itself that is the problem [for Artaud], so much 
as the codified ways in which it is used’ (Cull, 2009: 248). 
 
(d) Concluding remarks 
The Theatre of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation is one of Derrida’s most 
‘romantic’ moments of thought. It is the essay in which Derrida is more 
affirmative and positive in his argumentation than ever. In Differentiating Derrida and 
Deleuze Gordon C.F. Bearn claims that Derridean philosophy has been a 
proponent of ‘No’ as opposed to ‘Yes’, ‘a philosophy trapped in the frame of 
representation’, ‘a Derridean game you can never win’ (Bearn, 2000: 441). 
Although this seems to be a quite sweeping claim, Bearn makes a fair point in 
relation to much Derridean thought. Nevertheless, in Artaud’s work, Derrida finds 
an opening of a discourse that could break the barriers of the ‘text’. In this 
particular essay, Derrida sees a potential of performance to produce a language 
that challenges representation and mimesis; even if he understands it as an 
impossibility. As he notes, ‘if the idea of a theatre without representation, the idea 
of the impossible, does not help us to regulate theatrical practice, it does, perhaps, 
permit us to conceive its origin, eve and limit, and the horizon of death’ (Derrida, 
2001 [1978]: 314).  
Thus, it is worth noting that Derrida seems to perceive his own analysis as a 
brainstorming process which, however, aims at an unattainable theatre. Even 
while deconstructing Artaud’s theory, Derrida insists on textualism and the 
inevitability of repetition. His analysis seems like a ‘thought experiment’ since his 
conclusions ‘affirm’ the inescapability from representation to the extent that the 
latter is a re-presentation of presence. He wants to deconstruct representation, 
emancipating it from mimesis and transcendence; but his search is one of a lost 
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presence, rather than of a possibility of presence. Thus, claiming that 
representation is inescapable in actual terms, Derrida argues for a transformation 
of representation since, for Derrida, ‘presence, in order to be presence and self-
presence, has already begun to represent itself, has always already been 
penetrated’ (ibid). Derrida claims that the creative force of Artaud’s theatre is 
rather its potential to challenge the transcendentalism of repetition and 
representation, and not its possibility to subvert it on a theatrical stage. It is the 
possibility of converting the substance of representation into a non-repetitive re-
presentation. From this perspective, Artaud’s theatre of cruelty is, for Derrida, a 
critique that can influence the conditions of performing on stage. In other words, he 
argues that the virtue of the theatre of cruelty rests in its capacity to break the 
association of representation with transcendental repetition.  
Thus, Derrida conceives Artaud’s theatre of cruelty as a possibility of critique, 
which is nevertheless trapped in the limit between a possible and an impossible 
theatre. In emphasising the paradox of the theatre of cruelty, he notes that, 
‘[Artaud] cannot resign himself to theatre as repetition, and cannot renounce 
theatre as nonrepetition’ (ibid: 315). He goes on to argue that fidelity to Artaud is 
impossible – even in Artaud’s own attempts to put the theatre of cruelty into 
practice. For Derrida, the contribution of the theatre of cruelty, or as he notes, its 
‘grammar’ is always ‘to be found’ (ibid: 313). He concludes that, ‘[the theatre of 
cruelty] will always remain the inaccessible limit of a representation which is not 
repetition, of a re-presentation which is full presence, which does not carry its 
double within itself as its death, of a present which does not repeat itself, that is, of 
a present outside time, a nonpresent’ (ibid).  
There exist a number of critical insights into Derrida’s discussion of theatre, 
and most of them draw their arguments from a bold opposition between Derrida 
and Deleuze. For example, Gordon C.F. Bearn argues that while Derrida insists 
by all means on negation and cynicism, Deleuze attempts to ‘break on through to 
the other side of representation’, moving toward an affirmation of possibilities 
beyond codifications (Bearn, 2000: 441). Further, Martin Puchner states that the 
fundamental difference between Derrida and Deleuze in relation to theatre, lies in 
the opposition between the former’s ‘textualism’ and the latter’s ‘theatricalism’ – 
an opposition between drama and performance (Puchner, 2002: 526). Also, Laura 
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Cull criticises Derrida’s insistence on representation as an essential precondition of 
presence, by proposing the Deleuzian concept of ‘differential presence’, as an 
encounter with ‘continuous variation’ in theatrical performance (Cull, 2009: 244). 
Without overlooking the critical polemics of such accounts, in the following 
subchapter I will consider Deleuze’s impact on theatre and performance without 
focusing on an opposition to Derrida, but rather in order to unfold a different 
perspective on the possibility of performing critique. In other words, I take on a 
Deleuzian analysis of the problem of representation in theatre, not essentially as a 
counterargument to Derrida’s analysis of Artaud’s thought, but rather as a ‘line of 
thought’ that focuses less on limits and more on the possibility of breaking them.   
 
III. Deleuze on theatre: One less Manifesto 
(a) Deleuze and theatre?  
In choosing to merge the intellectual project of Gilles Deleuze with the art of 
theatre, we are confronted with a rather discouraging common belief: A broad 
part of academia sustains the impression that Deleuze and theatre are two 
incompatible ‘milieus’. Indeed, many scholars from Deleuze studies argue that 
theatrical performances and theatre directors were of no great interest to Deleuze, 
though with some exceptions (such as Antonin Artaud, Carmelo Bene and Robert 
Wilson). In particular, it could be argued that in certain Deleuzian writings on art, 
theatre has been treated as inferior to the experience that cinema provides. For 
example, in Cinema 2, Deleuze privileges cinema as being the only art form that 
can capture ‘conversation for itself’ (Deleuze, 2005 [1985]: 222). In Deleuze and 
Performance, Laura Cull attempts to explain this Deleuzian ‘preference’, arguing 
that, for Deleuze ‘[t]he stage has no equivalent of the camera-eye […] with its 
capacity to reveal inhuman viewpoints, to deterritorialise the eye and the ear of 
the spectator’ (Cull, 2009: 2). Nevertheless, to assert that Deleuze was an anti-
theatricalist would certainly be a biased postulation. In fact, in the following 
paragraphs, I intend not only to demonstrate the opposite, but also to show that 
Deleuzian thought draws distinctive mappings in the ways we understand and 
experience theatrical performances.  
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Interestingly, to encounter a potential intersection between Deleuze and 
theatre is to face a rather interesting paradox. Whereas his writings on art focus 
predominantly on painting, music and cinema, and while his arguable sympathy 
for both the canvas and the camera still echoes in contemporary theory, Deleuze’s 
lines of thought are recurrently depicted through notions of theatricality and 
performance. As Foucault argues in Theatrum Philosophicum, the work of Deleuze is 
‘philosophy not as thought but as theatre’ (Foucault, 1997 [1977]: 237). Deleuzian 
ontology, far from being a transcendentalist or an idealist project, can be 
understood as a practice that affirms difference within monism, variation within 
presence. His rhizomatic cosmology offers a unique aspect of understanding and 
experiencing subjectivity, and by extension, performance. One could argue that 
Deleuzian theory gives a renewed expression to the idea of praxis – to the 
potential synthesis between theory and practice. For example, in Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze not only uses instances of theatre in order to reveal the 
fundamental drives of being, but also seeks to ‘invent an equivalent of theatre 
within philosophy’ (Deleuze, 2004 [1968]: 9). As Martin Puchner argues in The 
Theatre in Modernist Thought, ‘[c]learly, the theatre, [in Difference and Repetition], is 
not simply a metaphor or a communicative device, but lies at the heart of 
Deleuze’s project, determining it terms, constructions, and arguments’ (Puchner, 
2002: 524). Furtehrmore, Laura Cull notes that, ‘Deleuze’s thought not only 
adopts the language of performance, but intervenes critically in the field with the 
production of a new vision of performance as a vital and philosophical force’ 
(Cull, 2009: 2). I argue that in thinking theatre and performance through and with 
Deleuze, we can arrive at a ‘minor’ notion of political theatre that not only 
disturbs mimetic representation, but also produces a possibility of performing 
critique as an immanent process within the theatrical event: a possibility of 
performing presence.  
 
(b) One less Manifesto: Deleuze’s description of a ‘critical operation’  
In One less Manifesto (1997 [1979]), Deleuze’s most direct encounter with 
theatre, the French theorist proposes a revolutionary way of thinking and 
performing on stage. Considering the practice of the Italian actor, filmmaker and 
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director Carmelo Bene, Deleuze unfolds a potential of theatre as ‘an always 
unbalanced, non-representative force’ (Deleuze, 1997 [1979]: 242). Through 
examining Bene’s methodological adaptation of classical plays – mainly 
Shakespeare – Deleuze offers ‘lines of escape’ from what sustains the importance 
of elements of power and representation in Western theatre. In short, Deleuze 
proposes a destratified theatrical process, which in all its complexity and 
variability allows us to rethink the philosopher’s ontology in direct relation to 
theatre and performance. It is worth noting here, that what seems to be one of 
Deleuze’s objectives in writing One less Manifesto is a call for a renewed relation 
between theory and practice; between critical discourse and performance. It is an 
essay that brings forward the political potentials of performing critique through 
breaking with representational mimesis. As Mohammad Kowsar notes in his case 
study of Carmelo Bene’s Richard III, ‘Gilles Deleuze meets Carmelo Bene at the 
crossroads where theory and theatrical practice converge’ (Kowsar, 1986: 19). 
Therefore, one of the main questions that Deleuze undertakes is in this essay is the 
question of endorsing and radicalising this convergence.    
Deleuze inquires into the ‘critical function’ of Carmelo Bene’s theatre by 
means of examining its capacity to actualise a critique of presence, as opposed to a 
critique of absence. He writes:  
‘Carmelo Bene describes his play Romeo and Juliet as a “critical essay on 
Shakespeare”. But the fact is that Carmelo Bene does not write on 
Shakespeare; the critical essay is actually a play’ (Deleuze, 1997 [1979]: 239).  
Through the theatre of Bene, Deleuze describes the relationship between theatre 
and critique through the capacity of the latter to be performed; to be staged rather 
than documented – to operate through present intensities rather than absent 
extensities. ‘One less Hamlet’, says Bene, and Deleuze agrees that a birth of 
something new and politically forceful in theatre occurs ‘not by addition but by 
subtraction, by amputation’ (ibid). Let us then unfold this idea that aims at 
transposing major theatrical processes into minor ones.   
By arguing for a process of amputation, Deleuze does not negate addition, or 
creation. On the contrary, the amputating operation that he observes in Bene’s 
plays carries with it a productive force of multiplication. He notes:  
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‘If you amputate Romeo, you will witness an astonishing development, the 
development of Mercutio, who was only a virtuality in the play by 
Shakespeare’ (ibid).    
Deleuze argues that the development of Mercutio is not a result of a lack of 
Romeo – it does not imply the emergence of a new sovereign theatrical subject-as-
Mercutio. In other words, Mercutio is not occuping the subject-position of 
Romeo. Through Bene’s approach, Deleuze suggests a ‘treatment’ of 
Shakespeare’s play that does not focus on the finality of a character through 
maintaining fidelity to the text. He argues for a process of becoming a character 
through destabilising its static positioning; that is, its capacity to act as a ‘major’ 
subject. Thus, Deleuze contends that Bene’s subtractive process does not replace 
Romeo with Mercutio, but rather suggests that an amputation of Romeo creates 
the conditions for a becoming-Mercutio. This becoming, a becoming that emerges 
through amputating a major character, is for Deleuze what matters the most in 
Bene’s theatre. He writes:  
‘The theatre maker is no longer an author, an actor, or a director. S/he is an 
operator. Operation must be understood as the movement of subtraction, of 
amputation, one already covered by the other movement that gives birth to 
and multiplies something unexpected, like a prosthesis: the amputation of 
Romeo and the colossal development of Mercutio, one in the other’ (ibid). 
So, what Carmelo Bene achieves through this process, and what Deleuze 
observes in One less Manifesto, is the emergence of new characters, emancipated 
from a fixed positioning or a self-identical presence; that is, the creation of ‘minor’ 
performing subjects. Yet, it is crucial to reiterate that for Deleuze, what matters is 
the process of emerging, rather than the character as such. He pays attention to 
the becoming of a character, rather than what might result from this becoming (i.e. a 
sovereign character, another Romeo in the place of Romeo). As Allen S. Weiss 
notes in his 2002 article about Bene’s death,  
‘[Bene’s plays] were largely based on a radical principle of adaptation: to 
work in the ‘hollow’ spaces of a text; to eliminate or ‘subtract’ the major 
dramatic structures of a play in order to reveal a revolutionary ‘minor’ 
discourse; to break open the representational system of both text and theatre’ 
(Weiss, 2002: 8).        
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Deleuze’s idea of becoming, and particularly of becoming-minor, is described 
mostly in his collaborations with Félix Guattari. From Anti-Oedipus (2004) and 
Kafka: toward a minor literature (1986), to A Thousand Plateaus and What is Philosophy? 
(1994), the concept of ‘minority consciousness’ has been used by Deleuze and 
Guattari as a proposal of deterritorialization of major subjectivities and 
normalised discourses of power. Becoming-minor is a process that affirms the 
virtue of becoming itself, since, ‘[t]here is no becoming-majoritarian; majority is 
never becoming. All becoming is minoritarian’, as Deleuze and Guattari argue in 
A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004 [1987]: 117). Verena Conley 
emphasises this point, arguing that, ‘[m]inorities are defined not by number but 
by becoming and by their lines of fluctuation’ (Conley, 2005: 165). Thus, 
Deleuze’s insistence on subtraction underlines the importance of becomings within 
a theatrical process, not as a way to repeat the construction of an authoritative 
and unified body; but, as Laura Cull puts it, ‘becomings constitute attempts to 
come into contact with the speeds and affects of a different kind of body, to break 
with a discrete self and to uproot the organs from the functions assigned to them 
by this ‘molar’ identity’ (Cull, 2009: 7).  
The title of the essay clearly ‘betrays’ its content: One less Manifesto, or else a 
minor manifesto, a manifesto that is subtracted in order to be multiplied as 
something else – or as Deleuze would clarify, a major form (a manifesto) with a 
minor treatment (one less). Deleuze describes Bene’s minor treatment in relation 
to Master-Servant interaction. By amputating the Master (e.g. Romeo), one 
magnifies the potential autonomisation of the Servant (e.g. Marcutio), but this 
process does not generate a new Master, since, as Deleuze argues, ‘[t]he Servant is 
not at all the reverse image of the Master, nor his replica or contradictory identity’ 
(Deleuze, 1997 [1979]: 240). What is important for Deleuze is the becoming, not 
its origin or resolution. He writes:   
‘What is interesting is never the way in which someone starts or finishes. Of 
interest is the middle (le milieu), what is happening in the middle. It is not by 
chance that the greatest speed is in the middle’ (ibid: 242).  
What are then the elements that Carmelo Bene amputates in his theatrical 
process? What does it mean ‘to amputate Romeo’? What does this amputation 
entails, and in what ways it creates new possibilities for staging critique? Deleuze 
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argues that Carmelo Bene’s theatrical operation ultimately subtracts the stable 
‘elements of power, the elements that constitute or represent a system of power’ 
(ibid: 241). Romeo, the Master, the King, the state power, all these are 
constituents of a stratified system of representation of power in Western theatre. 
To deduct their organic function is, thus, to enact a critical operation that 
destratifies a system in which these elements of power acquire both their 
coherency as well as their capacity to symbolise transcendental social relations. In 
this sense, becoming-minor is becoming a body without organs (BwO) – a 
destratified body that operates by affection as an assemblage, without being 
subjected to a hierarchically structured organism. As Laura Cull notes in her 
proposal for a ‘theatre without organs’, ‘[destratification] is a question of taking 
away that which attempts to fix the moving and homogenise the differing, a 
matter of undoing that which forms speed and subjectifies affect’ (Cull, 2009: 247). 
It is then a question of exposing, within theatre, an entire system of stratified 
representation of power, of conflicts, of History, of Culture, of Texts – in short, of 
everything that, instead of providing ‘lines of flight’, in fact normalises, 
territorialises possibilities of performing critique as presence.  
Now, the complexity of this process lies for Deleuze in the essentialist 
connection between power and representation in Western theatre. Coming closer 
to the Derridean account of representation in theatre, Deleuze argues that, ‘[t]he 
actual power of theatre is inseparable from a representation of power in theatre, 
even if it is a critical representation’ (Deleuze, 1997 [1979]: 241). However, by 
contrast to Derrida’s cynical view of Artaudian theatre, Deleuze finds in Carmelo 
Bene (as well as in his readings of Artaud, Bob Wilson, Grotowski and The Living 
Theatre) a potential that destabilises this essentialist connection. He sees a radical 
change both in the matter and in the manner of performing; a deterritorialisation 
of theatrical elements that function through representation. For example, Deleuze 
suggests that in Bene’s theatre, the subject-actor is desubjectified by becoming an 
operator. The theatrical subject is not an actor, it does not have a stable self-
identical presence, but becomes an operator through taking part in a constant 
variation and mobility of theatrical elements. Deleuze argues that by subtracting 
the theatrical invariants of power and representation, and by placing the 
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constituents of the mise en scène in continuous variation, Bene achieves a becoming-
minor potential of theatre as a ‘non-representative force’ (ibid: 242).  
Thus, Deleuze reveals a potential of critique-as-presence; a possibility of staging 
a non-codified critical operation that is produced within the event of performance. 
It is a critique that cannot be represented or symbolised, because it does not 
correspond to any ideological invariants or fixed images of meaning, but rather 
changes and differentiates itself within the performance. I argue that what Deleuze 
identifies in Bene’s theatre is a use of critique that becomes non-teleological and 
productively incomplete, in as much as it is not normalised as a political 
commonsense, but rather ‘proposes the presence of variation as a more active, 
more aggressive element’ (ibid: 252).  
How could we describe an incomplete critical process though? In particular, 
how can we use a language of critique in an incomplete manner? I suggest that the 
minor usage of language in theatre, as Deleuze understands it, not only 
denormalises its codified expression, but also disturbs its determinacy in ways that 
produce an incomplete performing language. It is incomplete in so far as it no 
longer symbolises transcendence, in as much as it does not represent a critique 
that corresponds to a self-identical truth; but rather, it is used to create the 
conditions for a becoming-critical experience. I argue then, that a minor 
treatment of language in theatre is, in effect, an incomplete treatment of its 
performance. I suggest that Deleuze’s proposal in One less Manifesto is a call to a 
performance of language in an incomplete and mobile manner. Ronald Bogue 
notes in Deleuze on Literature that, ‘Deleuze’s concept of a minor usage of language 
necessarily extends well beyond that of a writer’s manipulation of words on a 
page, and that the performance of language provides Deleuze with the fullest instance of a 
minor style’ (Bogue, 2003: 141; original emphasis). I would argue therefore that 
Deleuze’s argument on critique in One less Manifesto could be read as follows: to 
perform critique is to ‘mis-perform’ (that is, not to perform in normative ways, to 
perform almost in a ‘deviant’ manner). In a word, to perform in a productively 
incomplete manner. As Deleuze writes, ‘[t]o be bilingual, but in a single language, 
in a unique language […] to be a foreigner, but in one’s own tongue’ (Deleuze, 
1997 [1979]: 246; original emphasis). In a sense, this critical operation challenges 
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the classical meaning of performance as a complete act of expression (parfounir 
[Old French]: to complete, to carry out thoroughly).  
From this perspective, following Deleuze reading of Bene’s theatre, I argue that 
the ‘art’ of critique is performed when it is exposed to the variability, and even 
contingency, of the theatrical event. Deleuze endorses this point further by 
challenging Brecht’s idea of critique. He notes that, ‘Brecht performed the greatest 
‘critical operation’, but this operation was enacted ‘on the text and not on the 
stage’’ (ibid). In making this point, Deleuze implies that Brecht understood 
critique as a brainstorming process that requires rigorous thought for a resolution 
of a problem; without, however, addressing the possibility of critique to act as a 
challenge of the representational systems that create problems. Hence, according 
to Deleuze, Brecht displaces what is signified in theatre, but he does not destabilise 
the system of significations as a whole. He clarifies that,  
‘[w]ithout a doubt, there is Brecht’s attempt to make contradictions and 
oppositions something other than represented; but Brecht himself only wants 
them to be ‘understood’ and for the spectator to have the elements of possible 
‘solution’. This is not to leave the domain of representation but only to pass 
from one dramatic pole of bourgeois representation to an epic pole of popular 
representation. Brecht does not push the ‘critique’ far enough’ (ibid: 252).      
To sum up therefore, in One less Manifesto, Deleuze proposes a specific theatrical 
method of performing critique in a non-representational way. This method, or as 
Deleuze puts it, this ‘complete critical operation consists of (1) deducting the stable 
elements, (2) placing everything in continuous variation, (3) then transposing 
everything in minor’ (ibid: 246; original emphasis).    
 
(c) Concluding remarks  
It is important to raise some questions in relation to two specific points in 
Deleuze’s analysis. They are rather conceptual questions that could be addressed 
in relation to Deleuzian ontology in general. In other words, without intending to 
become rhetorical, I want to pose these questions as creative challenges to 
Deleuzian thought.    
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The first point comes out of Deleuze’s idea of a character’s becoming in Bene’s 
theatre. It is evident throughout the essay that Deleuze endorses Bene’s theatrical 
insistence on ephemerality. Quoting Bene, Deleuze writes that ‘[t]he spectacle 
begins and ends at the same moment it occurs’ (ibid: 240). Deleuze argues that the 
event takes place as a becoming of a character; the becoming of a theatrical 
subject. He notes however that,  
‘the play ends with the creation of the character. It has no other purpose and 
does not extend further than the process of this creation. It ends with birth 
when it normally ends with death’ (ibid).  
Yet, in making this anti-Aristotelian point (this critique of transcendental 
catharsis), Deleuze remains unclear about what this birth entails. Is this purpose, 
i.e. the birth of the character, an essential end of its process? What if the purpose 
of a play is not the creation of the character? What if there is no purpose? Without 
intending to ask a question that may lead to a nihilist conception of theatre, the 
point that I want to make is whether such a purpose is what makes its becoming so 
important and productive in Deleuzian thought? Can a play end with desire, with 
anger, with pain or happiness – with subjectless and, perhaps, unintentional 
intensities or experiences? In other words, I wonder whether birth (the birth of a 
character) constitutes the sole end of becoming in theatre?  
Of course, it is clear that Deleuze gives importance to the process of birth, rather 
than the act of birth as such. Yet, the question remains. Reformulated it would be: 
Do we need birth in theatre? Does becoming need a point of termination, or as 
Deleuze would say, a point of territorialisation? The reason I insist on this 
question is because I believe that birth carries within it a certain kind of ‘death’: 
the ‘death’ of the process of giving birth. Is, therefore, the birth of a character what 
ideologically, politically or even aesthetically completes a play? If so, I argue that this 
completion produces a perhaps displaced, yet largely representational and finite 
subject in performance. Thus, if performance ends with the creation of a 
character, does the critical function of performance end with the construction of a 
subject? Through Bene’s theatre, Deleuze suggests a theatrical process in which 
the characters are not unified subjects – they do not have an ‘Ego’, as he mentions 
(ibid: 241); their identities are nothing less and nothing more than becomings. 
However, if the play ends with the construction of an identity, with a production of 
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an image that is static and fixed, what effect does this creation have to critique as a 
process? Does critique cease to be process, a mobile and incomplete practice? 
Does critique become a ‘message’ to be conveyed to the audience? I want to take 
these questions into account throughout the thesis, although I believe that raising 
them here is very important in its own right.   
The second point that I want to briefly elaborate upon is the way in which 
Deleuze understands the function of power in Bene’s theatre. Deleuze argues that 
in order to create variations that render a performance minor, one has to subtract 
the stable elements of power that dominate and stratify Western theatre. This is a 
process that deterritorialises the representational power of a play, the ‘despotism 
of the invariant’ as he puts it, transforming it into minor becomings (ibid: 254). 
Since what matters to Deleuze is the process of becoming-minor rather than being 
minor in its own right, the existence of major elements is pivotal to this 
transformation: (re)territorialisation is essential to deterritorialisation. Although 
throughout One less Manifesto Deleuze’s critique of power and representation in 
theatre is substantial and polemic, he does not thoroughly describe the positive 
and productive role that power can play in Bene’s performances; as well as in 
theatre in general.  He writes:  
“[a]rt is not a form of power except when it ceases to be art and begins to 
become demagoguery’. Art is subject to many powers, but it is not a form of 
power’ (ibid).    
Deleuze suggests that the presence of variations and becomings operate as 
responses to power – as the resulting processes of subtracting power, in so far as 
the latter becomes representational and authoritative. Now, although Deleuze 
highlights that these variations are not powers in themselves, I suggest however 
that they result from power and end with power; therefore, they are, in a sense, 
powerful or forceful. Deleuze would probably use the word ‘desire’ to describe 
them, whereas Foucault would prefer the term ‘power’ as such. What I want to 
suggest here is that we need to account for the creative form of power that is 
immanent in becomings in a much more detailed manner. If, in One less Manifesto, 
Deleuze does not want to speak of variations and becomings as processes that are 
antithetical to power, this is not made clear through his analysis; that is, he seems 
to place power and becoming in a binary-like relation. While his critique of power 
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is very descriptive and useful for the hypothesis that I want to examine, what he 
suggests is not entirely clear in relation to power as a positive and productive 
process. In other words, while I agree with Deleuze’s understanding of variations 
and becomings in theatre as impersonal ‘lines of escape’ from the power of 
representation, I argue however that they need to be acknowledged as powerful 
presences, as ‘desiring’ movements in performance. If they acquire an entirely 
different form of power, as Deleuze seems to imply, I suggest that this has to be 
made clearer; not for clarity’s sake, but as a way to attribute specific qualities and 
potentialities to the function of becomings in theatre and performance. In short, I 
argue that theatrical becomings have to be ‘vitalised’ as theatrical processes; they 
have to be approached as lively and powerful challenges to representation and 
mimesis.  
Interestingly, this is perhaps a Deleuzian critique to Deleuze. Since his 
accounts on theatre and performance are limited, it makes sense that One less 
Manifesto can be understood as a critical text whose aim is hardly to provide an 
extremely in-depth analysis of political theatre and its non-representational 
possibilities. However, it is a text that not only motivates, but also initiates a 
rethinking of political theatre as an experience of processes, transformations, 
changes and differences, rather than fixed ideological messages, rhetorics and 
hierarchies. Indeed, it is the most useful starting point for this thesis.           
 
Conclusion   
Before proceeding to trace the ways in which British theatre directors and 
collectives have experimented with non-representational potentials of ‘performing 
critique’, I want to provide some concluding thoughts in order to connect this 
discussion in the case studies of the thesis.  
In the first section of the chapter, I attempted to examine the problematic 
relationship between theoretical frameworks and theatrical practices as it has been 
discussed or overlooked in academic scholarship during the latter half of the 20th 
century. In particular, I focused on the seeming reluctance of a significant body of 
theory to consider its own potential to be performed as an actual possibility that 
breaks with a transcendental representation of knowledge. Further, I went on to 
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examine two theoretical ‘discussions’ made between two philosophers (Derrida 
and Deleuze) and two theatre practitioners (Artaud and Bene) that prepare the 
theoretical ground on which I wish to step on with this thesis.   
 Following from this analysis, it seems to me that the question of critique as a 
non-representational process that merges theory with its performance on stage is 
key to our understanding of the politics of theatre, as well as of the possibilities of 
critique itself. Accordingly, I argue that this process can be thought in a number of 
ways – either Artaudian, Derridean, Deleuzian or others – yet, I believe that in 
each one of them one has to thoroughly address the urgent issues of 
representational forms and teleological outcomes. I thereby argue that studying 
the experimental challenges to mimetic representation and theatrical teleology, 
initiated by different British directors and groups, is more important than 
attempting to ‘locate’ one of them that fulfils the subversive potentials of an 
incomplete critique as non-representation – not to mention that, perhaps, the 
latter would be an impossible task. Thus, rather than seeking to find the ‘ideal’ 
instances of a theatre that was or is incomplete and non-representational, I am 
interested in tracing the conditions for the becoming of such a theatre through 
drawing elements from diverse approaches and perspectives as conceptualised and 
put into practice on the British stage. My critical analysis, then, will not be based 
on a potential discovery of a ‘lost treasure’, but on placing under discussion the 
different processes of such a discovery. 
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Beyond agit-prop: the popular theatre of Joan 
Littlewood 
 
 
Contents 
 
Introduction  
 
 I. Early years and the Soviet impact  
 
II. Littlewood and the condition of English theatre: from RADA to Theatre of 
Action and Theatre Union 
(a) English theatre’s ‘representationalism’ and RADA 
(b) Theatre of Action 
(c) Theatre Union 
 
III. Theatre Workshop and Theatre Royal: a shift in perspective 
 
IV. The Fun Palace: an ‘incomplete’ project 
 
V. Critical reflections: (Post)-Brecht, popular theatre and ‘the people’  
 
 
Introduction  
As suggested in the second chapter, it is mainly during the second half of the 
20th century that theatre began to be understood as a ‘space’ in which political 
discourse and critique could acquire the potential to be performed to and engaged 
with audiences. In different ways, critique became a process of discussion with 
spectators, rather than an ideological product to be conveyed or transmitted. The 
changing sociopolitical conditions of post-World War II transformed the art of 
theatre from a ‘podium’, from which ideas were represented as rhetorical 
questions, into a productive cultural space in which critical practice could emerge. 
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This is not to say that theatre, and art in general, stopped functioning as 
‘mediums’, i.e. as ways of expressing and communicating concepts, or as the 
‘substance’ through which artists were able to articulate their imagination; quite 
the contrary. Yet it is crucial, I suggest, to consider the post-war period as one in 
which artistic mediums obtained the capacity to also operate beyond 
symbolisations, significations and codifications of meaning – they acquired agency 
as the producers, and not only ‘carriers’, of social and political reality.  
In a more general tone, Murray Edelman argues that,    
 ‘works of art do not represent ‘reality,’ ‘the real world,’ or ‘everyday life,’ 
even if those terms are taken to carry a specific or meaningful reference. 
Rather, art creates realities and worlds. People perceive and conceive in the 
light of narratives, pictures, and images. That is why art is central to politics, 
just as it is central to social relationships […]’ (Edelman, 1995: 7; original 
emphasis).  
While Edelman makes a very useful point, I would argue that this function of art 
cannot be thought in a transhistorical way; that is, the manner in which political 
art is practiced and perceived, changes according to different historical, political 
and cultural conditions. For example, putting the Soviet movement of socialist 
realism or the early-20th-century expressionist realism of Germany under this 
theoretical framework is, I suggest, largely debatable. The ways in which such 
historical art movements made use of art is ambiguous in this respect. While 
indeed socialist realist or German expressionist artworks depicted social reality, 
their objective was not one of intervention, creation or change. Rather, their 
primary function was to disseminate and maintain a certain political and 
ideological status quo that was often manifested through extinguishing different 
(usually more avant-garde) approaches to artistic process.  
Thus, what I want to underline here is that especially in the second part of the 
20th century, there emerged a crisis in art’s representational function that 
gradually challenged the propagandistic and metaphorical role that art forms had 
been forced to play in the immediate past, and began to emancipate artistic 
creation and perception from ideological dogmatism and aesthetic determinacy.  
This gradual shift became particularly visible in theatrical contexts. Theatre 
spaces were unique in this respect, not only because this critique of dogmatic 
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representation was more relevant to theatre than in other art forms; but also 
because theatrical plays were inviting sites of political engagement in which such a 
critique could make a radical difference in both artistic expression and perception. 
Lehmann’s description of theatre’s function as an art form captures this particular 
‘uniqueness’:  
‘Theatre is the site not only of ‘heavy’ bodies but also of a real gathering, a place 
where a unique intersection of aesthetically organised and everyday real life 
takes place. In contrast to other arts, which produce an object and/or are 
communicated through media, here the aesthetic act itself (the performing) as 
well as the act of reception (the theatre going) take place as a real doing in the 
here and now’ (Lehmann, 2006 [1999]: 17; original emphasis).   
At the same time, the increasing production of theoretical texts by modern 
theatre practitioners (from Meyerhold and Copeau, to Brecht and Artaud) was a 
distinctive phenomenon that played a significant role in challenging the 
representational boundaries of theatrical processes. The advance of what Milling 
and Ley (2001) call the ‘theoretical practitioner’ became possible during 
modernity. This new theatrical subject became very influential and politically 
involved in ongoing discourses, as it transformed theatre art into a cultural space 
that ‘produced ideas as well as performances’ (Milling & Ley, 2001: vi). This 
creative exchange between theatre and theory was instrumental in producing non-
representational possibilities of staging critique that shaped and altered the 
function of political theatre in the second half of the 20th century.      
It is worth noting therefore, that the materialisation of these possibilities is not 
to be thought of as an impulsive or sudden shift in theatre-making. On the 
contrary, apart from the political impact of the ‘theoretical practitioners’, there 
were several important conditions that prepared the ground for non-
representational approaches to theatre in the latter part of the 20th century. To 
put it differently, the sociopolitical and artistic unrest of the pre-1950s period not 
only conditioned the ‘turn to performance’ (and its creative exchange with theory), 
but also composed a chain of theatrical events and milestones that resulted in 
transforming many parts of the theatrical avant-garde into ensembles and 
collectives that looked at different ways to stage political critique. After all, the 
term ‘political’ or ‘politicised’ theatre was born and practiced during the first half 
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of the 20th century. I suggest that looking at the pre-1950s period, and 
particularly at the sociohistorical developments that took place between the 
General Strike in England (1926) and the Second World War, is an important 
starting point for understanding these changing conditions in theatre and 
performance.     
One of the most polemical and influential directors of this period was Joan 
Littlewood. She was a theatre practitioner that not only ‘co-authored’ the making 
and development of political theatre in Britain, but also played a crucial role in 
revolutionising the notion of critical practice, by experimenting with its multiple 
expressions in her radical performances. This chapter is, thus, an attempt to 
understand these conditions that initiated the process for a rethinking of the ways 
in which critique is performed, by putting a spotlight on the theatre of Joan 
Littlewood. I argue that the case of Littlewood is particularly interesting, as her 
iconoclastic theatrical narratives and her post-Brechtian approach to popular 
theatre gave new insights to the potentials of relating politics to theatre in Britain. 
The chapter briefly examines some of the most important milestones in 
Littlewood’s directorial career, considering the artistic practice and intellectual 
resonances of her theatrical projects that were carried out under the umbrella of 
theatrical collectives and ensembles.  
 
I. Early years and the Soviet impact 
The period that followed the General Strike in England in 1926 was crucial in 
many respects. One of them was that politics and critique began to be understood 
as potentialities with aesthetic, creative and even theatrical expressions. Although 
the aftermath of the strike was not what the unions and the workers had been 
hoping for, there emerged a new sense of critical practice that inspired and 
boosted the dissenting voices of the British social world – particularly these 
intellectual and artistic communities that had been looking for more engaging 
ways to express their political commitment. As Robert Leach notes,  
‘[t]he 1926 General Strike was a marvellous ‘performance’. It had almost no 
direct political impact, but it conveyed a whiff of revolution and exposed the 
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smooth betrayal of the workers by their political and trade union leaders’ 
(Leach, 2006: 3).     
Within these changing sociopolitical conditions the idea of communism gained 
significant ground during the 1930s, especially after the communists’ clash with 
the subsequently unsuccessful and politically fragile labour government. The 
‘communist dream’ had never before been felt so real for a large part of the 
working people of England, who approached the communist party not only as a 
genuine political support, but also as a tangible way of preparing a radically 
effective uprising. Leach points out that,  
‘though few in number, Communists were always to be found at the 
battlefront of the class war, and they added a noisy, flamboyant, even 
theatrical, element to the workers’ struggles’ (ibid: 5).  
The Soviet avant-garde theatre – that had been active since the beginnings of 
the 20th century – was significantly influential in the emergence of agit-prop 
performances throughout a large part of the Western world, including England. 
James Roose-Evans (1989 [1970]) gives us a very comprehensive picture of the 
way in which these forms of theatre developed in Russia:  
‘The idea of open air collective spectacles as the theatre form of the future 
had been discussed in Russia from the time of the 1905 revolution, and 
became popular after the October 1917 revolution. These mass spectacles 
were characterised by collective authorship, military-like organisation, and 
the participation of different segments of society. They were not only 
conscious attempts to create a new, distinctly proletarian theatre but also and 
attempt to establish a new social ritual, re-enacting and celebrating the events 
of the revolution’ (Roose-Evans, 1989 [1970]: 27).   
Indeed, the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 was instrumental in bringing forth 
ideas, methods and techniques that could generate a theatre of ‘the people’ – a 
theatre that would be produced by, and speak for the needs of the working class. 
Platon Kerzhentzev’s The Creative Theatre,4 published in 1918 – a work that was 
influenced by Romain Rolland’s book The People’s Theatre (2007 [1903]) – was one 
of the first intellectual endeavours that supported and pushed for the 
                                                
4 See Roose-Evans (1989 [1970]: 27).  
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disintegration of traditional theatre and its replacement with performances 
authored and devised by the (frequently proletarian) audience. The majority of 
modernist Soviet directors working towards this end – such as Alexander Tairov, 
Vyachleslav Ivanov and Vsevolod Meyerhold – challenged the artistically 
‘exhausted’ form of realism in theatre (in Moscow Theatre, Stanislavski was one of 
the most important supporters of this type of theatre, with his psychological realist 
performances), by proposing symbolist and anti-realist techniques through which 
they could engage spectators while experimenting with sociopolitical commentary.  
Meyerhold, in particular, was sharply critical of realism because he understood 
it as a form that eradicated the richness of theatricality, imagination and 
improvisation. As Roose-Evans comments, Meyerhold was an advocate of a 
theatre that ‘should not mirror reality but should transcend the commonplace of 
everyday life by deliberately exaggerating and distorting reality through stylised 
theatrical techniques’ (Roose-Evans, 1989 [1970]: 24). Of course, it is worth 
noting that while experimenting with theatrical illusion and artistically complex 
performances, Meyerhold and many other avant-garde theatre directors 
simultaneously created a significant distance between their practices and the 
Soviet Union’s established art form at the time, which was socialist realism. This is 
the main reason why the leaders of the Communist state in Russia gradually 
subordinated avant-garde’s initiatives in favour of more straightforward theatrical 
techniques that supported the state’s propaganda. Bruce McConachie (2010) 
points out that,  
‘[a]fter the mid-1920s […] when hopes for international revolution had 
dimmed, Stalin and his bureaucrats began tightening the funding and 
freedoms of the avant-garde. They squeezed out and eventually eliminated 
those who would not conform to he narrow political and aesthetic constraints 
of ‘socialist realism,’ a mix of realism and communist party propaganda’ 
(McConachie et al, 2010: 426).     
However, the creative radicalism of the avant-garde could not be moderated or 
diminished by the Soviet state’s restrictive policies. On the contrary, this 
continuous censorship and control in one way or another empowered many 
dissident voices within theatre by challenging their ways of production. In fact, 
this anti-realist and modernist wave – that had begun in the Soviet Union – 
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spread around many parts of the industrial West. Directors such as the German 
Erwin Piscator, who called for a re-politicisation of theatre by evoking epic forms 
of sociohistorical analysis, the French Jacques Copeau with his revolutionary anti-
naturalist methods of devising political performances and Tristan Tzara, one of 
the initiators of the anti-art Dada movements in France, are celebrating cases of 
avant-garde’s resonance throughout Europe. Even though this wave of theatrical 
modernism was not as strong, or as enduring as the one of the 1950s (when the 
theoretical writings of Artaud and the impact of Brecht activated a much wider 
reverberation of avant-garde performances), it certainly was extremely important 
in the transformation of political theatre. 
 
II. Littlewood and the condition of English theatre: from 
RADA to Theatre of Action and Theatre Union  
(a) English theatre’s ‘representationalism’ and RADA 
Joan Littlewood holds a distinctive position within the spectrum of these 
directors and performance artists that attempted to re-politicise theatre while 
challenging established and conventional methods of performing. Based in 
England, Littlewood faced enormous difficulties of surpassing the ongoing 
traditionalism of theatrical naturalism, or ‘representationalism’ as she preferred to 
describe it. During the mid-1930s the patterns of English theatre were limited to 
mere depictions of classical plays. Whereas the terms ‘theatre’ and ‘performance’ 
were commonsensically associated with West End commercial productions, most 
modern approaches to directing were considered as ideologically ‘suspicious’ and, 
therefore, highly improper. While the critical reactions to this condition of English 
theatre were few in number, their tone was very polemical and even aggressive. In 
The English Theatre (1936), Allardyce Nicoll noted that, ‘[t]he English theatre, 
lacking the spirit for experimentation, is artistically and mentally moribund’ 
(Nicoll, 1936: 188). The challenge of ‘aestheticism’ and the radicalisation of the 
means of producing theatre in England (as well as in Europe) become gradually 
visible, with the French communist writer Leon Moussinac famously declaring: 
‘We no longer ask for beauty, that dead thing, but for the shock-values’ (as cited in 
Leach, 2006: 9). Indeed, although Moussinac’s writings were foremost critical 
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interventions to the art of cinema, his seminal 1931 work The New Movement in the 
Theatre had a significant impact to directors of political theatre, including 
Littlewood. As Derek Paget (1995) argues in his paper Theatre Workshop, Moussinac, 
and the European Connection, through Moussinac’s work, Littlewood’s Theatre 
Workshop ‘gained an understanding of European theatre’ (Paget, 1995: 212).  
Littlewood started working in the theatre during a period in which the 
prevailing modes of performing were based, according to Paget, on ‘a seamless 
narrative chronology and a surface realism (especially of ‘character’ – a ‘good’ 
actor becoming a performer who can present a set of recognizably believable 
behaviours to an audience)’ (ibid: 212-3). The Royal Academy of Dramatic Art 
(RADA) was, at the time, one of the major hegemonic institutions that promoted 
this ‘high-art’ approach to theatre making, by simultaneously excluding avant-
garde initiatives and politically informed performances. Ironically, however, 
RADA was the first place in which Littlewood engaged with theatre after winning 
a scholarship in 1932 that would financially secure her studies in the academy. 
Eventually, Littlewood realised that this was not the appropriate place for 
developing her theatrical skills and perspectives, since she believed that the 
restrictive ideological stance of RADA, as well as the elitist approach of both 
professors and students did not endorse a theatre of change, as she understood it; 
that is, a theatre that could speak about the condition of the working-class. 
Holdsworth (2006) points out that,  
‘[Littlewood] hated the concentration on classics, classical verse speaking and 
drawing room comedies that bore little relation to the ‘real’ world and her 
experience growing up in East London. The prospect of a theatre capable of 
contributing to the widespread calls for social change excited Littlewood and 
she did not find these represented at RADA’ (Holdsworth, 2006: 5).  
Thus, the institutional and ideological barriers that RADA (and other drama 
universities) were raising, pushed Littlewood away from a possible academic 
engagement with theatre. In fact, she became a sharp critic of theatre’s 
academisation, as she felt that it was normalising and limiting the possibility of a 
political theatre that could be direct and radical. Littlewood’s primary objective 
was to learn how to develop innovative and experimental theatrical methods 
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through which it would be feasible to create politicised performances for working 
class audiences.  
 
(b) Theatre of Action 
Following her resignation from her studies and a brief stay in Paris, where she 
worked as a painter, Littlewood settled in Manchester where she looked for a way 
to integrate in the theatre world. In 1934, while being employed as a documentary 
writer by the BBC, Littlewood met Ewan MacColl (then known as Jimmy Miller), 
an active agit-prop writer and performer. MacColl was at the time engaged in 
several politically informed theatrical projects that were active in the wider area of 
Manchester and were mainly a product of the Workers’ Theatre Movement’s5 
counteraction to Ramsay MacDonald’s administration. In particular, the Red 
Megaphones6, with its nomadic potentials, managed to transfer the agitational spirit 
of radical plays to the neighbourhoods of Manchester, by employing techniques 
inspired by the Italian commedia dell’ arte and the Soviet agit-prop.  
In the mean time, while the current urgency in Europe’s political climate (due 
to the dissemination of fascism and the rise of Hitler) was becoming growingly 
apparent throughout Britain, Littlewood and MacColl decided to collaborate and 
create a company that would provide a much more structured and organised 
support to strikes and demonstrations than that of street theatre’s spontaneous 
acts. As Leach points out,  
‘[a]fter 1933 […] simple agit-prop was seen as too crude for the new purposes 
of revolutionary theatre in the time of the rise of Fascism. It was dynamic and 
immediate, but was unable to deal with historical processes or an increasingly 
complex political situation’ (Leach, 2006: 25).  
Thus, MacColl formed the Theatre of Action in 1934 (a group which was, in fact, a 
reformation of the Red Megaphones) and Littlewood joined the group a short time 
                                                
5 Robert Leach describes Worker’s Theatre Movement (WTM) as a theatre organisation whose ‘drama 
drew both form and ideas from working-class experience, culture and entertainment’ (Leach, 2006: 
13). He notes that, ‘[t]he movement’s proponents argued that all art was effectively propaganda, 
and therefore proletarian art should be used unashamedly to that end – to raise workers’ 
consciousness, or highlight particular issues, or support workers in struggle’ (ibid: 14).      
6 Agit-prop theatre collective (in which MacColl was a member), mainly active in the broader 
Manchester area, famous for its didactic sketches and caustic songs. 
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later. It was an initiative that was considered as an artistic up-to-date response to 
the ongoing sociopolitical conditions. Provided that they shared very similar 
political and ideological beliefs, Littlewood and MacColl managed to collaborate 
effortlessly. They were talking the same artistic and political ‘language’, therefore 
it was obvious to them that they could work together creatively. In his 
autobiography, entitled Journeyman, MacColl shares the excitement of one of their 
first meetings:  
‘[We] told each other the story of our lives and discussed what we called real 
theatre. Our views, we found, coincided at almost every point. We were 
drunk with ideas, lightheaded with talk and lack of sleep and each of us 
jubilant at having discovered an ally’ (MacColl, 1990: 211).  
Theatre of Action’s theatrical methods were initially influenced by the work of 
Meyerhold, Piscator and Laban. Meyerhold’s scenic constructivism, Piscator’s 
epic forms of historical analysis and Laban’s perspectives on body language and 
movement were fundamental in the construction of the group’s process for 
creating radical performances. It is worth noting that the group was interested in 
amateur actors whose ‘anti-professionalism’ could contribute to the experimental 
character of the performances. As Leiter comments, ‘[t]hey rejected the trained 
and polished actors of the repertory theatres as being too mannered and artificial, 
and looked instead for untrained, natural, and even slovenly spoken performers, 
hoping to build their method from the ground up, through trial and error’ (Leiter, 
1991: 184). In The Theatre Workshop Story (1981), Howard Goorney outlines the 
four basic points on which the group focused the most:  
‘(1) An awareness of the social issues of the time, and in that sense, a political 
theatre;  
(2) A theatrical language that working people could understand, but that was 
capable of reflecting, when necessary, ideas, either simple or involved, in a 
poetic form;  
(3) An expressive and flexible form of movement, and a high standard of skill 
and technique in acting; 
(4) A high level of technical expertise capable of integrating sound and light 
into the production’ (Goorney, 1981: 8). 
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Gradually, the group became interested in experimenting with different 
techniques of embodying critique in performances. Plays such as Free Thaelmann 
(initially a film written in 1935 for the imprisonment of Ernst Thaelmann, the 
leader of the German Communist Party), Funarov’s The Fire Sermon and the 
political drama Newsboy are striking examples of the company’s endeavour to 
blend diverse theatrical methods and narratives. 
In one of his articles about the Theatre of Action, MacColl describes the 
group’s approach to theatre-making in a quite expressive way:  
‘'An actor', we said, 'should be like an athlete, he should be in complete 
control of his body, he should be able to make his body do anything that he 
calls upon it to do. Thus far we agree with Meyerhold. On the other hand we 
don't want a theatre which is just a troupe of acrobats. Then again, we don't 
want a theatre like Stanislavsky's where everybody is so busy living the role 
that they cannot step out of the role and comment on it from time to time.' 
Strange territory we were exploring - exploring is the right word. But we 
weren't like modern explorers who go out with botanists, biologists, radio 
engineers and all the rest of it - we were exploring from a position of 
ignorance. None of us could be said to have had any kind of education, we'd 
all left school when we were fourteen. We weren't merely exploring the 
theories, we were having to learn the words that described the theories […] 
We were teaching each other’ (MaColl et al, 1985: 244).  
MacColl’s testimony shows that the group was trying to produce politically 
‘effective’ performances, by understanding their theatrical practice as a learning 
process.   Littlewood and MacColl wanted to expose their own exploration and 
their continuous pursuit of knowledge by making it visible for the spectators in the 
performances. If Meyerhold’s theatrical ‘mechanics’ were considered too 
sophisticated and Stanislavski’s persistence on the actors’ emotional involvement 
with their character was seen as an apolitical approach, it was Brechtian theatre 
that provided a platform on which the Theatre of Action could step on.  
Brecht was becoming increasingly known amongst the European theatre world, 
and satirical-political plays such as The Threepenny Opera (1928) and the Rise and Fall 
of the City of Mahagonny (1930) already had a significant impact on theatre 
collectives and directors. The Theatre of Action produced pieces of theatre whose 
 78 
sociopolitical commentary could be well understood by the audiences, without 
excluding imaginative and poetic narratives. Like Brecht, they were trying to 
attract audiences derived from diverse social groupings, and make them reflect on 
what they were watching by exposing the ways in which their performances were 
constructed and arranged. In this sense, the group was oscillating between illusion 
and anti-illusion, between sociopolitical critique and imagination. They wanted to 
entertain the spectators by performing politically informed plays that raised the 
sociopolitical awareness of the audience, as well as of the group.  
 
(c) Theatre Union  
Theatre of Action’s distancing from the philosophy of socialist realism was 
considered as a threatening futuristic tendency by the communist party, whose 
leaders rushed to expel MacColl and Littlewood from their political circles. 
Ironically however, they were both offered scholarships to study theatre in Russia, 
but while waiting for their visas to be issued in London they decided to return in 
Manchester in 1936, where they formed a new group: Theatre Union. Their radical 
political framework continued to shape their approach to performance; Living 
Newspaper7 techniques were employed more consciously and more systematically, 
as the principal aims of the group (as expressed in the Theatre Union’s manifesto) 
were to ‘present to the widest possible public, and particularly to that section of 
the public which has been starved theatrically, plays of social significance’ 
(MacColl & Goorney, 1986: xxxix). With the Theatre Union, Littlewood and 
MacColl worked towards the materialisation of a truly popular theatre that would 
address the living conditions of working people as a whole. This is why, as 
Holdsworth points out, ‘they appealed to Trade Unions and to all groups engaged 
in political struggle to affiliate with this new organisation in order to build up a 
network of supporters who could promote shows in their local community and/or 
workplace’ (Holdsworth, 2006: 9). This was surely a political project, with clear 
ideological standpoints, references and objectives. At the same time, as MacColl 
clarifies, 
                                                
7 Living Newspaper was a narrative mode of popular theatre, through which the performers were 
presenting current socio-political issues (derived from the daily news) to an audience, in order to 
urge for social agitation and action. Direct techniques of experimentation, combined with the 
frequent use of multi-media, were Living Newspaper’s alternatives to naturalistic conventions. 
 79 
‘[i]t wasn’t a matter of having less art and more politics but of having more 
clearly stated politics and more powerful art. The better the politics, we 
reasoned, the better the art and the nearer we would be to achieving our goal 
of a truly popular theatre’ (MacColl, 1986: xliv). 
In theatrical terms, this approach was translated in Brechtian-like 
performances in which the audience would be able to observe enacted social 
contradictions and reflect on the ongoing action. Many performances were 
interrupted as a way to endorse audience intervention to what was happening on the 
stage. Littlewood and MacColl were great supporters of Brechtian interruptions8 
in their theatre, challenging the intellectual reflexes of their spectators in different 
ways. Some of these ways ‘included action on stage interrupted by the use of 
‘plants’ in the audience, or conventional stage action by direct address to the 
audience’ (Leach, 2006: 35). 
In aesthetic terms, Theatre Union’s performances prescribed the regular use of 
music as a central element of the plays. In fact, satisfactory musical education 
became a selective prerequisite during the actors’ auditions. The epic-theatre style 
became a norm in Theatre Union’s work, and its combination with Living 
Newspaper techniques produced many sociopolitically informed and audiovisually 
arranged shows. Meanwhile, the Second World War had begun, and although the 
group managed to continue working in the early stages of the conflicts, it soon 
became impossible for Littlewood and MacColl to carry on.  
 
III. Theatre Workshop and Theatre Royal: a shift in 
perspective  
After the break up of the company in 1942, each member followed their own 
path in theatre education and performance practice for the next three years. Even 
in the times of war, Littlewood and MacColl urged the former members of 
Theatre Union to continue their education, maintaining their desire for theatre 
                                                
8 Walter Benjamin was one of the first theoreticians that analysed and supported the theatrical 
practices of Brecht, advocating the value of ‘interruption’ as a key element of ‘epic theatre’. For 
Benjamin, ‘[q]uoting a text implies interrupting its context’, which means that the capacity to 
distance oneself from the flow of a narrative and reflect upon its meaning is not only a prerequisite 
of epic theatre, but also an essential tool for examining any cultural and critical discourse 
(Benjamin, 1998 [1966]: 19). 
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making. During these unstable and shocking conditions, they dedicated 
themselves in exploring diverse models of dramaturgy, ranging from commedia 
dell’ arte to Elizabethan, Roman and Chinese theatre. 
After the end of the war, and while artistic expression and intellectual initiatives 
were urgently needed throughout England – not only as a cultural relief from the 
war, but also as a part of a new beginning in post-war social life – the group 
reformed in 1945 in Kendal as Theatre Workshop. This was a very crucial turn in 
Littlewood’s theatre project. It was the beginning of a touring theatre collective 
that, while living together ‘on the road’, produced popular and political theatre by 
mostly focusing on improvisation and workshops. As Holdsworth notes, ‘[t]he new 
name signalled a growing concern with making theatre as an on-going process 
that grew out of research, training and collaboration’ (Holdsworth, 2006: 13). 
Even though the artistic and political intentions of Theatre Workshop were not 
very different from the ones of Theatre Union, there was an important shift in the 
materialisation of the group’s ways to engage audiences, as well as in the manner 
in which the company was working. The intensification of Littlewood’s vision and 
objectives was clearly manifested in her aspiration for the emergence of more 
direct ways to interact with, rather than educate, working-class audiences, through 
focusing on theatrical modes such as ‘direct address’, unexpected happenings and 
spectators’ participation. As noted in Theatre Workshop’s manifesto, the 
experimentation with space in arranging the performances (which was facilitated 
by the application of technological mediums) was fundamental in terms of the 
spectators’ accessibility to the on-stage action. Furthermore, the nomadic 
character of the company and its flexibility as a touring collective became an asset 
with regards to attracting audiences, since Theatre Workshop’s performances took 
place wherever it was easier for many spectators to gather. 
Despite the fact that the agit-prop quality of the work had remained visible 
(shocking audiovisuals combined with leftist rhetoric still was one of the basic 
theatrical elements of the group’s performances), Littlewood’s attention had 
shifted towards de-objectifying the spectators, transforming them into theatrical 
subjects. The process of creating an intimate socio-theatrical platform, on which 
audience and performers could co-exist, interact and share experiences, was a task 
of primary importance for Littlewood, who wanted to destabilise the passive 
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condition of her spectators. For example, in MacColl’s Uranium 235 (1946), there 
was an evening experimentation by the performers, during which they were 
repeating selected scenes from the play, inviting audience’s comments, 
interventions and interruptions. In Uranium 235, MacColl’s text attempted to raise 
awareness about the devastating potentiality of nuclear war, pointing the 
audience’s attention to the explosions in Japan in 1945. Based on challenge and 
exaggeration, Littlewood directed the play in a melodramatic way that alarmed 
the spectators by means of surprise. The actors were instructed to spontaneously 
address the audience and give way to their reactions. The reception of the play 
was enthusiastic, especially for young audiences, and left a promising feeling for 
radical theatre initiatives to follow. In her autobiography, Littlewood writes: 
‘At the end of the show the stage was packed with young people arguing, 
questioning, examining our sound and lighting equipment, wanting to know 
how to start a ‘Workshop’’ (Littlewood, 2003 [1994]: 191). 
Similarly directed, but with a different set design, the political thriller The 
Travellers was presented in Edinburgh’s annual theatre festival in 1952. 
Responding to the Europe’s war tendencies, the aisle of the auditorium was 
transformed into a spatial and audiovisual simulation of a train in motion. The 
evident influence of Eisenstein’s cinematic approach to audiovisual effects 
enhanced the aesthetic, as well as the political canvas of the play, producing an 
obscure sensation of ‘traveling’ amongst the audience. This displacing feeling 
shaped the interactive narrative of the play, as the spectators, who were set to face 
the aisle and therefore each other as well, had the feeling that they were in the 
interior of the train traveling with the performers (Leiter, 1991). 
Although its reception was also enthusiastic, The Travellers signaled the end of 
Theatre Workshop as an on-the-road ensemble. Littlewood’s efforts to stabilise the 
financial situation of the touring group, forced her, as well as the rest of the 
members, to relocate permanently in an East London venue called Theatre Royal.9 
Ewan MacColl, a founding member of Theatre Workshop, opposed to that move, 
‘as he feared a London setting and reliance on critical acclaim would undermine 
the ideological basis of the company’s work’ (Holdsworth, 2006: 22). His 
                                                
9 Also widely known as Stratford East.  
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resignation from the group was inevitable. Littlewood’s ambivalent, but 
emotionally powerful view on his departure, is described in her autobiography: 
‘One day, Ewan MacColl, James H. Miller, Jimmie, call him what you will, 
prime mover, inspiration, Daddy o’ t, walked out, quit, buggered off – and, 
not to put too fine a point on it, resigned’ (Littlewood, 2003 [1994]: 434). 
Despite her disappointment, Littlewood was willing to form a genuine repertory 
company, and thus encountered the Stratford East residency as a distinctive 
opportunity. After all, the city of London provided a stimulating urban context in 
which Theatre Workshop could function as a long-standing ensemble. The 
company’s work in Theatre Royal gradually became more systematic and 
organised. The status of Theatre Workshop was radically climbing levels, 
especially after the group’s participation at the Paris International Theatre Festival 
in May 1955, and the extremely enthusiastic feedback they received from French 
critics, for the presentation of the plays Volpone and the Elizabethan Arden of 
Faversham. The Paris success and the subsequent productions of the 1955-56 
seasons began to grow the company’s reputation within the British Theatre 
establishment.  
One of the most interesting performances that Littlewood directed during this 
period was A Taste of Honey (1958), a play written by Shelagh Delaney. Littlewood 
employed a seriocomic approach to Delaney’s challenging text in order to 
describe extravagant themes of everyday life. Complex human relationships and 
homosexuality were the basic subjects addressed in A Taste of Honey, through which 
Littlewood satirised the ways that society produces marginalisation and sustains its 
contradictions. The play portrayed and reflected upon ‘inordinate’ characters of 
everyday life and discussed their alleged ‘queerness’ in a critical, as well as 
entertaining manner. The emotional density of the performance was combined 
with a cabaret-style jazz trio, sudden questions and frequent comments to the 
audience. It was a Brechtian theatrical event, mostly based on an anti-illusionist 
and intimate way of engaging with the spectators. As Arthur K. Oberg notes in his 
1966 review of the performance, ‘[t]here are not only the direct addresses to the 
audience in Joan Littlewood’s fashion, but also the use of the extended tale or the 
dirty joke (‘Did I ever tell you about the …’), and the detached and beyond-
character remark’ (Oberg, 1966: 162). At the same time, rather than investing on 
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pessimism and despair, the sensation that the performance conveyed was both 
affirmative and radical. Delaney’s text was written in this direction and Littlewood 
wanted to emphasise and enrich this positive narrative in the performance. 
Delaney notes: 
‘no one in my play despairs. Like the majority of people they take in their 
stride whatever happens to them and remain cheerful […] I see the theatre as 
a place where you should go not only to be entertained but where the 
audience has contact with real people, people who are alive’ (as cited in 
Speakman, 1989: v; original emphasis). 
The radical quality of the play was not only manifested in its political 
commentary, but also in Littlewood’s achievement to present marginalised 
characters in a non-stereotypical way. Indeed, the play was largely a critique of 
typified representations of minorities and repressed communities. This approach is 
well depicted by the novelist and journalist Colin Macinnes in Encounter (1959): 
‘[…] the first English play I’ve seen in which a coloured man, and a queer 
boy, are presented as natural characters, factually without a nudge or 
shudder. It is also the first play I can remember about working-class people 
that entirely escapes being a ‘working-class play’: no patronage, no dogma, 
just the thing as it is, taken straight’ (as cited in Speakman, 1989: vi). 
Thus, it was this challenge to dogmatic representation, this ‘escape’ from a 
patronising depiction of different identities, that gave a unique political disposition 
to the staging of A Taste of Honey. The level of agency that the play introduced to 
real characters (whose life stories were typically hidden from the public eye), along 
with the interactive sensation of the performance, were a radical breakthrough for 
the British theatre of the late 1950s. As Oberg notes, 
‘[a]lthough A Taste of Honey is never prescriptively social or political in the way 
that other Joan Littlewood presentations were, the text and the kind of 
production it received earmark A Taste of Honey for importance in the history 
of the revival of the grass-roots, popular play’ (Oberg, 1966: 160). 
At the same time, even though Littlewood used Brechtian anti-illusionist 
techniques to raise the critical perception of the audience in a tangible way, the 
absence of props from the performance was considered as a theatrical attempt to 
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address a transcendental idea of life. For example, in 1962, John Russell Taylor 
pointed out that, ‘[A Taste of Honey] was in Joan Littlewood’s characteristic 
manner, a sort of magnified realism in which everything is lifelike but somehow 
larger than life’ (Taylor, 1962: 132). 
While the staging of Delaney’s A Taste of Honey was an illustration of 
Littlewood’s relation to the Berliner Ensemble,10 the subsequent production of 
Brendan Behan’s The Hostage (1958-59) demonstrated Littlewood’s capacity to go 
beyond Brecht’s theatrical ‘severity’ by transforming the play into an 
improvisational burlesque. The narrative, as well as the conceptual structure of 
The Hostage was actually created during the rehearsals, since Behan’s failure to 
submit the script on time urged Littlewood to begin working on a coarse draft. 
The end result had hardly any similarities with the original dramatic text. 
However, Behan’s admiration of Littlewood’s theatrical philosophy provided 
Theatre Workshop with confidence to experiment, and placed emphasis on the 
mode of presentation, rather than the illustration of the story’s morale. Behan was 
in agreement with Littlewood that music hall11 style could politically entertain 
working-class audiences.  
The subject matter of The Hostage is indeed very political. It follows the story of 
a young British soldier’s kidnapping by the IRA (he was kept as a hostage in order 
to pressure for the release of an IRA prisoner who was facing execution). The plot 
of the play focuses on the discussions about Irish nationalism and British 
colonialism that emerged in the place where the soldier was kept. To consider the 
political questions around the relationship between Britain and Ireland was very 
important during the late 1950s, as the conflict in Northern Ireland was brewing. 
In a sense, The Hostage was a dialogue between Irish and British theatre and 
politics. 
Littlewood directed the play according to a mixture of certain techniques of 
commedia dell’ arte and music hall spontaneity. The performance transformed 
the text’s sociopolitical ‘message’ into a wide discussion with the audience, 
especially since the play had been converted into a celebratory and impromptu 
                                                
10 Famous German Theatre Company, established by Bertolt Brecht and his wife Helen Weigel in 
East Berlin in 1949.  
11 Similar to the American vaudeville, music hall refers to a particular form of musical theatre 
usually composed by agitational songs and seriocomic elements.    
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happening-like event. Furthermore, the diffused seriocomic element of the staging 
came together with ‘living newspaper’ techniques, producing a multi-temporal 
and multidimensional experience. What was eventually considered as the triumph 
of the play was its ‘unexpectedness’, which resulted in the emergence of an 
intimate relation between the performers and the audience. Direct address to the 
spectators, particularly the latecomers and the early-leavers, was once more the 
tool of engagement that Theatre Workshop employed. Howard Goorney, who 
worked with Littlewood from 1937 to 1960, refers to the staging of The Hostage 
pointing out that, 
‘we allowed for improvisation in the actual performance, particularly in 
relation to the audience: interruptions were never ignored, we dealt with what 
was given to us. If someone walked out, we turned it to our advantage, and 
late-comers were treated roughly’ (Goorney, 1966: 103).  
In the meantime, Littlewood’s residency at the Theatre Royal had begun to be 
surrounded by growing concerns and tension. The pressure that Littlewood 
experienced in attempting to achieve the simultaneous satisfaction of actors, 
audience and critics made her devise some revisionist (and more conventional) 
performances that could be transferred to the commercial context of the West 
End. Situated in the middle of this intensity, which was further manifested by the 
Lord Chamberlain’s strict censorship, Theatre Workshop persisted on promoting 
popular theatre inventiveness, through maintaining its radical iconoclastic 
approach. Littlewood’s insistence on experimenting through improvisation and 
especially the latter’s placement as a fundamental component of both the 
rehearsals and the performances, was often criticised by censors who encountered 
the ‘unexpected’ elements of the plays as threatening initiatives. Moreover, 
financial matters kept raising the urgency of the situation since the Arts Council 
was refusing to support such avant-garde versions of the classical works, in favour 
of the dissemination of ‘high’ culture (Holdsworth, 2006). The mistrustful 
atmosphere of the Cold War had had significant influence to the function of the 
British state, and constituted one of the principal alibis for such a restrictive 
attitude towards theatrical experimentation and grassroots activities. Several 
writers’ frustration about Littlewood’s deconstructive effects on their scripts, as 
well as the critical reaction to the West End staging of Goldman’s They Might Be 
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Giants constituted the occasions for Littlewood’ two-year resignation from Theatre 
Workshop in 1961. However, the most important reasons that urged her to that 
decision remained her powerlessness to attract a permanent working-class 
audience, and the tight conditions of a play’s rehearsal and staging. 
 
IV. The Fun Palace: an ‘incomplete’ project  
The beginning of the end of Theatre Workshop (which practically occurred in 
1975) was partly a consequence of the transitional character of the early and mid 
1960s, and came in parallel to significant changes in the political terrain of the 
Western world. In the beginning of the 1960s there emerged a shift in the ways in 
which politics and critique were conceptualised and expressed. ‘Youth culture’ 
became popular in conjunction with the blossoming of pop and rock music (The 
Beatles, Bob Dylan etc.) and, subsequently, ‘style – to some extent at least – 
became generational rather than class-based’ (Leach, 2006: 199). Ironically, while 
the 1960s was a decade of radicalisation and subversion within political discourses, 
and despite the fact that arts were becoming more and more connected to the 
political sphere12, Littlewood could not ‘follow’ these developments – at least, not 
in the same way as before. Theatre Workshop’s sociopolitical and aesthetic 
relevance to the times was widely questioned (even by Littlewood), and while the 
establishment of the Royal Shakespeare Company (1960) and National Theatre 
(1963) in some way ‘legitimised’ and gave a renewed status to the theatre as an art 
form, it also marginalised the dynamics and potentials of avant-garde collectives. 
Besides, Littlewood was disappointed with the ways in which theatrical 
productions were taking place in London, especially due to the increased pressure 
created by the West End domination over independent theatrical initiatives. The 
tight conditions of a play’s rehearsal process and staging, as well as the advancing 
marketisation of the theatre industry made Littlewood skeptical towards theatre 
itself. In a 1961 article, published in The Times, she stated that, ‘when you have to 
live by exporting bowdlerized versions of your shows as light entertainments for 
sophisticated West End audiences you’re through’ (Littlewood, 1961: 5).  
                                                
12 As Leach observes, ‘[d]uring the 1960s a number of matters that had been of particular concern 
to Theatre Workshop were legislated on, including in 1965 the abolition of the death penalty and 
in 1968 the abolition of the Lord Chamberlain’s power to censor stage plays’ (Leach, 2006: 200).  
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Thus, being semi-detached from directorial activity and while dedicating 
significant time to travelling and working for diverse artistic projects – such as the 
attempt to create a film based on Wole Soyinka’s The Lion and the Jewel (1959), in 
Nigeria – Littlewood entered into a self-reflexive period during which she was able 
to look at her past experiences with the ensembles in retrospect, while getting 
synchronised to the ongoing social and political discourses. The need for the 
democratisation of the arts together with the growing demand for a more 
egalitarian educational system were for Littlewood two of the most important 
sociocultural questions of the 1960s in England. In a critical tone, she notes that, 
‘[n]inteenth century society worked on the principle of ‘higher education’ for 
a minority, and that education was designed merely to perpetuate the status 
quo; museums and art centres were built ‘to form and promote a taste for the 
beautiful … [and to] humanise, educate and refine a practical and laborious 
people’. These concepts have not changed and our society is perpetuating 
obsolete forms in which human energy can no longer be contained. The most 
important aspects of human development are still ignored by town planners 
and the problem of alleviating human misery, despair and apathy is so acute 
that every skilled teacher, cybernetician and artist must be recruited for the 
war on dullness’.13 
Littlewood’s social concern was shifted toward criticising the ongoing stratification 
of the English educational and artistic sectors. At the same time, she approached 
the role of the ‘people’ (either the students, spectators, users or the workers) as 
fundamental in their substantial emancipation from the social implications of 
these hierarchies. Her visualisation of a genuine cultural democracy demanded a 
more actual participation and involvement of the ‘people’ in the production of 
culture, as well as in the distribution of knowledge, than what Theatre Workshop 
had suggested in the past.  
Thus, as a result of this reflective period and while still in Nigeria, Littlewood 
began shaping some of her thoughts about the creation of an artistic multi-space – 
a ‘Fun Palace’ (as she termed it) that would somehow ‘embody’ and invite 
productive responses to the social problems of English society.  Although the 
                                                
13 Littlewood, Joan, notes, 1964. Littlewood does not identify the source of her citation; (as cited in 
Mathews, 2007: 69).  
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project never actually materialised – because of lack of potential funding – the 
resonance of its concept proved to be extremely influential to many artists, 
architects and directors, and highlighted the question of interactivity within art 
and education settings. Architecturally conceived as a multimedia fun park by 
Littlewood’s collaborator Cedric Price (an innovative English architect), the Fun 
Palace was meant to attract the widest possible public, by offering artistic 
experiences, interactive educational exchanges and, most of all, fun to its users. 
Cedric Price, who was at that time teaching at the AA and at the Council of 
Industrial Design, was equally motivated by this idea. He notes that,  
‘[w]e are apathetic people, if we do not now attempt to make a new art of 
living, instead of escaping from living into rather dreary art. As a temporary 
measure the proposal has been put forward that every town should have a 
space at its disposal where the latest discoveries of engineering and science 
can provide an environment for pleasure and discovery, a place to look at the 
stars, to eat, stroll, meet and play’.14 
Indeed, the concept of the Fun Palace required the deployment of technologically 
up-to-date mediums (and thus an extensive knowledge of cybernetics) that would 
be used as interfaces for the animation of community-based activity and 
interactive learning processes.  
Although coming from different backgrounds, Littlewood and Price shared a 
similar desire to go beyond ordinary practices of artistic and cultural engagement, 
breaking with the dogmatic barriers that modernist England had imposed to the 
ways in which art and education was disseminated. While Littlewood was looking 
for a way to attract and engage with working-class people by destabilising the 
political ‘evangelism’ inherent within agit-prop theatre and performance, Price 
wanted to re-conceive the potentialities of a ‘building’s worth not in terms of its 
durability or the quality of its construction material, but in terms of its use and 
social value’ (Holdsworth, 2006: 35). 
At the same time, both Littlewood and Price wanted to address and provide 
responses to the ongoing debate around the question of leisure in England. By 
critiquing the rather patronising manner in which critics and politicians had 
                                                
14 Price, Cedric, “Pensées” (1963); (as cited in Mathews, 2007: 66).  
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approached the problem of leisure time (which was expected to increase during 
the 1960s) and its usefulness – i.e. the indirect channelling of free time towards 
liberal and consumer-based behaviours as a means to stay away from crime and 
dissident conduct – Littlewood and Price argued for a less demarcated relation 
between work and leisure, suggesting a new conception of the ‘social’ and the 
‘political’. Price notes that, ‘[t]he division between work and leisure has never 
been more than a convenient generalisation used in summarising conscious 
human activity – voluntary and imposed’ (Mathews, 2007: 70). In a more 
polemical tone, Littlewood writes:  
‘So, how are we to use our freedom from unnecessary labour? We shall be 
caught short again, as we were after the invention of the steam engine, if we 
don’t look out […] ‘work’ and ‘leisure’ overlap and merge: life becomes a 
whole’.15  
Thus, this ambitious project was ultimately an attempt to unify the notions of 
work and free time, by providing its users with educational and artistic platforms 
on which they could become the agents of their own social reality; the authors of 
their own sociocultural exchanges. As Mathews states, ‘the Fun Palace was 
intended explicitly as a response to the social and economic crises that plagued 
post-war England, and especially to the way in which technology promised to 
erase the distinctions between work, education, and leisure’ (ibid: 69).  
In terms of its functionality, the Fun Palace was conceived as a complex space 
in which spontaneous way-finding and flexibility would invite the users’ 
participation. Cedric’s final plans illustrated spatial representations within the 
topographical plan intended to function as interactive playrooms. For instance, 
there would be a ‘science playground’, suitable for exploration and learning, 
alongside an interactive ‘fun arcade’ where the users were invited to participate in 
a playroom of educational and artistic experiences drawn from current social 
contexts (Littlewood & Price, 1968: 130). Moreover, a space dedicated to the 
development of craft skills, and an additional one that would facilitate musical 
learning, would constitute a ‘plastic’ and a ‘music area’ respectively. As expected, 
Littlewood was more actively involved in the making of the ‘acting area’ of the 
                                                
15 Price, Cedric, notes on Fun Palace, 19 February 1964, Cedric Price Archives; (as cited in 
Mathews, 2007: 70). 
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Fun Palace. Although the authorship of a huge part of the project belonged to her, 
Littlewood’s familiarity with such a space was explicitly present. She envisaged the 
specific section of the space as a type of an open space, where individuals could 
theatrically enact instances of their lives and take advantage of theatre’s capacity 
to enable critical thinking and empowerment. As Holdsworth observes, ‘rather 
than performing to an audience, she proposed a theatre of everyday life in which 
people would use theatre to explore ideas, events and dilemmas that directly 
affected them’ (Holdsworth, 2006: 34). For the implementation of this part of the 
Fun Palace, Littlewood was inspired by the techniques of Augusto Boal’s Theatre 
of the Oppressed, and more particularly from Forum Theatre.16 Littlewood 
wanted to make use of Boal’s notion of ‘spect-actor’ as she believed that this was a 
truly revolutionary way to introduce political agency to her audiences. In other 
words, she was interested in enabling the users of the Fun Palace to position 
themselves politically within the space, by inviting them to participate in the space’s 
functionality. 
Now, I argue that it is important to observe an interesting turn in the way that 
Littlewood understood the staging of sociopolitical critique in her post-Theatre 
Workshop period. Not only did she change her line of thinking – from agit-prop 
art and didactic ways of performing to a more engaging form of theatre – but also, 
she became interested in decomposing the teleology and the implied grand 
narratives of political theatre of the past. In effect, in conceiving the Fun Palace 
idea, Littlewood and Price suggested non-permanent, mobile and open-ended 
ways to engage with people. In a sense, they suggested and advocated the creation 
of an ‘incomplete’ space in which individuals would be able to experience a 
multiplicity of activities by having the opportunity to shape them collectively 
either in advance or in the course of this experiencing. In framing the project’s 
aims and objectives, Littlewood and Price note: 
‘By careful planning we could have an environment in which the human 
mind and spirit may either relax or find the stimulus and delight which leads 
to creative activity […] This series of forms, these ideas, shall not be sealed or 
enclosed by some limiting scheme or statistical or sociological theories 
regarding the activity of the people, but in their incompleteness the place will 
                                                
16 I offer a brief discussion of Boal’s theatre in the introduction of the thesis.  
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leave to people themselves the possibility of developing new experiences for 
themselves’.17 
Thus, they visualised a space that would not impose any specific process (artistic 
or educational); a space that would not assume any definite theoretical or political 
agenda, but would rather ‘invite’ its users to generate the activities they want to do 
while discussing the political resonances of these activities. In fact, Price went even 
further to suggest that since the function of the Fun Palace would not be fixed, and 
given that the entire structure would be based on variability, then the building 
itself should be left open to changes and interventions by the users. As Mathews 
notes: 
‘It would not be truly ‘complete’ or even a ‘building’ in any conventional 
sense of the word. Was it possible that the users could ‘design’ it as they used 
it?’ (Mathews, 2007: 72). 
Therefore, the users of the Fun Palace would not only be able to determine the 
content of their experiences, but they would also obtain the capacity to create, and 
subsequently modify, the conditions of their own presence within the space. For 
Price, this would be the quality of an ‘anti-building’, as he termed it: 
‘The varied and ever-changing activities will determine the form of the site. 
To enclose these activities the anti-building must have equal flexibility. Thus 
the prime motivation of the area is caused by the people and their activities 
and the resultant form is continually dependent on them’.18 
Undoubtedly, it is not easy to think of the Fun Palace idea as a physically 
possible one – especially during the 1960s. Perhaps, the whole project could be 
accused for vagueness or even utopianism. However, I suggest that it is crucial to 
understand the conception of the Fun Palace as an important attempt to challenge 
the established meeting points of politics and theatre, by proposing a revolutionary 
way in which people would engage with sociopolitical reality and enhance their 
critical perception. I argue that all these ambitiously ‘imprecise’ ideas of 
Littlewood and Price (the mobile space, the ‘anti-building’, the more or less 
‘rhizomatic’ structure of the Fun Palace) should be acknowledged and appreciated 
                                                
17 Price, Cedric, “Objectives: Glengall Wharf, Isle of Dogs” (1963); (as cited in Mathews, 2007: 
68).  
18 Price Cedric, (1963), Cedric Price Archives; (as cited in Mathews, 2007:73).  
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as vital parts of a transitional period in British theatre; a period during which 
theatre performances began to be intentionally less prescriptive, less subjective and 
less didactic. It was this period when the grand narratives of performing critique 
began to fade more visibly than ever before; allowing space for more 
micropolitical and non-representational approaches to political theatre. 
 
V. Critical reflections: (Post)-Brecht, popular theatre and 
‘the people’ 
The reverberation of Littlewood’s project in the way that British theatre 
understood the question of critique in performance is substantial and important. 
In particular, the collaborative theatrical processes, as well as the revolutionary 
approaches to live performance that Theatre Workshop suggested and endorsed, 
produced renewed possibilities for staging critical practice. In Robert Leach’s 
words, 
‘Theatre Workshop changed – and failed to change – British theatre in 
extraordinary ways. It may be that without Theatre Workshop, the theatre in 
Britain would still be languishing in the drawing-room representationalism 
and the decorative plangency of escapist Shakespeare that was the norm 
before Theatre Workshop appeared. Theatre Workshop’s modernism was 
often rejected, but by the 1960s its influence was pervasive’ (Leach, 2006: 
203).  
For Leach, the primary contribution of Theatre Workshop lies in its capacity to 
somehow ‘impose’ a modernist radicalisation of theatre, especially in relation to its 
politics of representation. Indeed, Littlewood was instrumental in destabilising the 
bourgeois mode of representation that the reiteration of classic dramatic texts was 
maintaining. She modernised British theatre to the extent that her productions 
confronted a long-established ideological and textual mimeticism that was inherent 
in traditional theatre. From this perspective, I would argue that Littlewood was 
also one of the harbingers of postmodern theatre, since her performances 
(especially with the Theatre Workshop) were, directly or not, informed by the 
need to challenge the ideological, political and cultural implications of grand 
dramatic narratives and predetermined political outcomes. This became obvious 
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in Littlewood’s late projects, and especially in her conception and framing of the 
Fun Palace, but also in her continuous attempts to creatively ‘de-specify’ the 
process of communicating with audiences as a means to introduce substantial 
agency to working-class people. In other words, I suggest that by transforming the 
mode of engaging with audiences into an ‘inexact’ (that is, a less predetermined), 
yet polemical interplay, Littlewood managed to challenge, and frequently subvert, 
the stratification in the power relations of her theatre. 
In what follows I want to briefly reflect on three critical points in relation to 
Littlewood’s theatrology, in an attempt to conclude this chapter by focusing on the 
importance of her role in British political theatre. Firstly, I want to argue that the 
mode of critique in Littlewood’s theatre was situated in the interval between a 
Brechtian and a post-Brechtian approach; secondly, I want to examine 
Littlewood’s experimentation with a polemical conception of ‘popularity’ in 
theatrical settings – especially in relation to the way in which she addressed ‘the 
people’ as constituting the working-class subject; and thirdly, I want to close the 
chapter with a brief remark on Littlewood’s contribution to the emancipation of 
theatrical expression (and its reception) from teleological outcomes.  
Littlewood’s theatre drew extensively from Brecht. In particular, the Berliner 
Ensemble had a direct influence in the way in which Theatre Workshop managed 
to discuss the sociohistorical context of the performances, while providing a 
critical commentary on crucial political discourses. At the same time, Littlewood’s 
theatre was essentially a post-Brechtian one. On one level, this became possible 
due to the wide misconception of Brechtian theatre in England during the 1950s. I 
argue that, paradoxically, Littlewood was post-Brechtian to the extent that in her 
performances she used genuine interpretations of Brecht’s ideas. To illustrate this 
point, during the 1950s Brechtian theatre in England was not really Brechtian. It 
was rather a theatrical amalgam based on several misrepresentations of the 
Berliner Ensemble’s way of working with actors and of presenting plays. In his 
1966 essay, Brecht and the English Theatre, Martin Esslin captures this problem. He 
points out that, 
‘[the] Brechtian era had a great deal of talk and discussion about Brecht and 
what he was thought to stand for, but few valid productions of Brecht, little 
genuine knowledge about Brecht, and hence little evidence of any influence of 
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Brecht’s actual work and thought. The ‘Brechtian’ era in England stood 
under the aegis not of Brecht himself but of various second-hand ideas and 
concepts about Brecht, an image of Brecht created from misunderstandings 
and misconceptions’ (Esslin, 1966: 63; original emphasis). 
Thus, from this perspective it makes sense to think of Littlewood’s theatre as a 
post-Brechtian one, since she was amongst these directors whose practice was 
genuinely informed by Brecht’s epic theatre. In other words, I suggest that in this 
case the prefix ‘post’ signifies Littlewood’s move beyond the misrepresentation of 
Brecht in English theatre towards a theatrical project that did not imitate Brecht, 
but one that certainly did not misconceive him. According to Esslin, ‘Joan 
Littlewood’s and Peter Brook’s work on plays by other authors, must, on the 
whole, be regarded as the most positive result of Brechtian influence on the art of 
stage directing in England’ (ibid: 66). While commenting on Brechtian theatre in 
an interview with Janelle G. Reinelt, John McGrath makes a similar claim stating 
that, ‘[t]his was a very big, very major theatrical creation, of which the imitations 
were travesties, and it was only Joan who got through to some of what Brecht was 
about’.19 
On a second level, Littlewood’s theatre was indeed post-Brechtian. Although 
Littlewood employed the anti-illusionist techniques that Brecht used, in order to 
maintain rotation around the sociopolitical context of the plays, she also 
experimented with the development of an emotionally intense dialogue between 
the actors and the audience, as a means to expand the narrative of the 
performances towards ephemeral and unexpected directions. In his 1969 essay, 
Brecht’s Baby, A Misconception about Joan Littlewood, John Harrop points out that,  
‘[i]n Littlewood’s theatre there is an emphatic and sensual cooperation 
between the actor and the audience which Brecht avoided. For her the actors, 
while playing their parts, are still people who are talking to other people; 
therefore an actor can ad-lib on stage, or can talk directly to the audience 
without any conspicuous purpose of breaking the audience’s illusion – the 
truth of the theatre includes the spectator’s emotional agreement to 
participate in the sensual and intellectual experience’ (Harrop, 1969: 78).  
                                                
19 Interview with John McGrath, October 15, 1985; (as cited in Reinelt, 1994: 179).   
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From this perspective, Littlewood’s theatre raised questions that were directly 
informed by Brecht’s problematisations, but she also pushed the form of epic 
theatre towards a more affective level in terms of the relation between performers 
and audience. Unlike Brecht, Littlewood believed that the ‘alienation effect’ – 
achieved by making the artifices visible as a means to break any illusionary 
emotions that the spectators may have – could be shared with the audience, rather 
than being imposed by the performance. Whereas Brecht wanted to be in total 
control of a theatrical event, Littlewood wanted to be surprised by the ‘becoming’ 
of the event by inviting the audience to intervene and alter its progress. In this 
sense, I argue that her difference with Brecht’s theatre should be thought not only 
on a formalist basis, as both McGrath and Reinelt seem to suggest: McGrath 
argues that Littlewood differentiated her theatrical project from Brecht in so far as 
she was working with a purely ‘British popular theatre tradition’,20 and Reinelt 
goes on to add that, ‘[w]hile Brecht used the cabaret, or café, culture of Germany 
combined with some regional folk traditions from Bavaria, or source material 
taken from oral as well as written traditions, Littlewood used music hall and 
variety show forms, British seaside entertainment, and panto’ (Reinelt, 1994: 179). 
What I argue does not essentially stand in contrast to these accounts, since 
popularising the form and the style of the performances was in effect a move 
towards a more engaging mode of theatre; however, I suggest that in contrast to 
Brecht’s assumption that the staging of critique should be presented to de-
illusionised spectators, it is crucial to consider Littlewood’s theatre as one that 
created the conditions for critique’s becoming as a shared process within the 
event. Thus, it makes sense to argue that, in a way, Littlewood redefined 
Brechtian theatre by investing in the revolutionary aspect of emotions and empathy, 
in as much as these qualities become shared experiences that produce critical 
engagement with a performance. While Brecht argued that, ‘[f]eelings are private 
and limited’, Littlewood introduced the critical value of emotional ‘vibrations’ 
within the context of epic theatre (Brecht, 1964: 15). Considered as such, I suggest 
that Littlewood’s theatre belongs to an ‘interval’ between a Brechtian and post-
Brechtian approach. Implicit in this belonging, is the need for transforming the 
‘theatre of the people’ into a theatre of presence. In other words, despite the fact 
                                                
20 Interview with John McGrath, October 15, 1985; (as cited in Reinelt, 1994: 179).  
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that Littlewood is known as the director of a ‘theatre of the people’, I argue that 
one of her most unique contributions to political theatre is the attempt to create 
(and also theorise) a ‘theatre of the event’: namely, a theatre of the ‘here and now’. 
As Leach notes,  
‘[Littlewood’s] actors […] were expected to act ‘in the present’, to listen to 
their partners on the stage and to react honestly to what those partners said or 
did. Never was a Theatre Workshop actor to serve up memories of rehearsals’ 
(Leach, 2006: 209).  
Now, in keeping with this argument, I suggest that it is important to understand 
Littlewood’s theatrical method as a revolutionary approach to popular theatre. After 
all, Littlewood is amongst these directors that attempted to emancipate the term 
‘popular theatre’ from its apolitical and ‘soft entertaining’ representations in 
bourgeois and middle-class contexts. According to Prentki and Selman, ‘[p]opular 
theatre is the practice of theatre as an expression of specific communities’ stories, 
issues, knowledge and needs’ (Prentki & Selman, 2000: 8). This sort of definition is 
clear and comprehensive in outlining the basic need that makes popular theatre 
possible; but, at the same time, I argue that it does not answer the question: Is 
popular theatre political? Prentki and Selman clarify that, ‘[p]opular theatre is a 
process of theatre which deeply involves specific communities in identifying issues of 
concern, analysing current conditions and causes of a situation, identifying points 
of change, and analysing how change could happen and/or contributing to the 
actions implied’ (ibid; original emphasis). In this second description of popular 
theatre, one can make the connections between the ‘popular’ and the ‘political’ in 
a much more justifiable manner. As Joel Schechter points out, ‘the term ‘popular 
theatre’ is still associated with democratic, proletarian, and politically progressive 
theatre’ (Schechter, 2003: 3).  
For Littlewood, a true popular theatre is fundamentally a political theatre; seen 
both as practice and as a process that contributes to social change through its 
engagement with working-class people. In this sense, Littlewood drew a sharp 
dividing line between a popular and a populist theatre. She openly opposed any 
comparisons to be made between West End productions, ‘escapist’ plays of no 
relevance to the working-class communities and the popular ‘theatre of the people’ 
that she, Ewan MacColl, John McGrath and other similar directors had practiced. 
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In fact, Littlewood’s conception of the ‘popular’ can be considered as very similar 
to Brecht’s description of Volkstümlich (which in German means something between 
popular and traditional), as a ‘becoming’ condition, rather than as a ‘static one, 
without background or development’ (Brecht, 1964: 108). Brecht offered one of 
the most revolutionary descriptions of popular theatre – one that Littlewood 
wholeheartedly embraced: 
‘Our conception of ‘popular’ refers to the people who are not only fully 
involved in the process of development but are actually taking it over, forcing 
it, deciding it. We have in mind a people that is making history and altering 
the world and itself. We have in mind a fighting people and also a fighting 
conception of ‘popularity’’ (ibid). 
Thus, Littlewood and Brecht shared a parallel perspective about the radical 
potential of popular theatre. They both believed in the possibility of modern 
theatre to become more popular, more familiar, and therefore more effective, to 
the working class audiences than the conventional realist theatre of the past.  
Now, amongst these theorists that have criticised the function of popular 
theatre and its political role, Gilles Deleuze is one that challenges its form, content 
and social implications in the most unconditional way. In One less Manfesto (1979), 
an essay in which he discusses the theatre of Carmelo Bene,21 Deleuze counters 
the practice of popular theatre focusing on the latter’s incapacity to challenge the 
normalisation of sociopolitical reality and its representation on stage. He argues 
that, ‘when one speaks of a popular theatre, one always privileges a certain 
representation of conflicts, conflicts of the individual and society, of life and history, 
contradictions and oppositions of all kinds that cut across a society as well as its 
individuals’ (Deleuze, 1997 [1979]: 252; original emphasis). Deleuze criticises the 
attempts to create a ‘theatre for all’, as he believes that, no matter how political or 
avant-garde they can be, they all fail to challenge and subvert the hierarchically 
structured power relations that emerge from representing society in a ‘major’ 
manner, i.e. in a generalising and territorial way. He writes:  
‘But why do conflicts generally depend on representation? Why does theatre 
remain representative each time it focuses on conflicts, contradictions, and 
                                                
21 A more detailed discussion of this particular essay is offered in chapter 2.  
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oppositions? It is because conflicts are already normalised, codified and 
institutionalised. They are ‘products’. They are already a representation that 
can be represented so much the better on stage’ (ibid). 
Thus, Deleuze argues that popular theatre lacks any radical potential, in so far as 
it continues to become possible through abstract significations that function as 
normative enactments of social life. 
Although Deleuze’s position is inspiring and justifiable, I argue that it does not 
make a distinction between a ‘static’ and a ‘becoming’ notion of popular theatre. 
Deleuze denounces popular theatre on the basis of its capacity to address a mass 
public through representing a codified mixture of ideologies and/or social 
situations; but, at the same time, he overlooks specific instances of popular 
theatrical practice which not only challenge normative representations of society, 
but also operate through theatrical variations, creative unexpectedness and 
‘minor’ approaches to political critique. I suggest that Littlewood’s project belongs 
to this kind of theatrical practice by means of her attempt to create the conditions 
for a more actual process of critique, rather than a representational one. The 
practice of Theatre Workshop profoundly rejected the institutionalisation of 
critical processes and their representation either as ideological doctrines or self-
identical truths (or in Deleuze’s words as ‘products’). The way in which Littlewood 
directed her performances was (especially with the Theatre Workshop) based on 
destratifying the power relations that emerge during a theatrical play, through the 
de-objectification of the audience. From this perspective, Littlewood’s theatre was 
not a static expression of popular theatre (that is, a normalised practice of 
representing abstract political ideas and concepts). Rather, it was a ‘becoming’ 
political theatre that employed popular forms not as a means to please and 
preserve a working-class audience, but as a means to enrich the political 
potentiality of a ‘becoming theatre of the people’. 
At the same time however, Deleuze makes a fair point: 
‘Everyone appeals to the people in the name of the majority language. But 
where are the people? ‘The people are missing’’ (ibid: 254). 
Although Littlewood did not use a ‘majority language’ in the performances, that is 
a language that would convey institutionalised representations of predetermined 
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meanings, she surely sought for a ‘major’ audience; not in the sense of the identity 
(individual or collective) of the people that composed her audiences, but in the 
way that she was addressing them as a unified subject that was abstractly (and 
debatably) constituted. In other words, even though Littlewood did not ‘speak’ the 
codified language of an established leftist rhetoric, she nevertheless approached 
her audiences as a codified representation of the working-class condition, of its 
conflicts and, by extension, of its revolutionary possibilities. As Leiter notes, 
‘Littlewood’s career reveals her consuming passion for a relevant theatre that 
would appeal to the average man’ (Leiter, 1991:203). Thus, in this sense, 
Littlewood attempted to de-objectify and introduce political agency to a ‘body’ of 
working people by assuming both its political consistency and its cultural 
homogeneity. They were ‘the people’, that is Littlewood’s desired addressees 
whom she considered as a homogeneous whole: the working-class subject. It is at 
this point, I argue, that Littlewood’s theatrical project is at odds with her anti-
normative political aspirations. Because, in so far as Littlewood ‘theorised’ her 
spectators as ‘the people’ and framed them under a specific political discourse, she 
simultaneously gave way to their standardisation as potential ‘seeds’ of 
sociopolitical change, as well as to their normalisation within a representation of 
the working-class condition. While commenting on the constitution of ‘the people’ 
as a unified working-class subject, Deleuze describes this process as an important 
territorial operation:  
‘But we have subjected them to a strange graft, to a strange operation: we 
have mapped, represented, normalised, historicised them, integrated them 
into majority rule. And there, indeed, we have made them poor. We have 
made them slaves. We have turned them into the people. We have rendered 
them major in History’ (ibid: 254-5). 
Viewed as such, Littlewood’s endeavour to constantly push for the composition of 
a homogeneous and consistent audience was problematic to the extent that it 
compressed the politically subversive potentials of difference amongst and within this 
audience. At the same time, I argue that this cannot be generalised as a structural 
problem of popular theatre: seeking for a wide resonance, for a large popular 
audience, does not essentially imply the latter’s representation as a homogeneous 
entity that thinks, feels, understands, experiences and acts identically. 
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Furthermore, identifying the same contradictions within the sociopolitical and 
economic system of a society does not imply the formation of a counter-body of 
action that, in one way or another, signifies subversion in a macro-political level 
and should behave as a unified organism. 
This is not to suggest that Littlewood’s theatre was politically unproductive or 
ideologically institutionalised. After all, Littlewood was the first one to quit when 
institutionalisation became a serious threat to the practice of Theatre Workshop. 
Although Littlewood’s way of attracting and ‘labelling’ her spectators was perhaps 
problematic (most probably because of her polemical attitude and her motivation 
to respond to ongoing sociopolitical problems), that was not the case with her way 
to critically engage with them. I suggest that Littlewood managed to create the 
conditions of possibility for critique to be thought, performed and actualised in a 
micropolitical manner – beyond its representation as a normalised discourse. Her 
‘immaturity’ as a political commentator or an academic critic, in a way, gave her 
this capacity in so far as it functioned as a creative asset within her theatre. In a 
sense, Littlewood’s theatre could never be institutionalised, and therefore 
hierarchically structured, because it was practiced in unexpected, incomplete and 
politically ‘immature’ ways. It is not by chance that the most common objects of 
censorship to Littlewood’s theatre were the free improvisation of classical texts and 
the unexpected happenings that were taking place in the theatrical events of 
Theatre Workshop. The fact that the establishment considered these qualities as 
potentially ‘dangerous’ is a verification of their radical possibilities, as well as of 
their political relevance. Littlewood was a problem for Lord Chamberlain 
because: firstly, she transformed the traditional mode of engaging with audiences, 
instilling unexpected (even to the performers) ways of coming into contact with the 
spectators – and, as a result, she introduced more politically forceful agential 
possibilities to them; secondly, Littlewood’s continuous experimentation and 
improvisation of classical plays was an important threat to the conformist 
representations of directors such as Shakespeare, Moliere and Heywood – 
representations through which bourgeois values were sustained and endorsed; and 
thirdly, as a result of the unexpected ways in which Littlewood’s theatrical events 
were performed, Littlewood managed to emancipate political theatre from a 
notion of teleology, both in terms of political but also of artistic outcomes. The 
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‘incompleteness’ of Theatre Workshop’s theatre was used by Littlewood as a 
productive and critical possibility that could destabilise teleology and normativity 
in the way of perceiving and experiencing political theatre. I argue that this sense 
of the ‘unfinished experience’ – that was so frequent in Theatre Workshop’s plays 
– played a crucial role in the decomposition of normative representation of 
sociopolitical conflicts and also created the conditions for an always becoming-
critique that was, in part, produced within the event.   
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Introduction 
This chapter examines the way in which the British director Peter Brook 
attempted to conceptualise and put into practice a so-called ‘pre-cultural’ theatre; 
that is, a potential of performance to have an affective and pre-cognitive relation 
to the audience. Brook took up this challenge particularly during his work with the 
Theatre of Cruelty Workshop in the mid-1960s, as well as with the International Centre for 
Theatre Research in the 1970s. I suggest that it is during this particular period that 
Brook made a significant contribution to political theatre, since his work 
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challenged the function of representation and radicalised metaphysics in 
performance. Through examining Brook’s theatre project, and therefore 
capturing a sense of the transitional 1960s-1970s period, we can address the 
question of a non-representational approach to theatre in a way that still echoes in 
contemporary performance practices. 
Peter Brook has been a researcher of the possibilities that emerge from 
exploring the ‘primal’ aspect of performance. Describing this ‘area of research’ as 
a common ground of many theatrical initiatives of the 1960s, Innes notes that,  
‘[i]n theatrical terms this is reflected by a reversion to ‘original’ forms: the 
Dionysian rituals of Ancient Greece, shamanistic performances, the Balinese 
dance-drama’ (ibid: 3). 
Belonging to the 1960s avant-garde, Brook’s theatrical project can be thought as 
an important part of what Innes calls ‘primitivist theatre’. He writes:   
 ‘Perhaps paradoxically, what defines this avant garde movement is not 
overtly modern qualities […] but primitivism. This has two complementary 
facets: the exploration of dream states or the instinctive and subconscious 
levels of the psyche; and the quasi-religious focus on myth and magic, which 
in the theatre leads to experiments with ritual and ritualistic patterning of 
performance’ (Innes, 1993: 2-3).   
In this chapter, I will argue that Brook’s theatre can be thought of as a 
radicalisation of this primitivist shift that Innes observes. I will suggest that while 
experimenting with metaphysics in theatre, Brook challenged the transcendental 
function of representation and proposed a theatre that breaks with the imitation of 
rituals or myths. 
From his first directorial attempt with Dr Faustus in 1942, to the reformation of 
the Royal Shakespeare Company in 1962 (with Peter Hall and Michel Saint-
Denis) – and from the Theatre of Cruelty Workshop (with Charles Marowitz) to the 
establishment of the International Centre for Theatre Research in Paris in 1970 
(with Micheline Rozan), Brook’s initiatives were performed in response to a 
crucial inquiry: Why theatre? (Brook, 1990 [1968]; 2005 [1993]; Smith, 1972). As 
Thomas R. Whitaker remarks, ‘[n]o contemporary director has more fully 
engaged that question than Brook’ (Whitaker, 1999: 224). Throughout his career, 
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and by looking at multiple ways to engage with this inquiry, Brook was led to 
another very important area of research: that is, the reconstitution of the relation 
between performers and spectators in political theatre. In an interview with 
Margaret Croyden in 1970, Brook argues that,  
‘[t]here is not theatre, there is nothing that one can examine, or discuss, or 
feel, or think, or argue about except at the moment when the actor and the 
audience are related. The question of what makes this a satisfactory 
relationship is the deepest and perhaps the only question in the theatre of our 
time’ (Croyden & Brook, 2003: 28).  
Following this argument, I would add that this question is also one that redefines 
critical practice. It is a question that considers the critical function of theatre as a 
process that becomes possible between the performance and the audience. 
Elaborating on this question, this chapter considers the ways through which Peter 
Brook attempted to defamiliarise commonsensical notions of the conceptual and 
pragmatic ‘space’ that separates a performer and a spectator.  
The chapter is divided into two sections. In the first one, I consider Brook’s 
theoretical project, focusing on his central notion of the ‘empty space’. In assessing 
Brook’s ideas (especially his descriptions of a deadly and a holy theatre), an explicit 
emphasis is given to The Empty Space, as I suggest, this influential work provides the 
necessary tools for a thorough examination of Brookian theory, while opening a 
dialogue with metaphysics in theatre. In the second section, I offer a critical 
analysis (in the form of a case study) of Orghast, which was the first public 
production of the International Centre for Theatre Research in Persepolis, Iran in 
1971. My intention in this second section is to trace, in a more particular vein, the 
way in which Brook materialised a theatrical challenge to mimetic representation, 
through his experimentation with a pre-cultural performance.   
The aim of the chapter is by no means to give a general account of Brook’s 
theatrology; it is rather to trace those singular, ‘micropolitical’ parts of his theatre 
project that challenged the stratified structure of theatrical binaries, by mapping 
theatrical territories beyond (or before) representation and linguistic normativity. 
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I. ‘Emptying’ the Space: Brook’s theatre 
(a) A (non)-defined theatre 
The Empty Space is a work derived from a series of lectures given by Brook at 
various universities and colleges in the pre–70s period of his career.22 The oral 
element of the lectures has remained ‘visible’ in the text, enriching the narrative of 
the book. Although its writing style and structure resemble the form of a manifesto 
for theatre, its tone remains explicitly conversational producing a ‘lively’ sense, 
with the book seemingly unfolding through the reader. As Michael Kustow remarks 
in his biography of Peter Brook, ‘[The Empty Space] moves smoothly between 
magisterial abstractions […] and easygoing vernacular anecdote’ (Kustow, 2005: 
153).  
The resonance of The Empty Space has been evident in the work of many artists 
and theatre collectives that framed their practices around basic and site-specific 
ideas of theatre; mainly because of Brook’s ability to address theatre as a simple 
art form that stems from the elementary intensities that produce the human need 
for performance. Accordingly, I argue that Brook’s methodology was based on a 
certain minimalism. He defined theatre by the fewest elements possible, as a 
means to understand and explore the desires that motivate human beings to 
become performers. Particularly, in The Empty Space he is critical of Western 
theatre’s tendency to approach dramatic texts (most of all Shakespearean texts) as 
immobile and self-identical truths, rather than as open-ended processes of 
theatrical meaning. He argues that, ‘[a] word does not start as a word – it is an 
end product which begins as an impulse, stimulated by attitude and behaviour 
which dictates the need for expression’ (Brook, 1990 [1968]: 15). Interestingly, in 
Evoking Shakespeare, Brook notes that, ‘it is almost impossible to discover a 
Shakespeare point of view, unless you say that being Shakespeare he contained in 
himself at least a thousand Shakespeares’ (Brook, 1999: 21-22).  
In a similar manner, Jerzy Grotowski described his pursuit of a ‘poor theatre’ 
during the same period. Looking for a non-linear approach to communication in 
theatre, Grotowski argued that, ‘[t]he acceptance of poverty in theatre, stripped of 
all that is not essential to it, revealed to us not only the backbone of the medium, 
                                                
22 These lectures were given at the universities of Hull, Keele, Manchester and Sheffield.  
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but also the deep riches which lie in the very nature of the art-form’ (Grotowski, 
1975 [1968]: 21). Both Brook and Grotowski had rejected the essentialism and the 
limitations of realism and naturalism (two of the inherited forms of pre-modernist 
theatre), in favour of a ‘sacred theatre’ that would emerge out of decomposing 
existing theatrical forms. It is not by coincidence that their projects were 
frequently overlapping, as they collaborated repeatedly throughout the years.23 
However, despite this commonness in approach, they were ultimately looking at 
different perspectives in performance; in a sense, they posed divergent research 
questions. Whereas for Grotowski the point was, mainly, to explore the psychic 
potentials of an actor through self-penetration and exposure, Brook’s research has 
been conducted on the basis of discovering the ‘pre-cultural’ possibilities that 
emerge in the relation between an actor and a spectator. In other words, Brook 
was interested in rethinking theatrical expression and engagement in a way that 
bypasses or challenges normative and linguistic signification in performance.      
Brook’s understanding of a theatrical process is one that stresses the importance 
of constant shifts in perspectives. He advocates an experimental approach in his 
work that develops and progresses through trial and error. Considering this rather 
‘plastic’ approach to performance practice, Brook’s attempt to define theatre can 
be seen as unexpected or even paradoxical. The opening passage of The Empty 
Space – Brook’s most famous and widely quoted statement – has been interpreted 
as a clear attempt to define the fundamental nature of theatre and performance. 
He writes:   
‘I can take an empty space and call it a bare stage. A man walks across this 
empty space whilst someone else is watching him, and this is all that is needed 
for an act of theatre to be engaged’ (Brook, 1990 [1968]: 11).  
Indeed, the impact of this simple, yet powerful, formulation has been catalytic in 
reshaping the idea of site-specific performance in Britain and elsewhere. It is, I 
argue, foremost its resonance rather than its intention that has converted this 
conception into a definition. Richard Gilman, drama professor at Yale University, 
notes in an interview with Margaret Croyden in The New York Times that, 
‘[Brook] defined the nature of directing more than anyone else’ (Croyden & 
                                                
23 Interestingly, both The Empty Space and Grotowski’s Towards a Poor Theatre were originally 
published in 1968.   
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Gilman, 1987: 36). Kustow refers to these two sentences as being ‘arguably the 
most inspiring theatre writing since Aristotle’ (Kustow, 2005: 153). Also, when 
Brook was in South Africa, a local director (initiator of a Black Theatre Movement 
in the area of Soweto) acknowledged the importance of The Empty Space in his 
work, and when Brook asked him what link did he make between the text of the 
book and the conditions of theatre-making in Soweto, the director answered: ‘The 
first sentence!’ (Brook, 2005 [1993]: 5). Thus, in so far as this statement has 
evolved from a specific account into a trans-temporal model of performance, it 
can be understood as a potential definition of theatre – at least Brook’s definition 
of theatre; his point of view. At the same time, in The Shifting Point, Brook writes:  
‘For a point of view to be of any use at all, one must commit oneself totally to 
it, one must defend it to the very death. Yet, at the same time, there is an 
inner voice that murmurs: “Don’t take it too seriously. Hold on tightly, let go 
lightly”’ (Brook, 1987: preface). 
In other words, Brook argues that subjective and bold beliefs are very important in 
as much as they are subject to change and experimentation. He understands 
theatre as a ‘space’ that although constructed through passionate and subjectivist 
commitment, it is open to constant discussion and reconstruction. For Brook this 
is a great challenge in theatre – a challenge for which he does not seek resolution. 
The shifts in his thoughts on theatre do not imply a negation of the former ones. 
Thus, the purpose of his descriptions of theatre is in effect to create the conditions 
for next descriptions to emerge. I argue, therefore, that Brook’s idea of progress is 
not a movement towards a ‘better defined’ theatre. He starts from scratch as a way 
of modifying points of view. He looks for constant shifts in perspectives. As he 
notes in The Empty Space, he has been looking for ‘the moving towards a less 
deadly, but, as yet, largely undefined theatre’ (Brook, 1990 [1968]: 36).   
Thus, I argue that the opening passage of The Empty Space should not be 
considered as a trans-temporal ‘truth’ of theatre. At the very moment when it 
functions as such, it becomes problematically inflexible and potentially misleading. 
For instance, Carlson spots two reasons why this ‘striking statement’, as he calls it, 
may become problematic (Carlson, 2003: 132). Firstly, Carlson argues that the 
action of one person (walking across an empty space) and the respective response 
of another one (watching) do not create a theatrical act. He notes that, ‘[a] certain 
 108 
perceptual contract is also necessary, an agreement that this action will be framed as 
theatre’ (ibid; my emphasis). Of course, it might be argued that this ‘perceptual 
contract’ is described in the phrase: ‘and call it a bare stage’. However, what 
Carlson observes is important: it is the relation between the person who performs 
and the one that observes within the performatively constituted ‘stage’, that makes 
an act of theatre being engaged – and not the acts of ‘walking’ and ‘watching’ by 
themselves. Secondly, Carlson is critical of the hypothetical ‘spatial emptiness’ that 
Brook’s account implies. How empty can a space be? He notes that, ‘[u]nlike that 
of Genesis, Brook’s creative interpellation does not create a theatre out of a void 
but makes a theatre out of a space that previously was thought of as something 
else’ (ibid: 133). Carlson compares the interpellation of space into a stage with the 
interpellation of a person into a character. A person becomes a character, or is 
interpellated into a performer; yet, he argues that this new identity emerges from 
and is related to the historicity of the person. According to Carlson, the same 
process applies to the interpellation of a space into a stage. A similar critical view 
is that of Allain and Harvie, who point out that,  
‘any space comes already ideologically loaded with meanings […] There are 
no empty spaces, only variably different spaces’ (Allain & Harvie, 2006: 207).         
Considered as such, the notion of the ‘empty space’ is problematic because it 
implies the existence of a neutral or pre-discursive site. However, I argue that 
what Brook proposes through the idea of the empty space can be read in a 
different way. I suggest that Brook implies neither that emptiness is the 
‘ontological atom’ of theatre, nor that there are pure and neutral spaces. Rather 
he points out the importance of relating to a space as if it were empty. The 
difference here is important, since what Brook does is to argue for a non-
prescriptive theatre; for a non-prescriptive theatrical space. As Schechner argues 
in Performance Theory, ‘sometimes – especially in the theatre – it is necessary to live 
as if ‘as if’ = ‘is’’ (Schechner, 2003: xviii). I suggest that, in a sense, the 
interpellation of a place into an ‘empty space’ is what Carlson calls a ‘perceptual 
contract’ amongst the interpellators. It is an ephemeral agreement that creates the 
conditions for a theatre of presence. As Innes notes, it makes possible ‘[an] 
imaginative neutrality […] which allows the actor to move freely through the 
entire physical world and into subjective experience’ (Innes, 1981:129). Therefore, 
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I argue that Brook’s idea of the ‘empty space’ does not imply a negation of the 
space’s historical, architectural or emotional qualities. Instead, it suggests that such 
qualities, rather than being essentially predefined and prescribed, should be 
initially negotiated, discussed, or even disregarded – while acquiring the potential 
of being fostered, changed and multiplied.24   
 
(b) Deadly, Holy, Rough   
In order to provide a lucid theorisation of his theatre, Brook drew dividing – 
although, frequently intertwining – lines between different conceptions of 
theatrical practice: He spoke about a Deadly Theatre, a Holy Theatre, a Rough 
Theatre and an Immediate Theatre.25 This taxonomical arrangement of theatre 
modes forms the structure of The Empty Space while, at the same time, it is 
descriptive of the book’s main thesis. In what follows, I focus on Brook’s notions of 
deadly and holy Theatre, as it is through these two notions that Brook engages 
with the complexity and interrelation between what he rejects and what he 
proposes.  
Brook uses the term ‘deadly’ to discuss the entire spectrum of commercialised 
theatre (ranging from Broadway to the West End) and its implications in 
commonsensical notions of performance art. At the same time though, Brook 
clarifies that, ‘deadliness is deceptive and can appear anywhere’ – for instance, in 
‘the plays of Moliere and the plays of Brecht’, and above all Shakespeare (Brook, 
1990 [1968]: 12). For Brook, a deadly theatre is largely based on strict repetition, 
especially in the way that it is dictated in the continuous mode of theatrical 
production. According to Brook, the repetitive function of commercial theatre 
promotes an apolitical and static theatrical tradition, because it fails to question 
existing forms of engaging with audiences. He notes:  
                                                
24 In this sense, Brook’s notion of the ‘empty space’ could be understood as similar to Deleuze’s 
reading of Bene’s theatre (as discussed in chapter 2). In both ideas, we can observe a productive 
possibility of subtracting prescribed elements, in creating the conditions for a theatre that escapes 
representational normativity. 
25 The chapter will not discuss the last chapter of The Empty Space (Immediate Theatre), which is 
predominantly a reflexive account of Brook’s directorial practices, techniques and emotions.    
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‘Deadliness always brings us back to repetition […] A deadly director is a 
director who brings no challenge to the conditioned reflexes that every 
[theatre] department must contain’ (ibid: 44).  
Thus, what Brook identifies as a ‘deadly’ aspect of theatre is a fixed and static 
understanding of theatrical processes, which is promoted and sustained by 
theatre’s repetitive function. Interestingly, Brook chose the term ‘deadly’, instead 
of ‘dead’, to attribute an active sense to the term. He wanted to emphasise the 
potential of deadly theatre to become something different. He writes:  
‘When we say deadly, we never mean dead: we mean something depressingly 
active, but for this very reason capable of change’ (ibid: 45).     
 Furthermore, Brook argues that in a deadly theatre the relation between the 
performance and the spectators is based on a transcendental commonsense. He 
opposes the theatre forms that ‘divide the eternal truths from the superficial 
variations’ (ibid: 19). According to Brook, such theatre forms prohibit the intensity 
and the presence that the relation of the performance to the audience should have. 
On one hand, the actors who perform e.g. Shakespeare or Moliere, believe that 
their artistic mission is accomplished if they remain faithful to the exact texts. In 
doing so, such actors become ‘executors of a past’ – they become docile to a 
dogmatic textualism and a mimetic representation (which, in any case, is subject 
to interpretation) that put limits to their capacity to engage with the audience. In 
this sense, these actors’ capacity to create art, as well as to communicate with the 
spectators, becomes limited, since their main purpose is to carry out a 
predetermined task. On the other hand, according to Brook, the spectators can 
also be held responsible for this. For Brook, a ‘deadly spectator’ is one who craves 
for a ‘theatre that is nobler-than-life’, and in so doing s/he feels content with a 
certain level of ‘intellectual satisfaction’ that confirms his/her theoretical views of 
the world (ibid: 13).  
In contrast to this confusion between theatrical engagement and excessive 
‘intellectualism’, Brook suggests an alternative way of experiencing metaphysics in 
theatre: He suggests a ‘Holy Theatre’. In the respective section of The Empty Space, 
Brook describes this theatre as being ‘The Theatre of the Invisible-made-Visible’ 
(ibid: 47). For Brook, theatre is the place where this ‘metamorphosis’ takes place in 
an actual, rather than symbolic way. Demastes draws a parallel between Brook’s 
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holy theatre and religious processes, emphasising communion rather than mimesis 
or symbolism. He notes:      
‘The invisible-made-visible clearly echoes the trick of the magician, but the 
theatre’s event is no more trick than a Christian’s act of communion (at least 
for the believer). In the theatre the invisible is made visible; the immaterial is 
made material in a genuine and not just metaphorical sense’ (Demastes, 2002: 
16; original emphasis).  
The difference between actualising and symbolising metaphysics in theatre is a 
crucial point of challenge of mimetic representation in Brook’s theatre. I argue 
that it is a difference between a real experience and an abstract idea of experience. 
In a similar way to that of Derrida and Artaud (as seen in chapter 2), with his 
proposal for a holy theatre, Brook wants to challenge the mimetic function of 
metaphysics in theatre, experimenting with tangible ways to encounter 
unexpected, inexact, or even unexplainable experiences. He suggests an actual 
sacred theatre, rather than an image of a sacred theatre.    
In order to explore the possibility of such a theatre, Brook experiments with the 
potential of communication to be achieved as an immediate, pre-cognitive and 
affective encounter between performers and spectators. Opposing a 
transcendental representation of religiosity – a tradition of imitating rituals (e.g. 
pagan or baroque ceremonies), which according to Brook, has been inserted into 
performance art by the bourgeoisie – Brook proposes the performance of ‘true 
rituals’ on stage (Brook, 1990 [1968]: 51). In making this argument, Brook 
suggests a ritualisation of the ‘here and now’ of theatrical performances; that is, he 
does not argue for a certain ‘trueness’ or purity in performing rituals, but for a 
true presence in experiencing them. I argue that it is by virtue of this desire for 
presence, or this theatrical immediacy, that Brook’s holy theatre can be 
considered as an attempt to actualise or materialise metaphysics (in Artaud’s sense) 
in theatre.  
Brook’s opposition to the Stanislavskian-ethic – according to which a character 
is being built (as described in Stanislavski’s Building a Character, 1950) – is a useful 
point for understanding what a holy theatre is. In contrast to Stanislavski’s 
proposal for a step-by-step process in which a character develops gradually, Brook 
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argues that a character, rather than being built, is born. Highlighting that this is a 
difficult process, he writes:  
‘The role that has been built is the same every night – except that it slowly 
erodes. For the part that is born to be the same it must always be reborn, 
which makes it always difficult’ (Brook, 1990 [1968]: 129).  
Brook’s disagreement with Stanislavski lies at the process of becoming a character. 
While Stanislavski understands this process as a rational and methodical one, 
Brook argues that ‘becoming a character’ is both immediate and irrational.26 
Brook emphasises that immediacy in theatrical expression destabilises repetition 
and embraces difference. A character is born and reborn every moment when 
s/he transforms the ‘invisible’ into ‘visible’; that is, when s/he manages to 
interrupt mimetic and representational processes of creation in performance. 
What is born in theatre is, therefore, not developed as a symbol or reflection of an 
underlying substance (e.g. a text, an idea). Rather it is created within the event by 
considering the text or speech as another theatrical layer – another productive 
force. This is why, according to Brook, theatrical forms are important in so far as 
they create the conditions for their own deconstruction; forms are composed in 
order to acquire the potential of being decomposed. In other words, to structure a 
theatre process in a holy theatre is not an end in itself; it is a starting point for 
raising different problems and raising different questions about theatre. It is an 
endless process of experimentation with, and challenge of, one’s own questions.    
The influence of Artaud’s theatre of cruelty is, indeed, central to Brook’s 
theatre. Brook relates his notion of holy theatre to Artaudian thought when he 
argues for ‘powerful immediate explosions of human matter’ (ibid: 61); that create 
‘[a] theatre working like the plague, by intoxication, by infection, by analogy, by 
magic; a theatre in which the play, the event itself, stands in place of a text’ (ibid: 
55). In 1964 – following the establishment of Royal Shakespeare Company (a.k.a. 
RSC) at Stratford, with Michel-Saint Denis and Peter Hall – Brook collaborated 
with the critic and director Charles Marowitz in the formation of an experimental 
                                                
26 It is interesting to compare this view to Deleuze’s idea of ‘becoming a character’ in Carmelo 
Bene’s theatre (as discussed in chapter 2). In contrast to Deleuze, who suggests that one becomes a 
character only at the end of the play (focusing on the character’s becoming-minor during the play), 
Brook argues that in a holy theatre one becomes a character immediately, unexpectedly and even 
violently; almost as an ‘explosion’. In this sense, Brook’s theory is closer to Artaudian thought.    
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laboratory called the Theatre of Cruelty Workshop. The majority of the experiments 
and exercises that the laboratory undertook were ‘directly stimulated by Artaud’s 
thought’ (ibid: 55). In a sense, The Theatre of Cruelty Workshop was an attempt 
to experiment with Artaud’s pursuit of a theatre space as ‘a concrete physical 
place which asks to be filled, and to be given its own concrete language to speak’ 
(Artaud, 1958: 37). The following experiment with actors (directed by Brook and 
Marowitz) captures the workshop’s way of working toward the construction of an 
‘Artaudian’ language:  
‘An actor sits at one end of the room, facing the wall. At the other end is 
another actor, looking at the first one’s back, not allowed to move. The 
second actor must make the first one obey him. As the first one has his back 
turned, the second has no way of communicating his wishes except through 
sounds, for he is allowed no words. This seems impossible, but it can be done. 
It is like crossing an abyss on a tightrope: necessity suddenly produces strange 
powers’ (Brook, 1990 [1968]: 56).  
Of course, the point as well as the challenge of this Artaudian-experiment was to 
create such affective conditions between performers and spectators in actual 
performance contexts. As Ridout writes, ‘[t]he logic of [Artaud’s] desire is that the 
theatrical image and the audience should end up wired to each other by the 
transmission of vibrations that are sensed immediately rather than translated or 
decoded into specific sense data (sound, light, heat), let alone into representational 
form (image, sign, language)’ (Ridout, 2008: 230). It is therefore on the basis of 
these ‘vibratory’ moments, or these interruptions of normative dialogue, that 
Brook suggests a more actual (non-representational) way of experiencing 
metaphysics in a holy theatre. Such ‘strange powers’ are possible in theatre in as 
much as one does not imitate or represent them (by presuming they are absolutely 
unreal), but rather experiences what is real and present about them. Brook writes: ‘[W]e 
need desperately to experience magic in so direct a way that our very notion of 
what is substantial could be changed’ (ibid:108). For Brook, a direct experience of 
magic, its materialisation in performance is possible and differs fundamentally 
from a representation of magic. He notes that, ‘[w]e may want magic, but we 
confuse it with hocus-pocus, and we have hopelessly mixed up love with sex, 
beauty with aestheticism’ (ibid). 
 114 
Now, while The Theatre of Cruelty Workshop experimented extensively with 
Artaud’s ideas, Brook insists that his intention with Marowitz was not to apply an 
Artaudian model to performances, or ‘to reconstruct Artaud’s own theatre’ (ibid: 
55). He argues that ‘Artaud applied is Artaud betrayed’ (ibid: 60). This bold 
statement is interesting and useful here. Indeed, I would agree with Brook that if 
one applies Artaudian theory to a theatrical event, one loses the point of Artaud’s 
philosophy. In most of Artaud’s writings it is evident that he did not wanted his 
ideas to be understood as a coherent model of theatre. On the contrary, he was 
critical of a theatre that becomes dominated by closed-up frameworks, whether 
theoretical, dramatic, ideological or political. From this perspective, I argue that 
the function of Artaud’s theory is to activate and vitalise a theatre of presence; a 
theatre that does not imitate techniques or represent concepts, but rather uses 
them as theatrical drives or forces. At the same time, how could someone ‘betray’ 
Artaud? Brook notes that ‘it is always just a portion of his thought that is 
exploited, betrayed because it is easier to apply rules to the work of a handful of 
dedicated actors than to the lives of the unknown spectators […]’ (ibid: 60-1). 
Although Brook’s makes a fair point, it could be argued that, in a sense, Artaud 
wanted to be betrayed, in so far as he wanted his theory (even the bold statements of 
the two manifestos for a theatre of cruelty) to express a need, a desire for different 
theatre practices, rather than a coherent framework according to which a new 
theatre should emerge. From this perspective, one could argue that ‘to betray’ 
Artaud is to create a genuine Artaudian performance. If the function of his theory 
is to give new potentials to theatre practice, then it is not a matter of ‘betrayal’ but 
one of experimentation. Thus, I argue that Artaud cannot be betrayed in the way 
that Brook suggests; precisely because Artaud cannot be applied as a structured 
and methodical form of theatre.    
In The Empty Space, Brook shares a very interesting experience he had as a 
spectator of a clown-performance in Hamburg, in 1946. In a way, his account of 
this experience clarifies what he understands as the invisible-made-visible. Two 
clowns were performing on stage, discussing what should they ask for from the 
‘Queen of Heaven’. When one of them said, ‘dinner’, the audience (composed 
mainly by children) ‘screamed approval’ (ibid: 49). Then, the clown started listing 
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all the possible foods that they could ask for, but which nevertheless they were 
unable to actually obtain on stage. Brook notes:  
‘[T]he squeals of excitement were gradually replaced by a hush – a hush that 
settled into a deep and true theatrical silence. An image was being made real, 
in answer to the need for something that was not there’ (ibid; my emphasis).  
Brook makes this observation to emphasise an aspect of holy theatre: something 
invisible was made visible on stage. What was made visible was, fundamentally, a 
need for something, rather than this something itself. In other words, what Brook 
experienced on that day, was an actualisation of a need, the materialisation of a 
desire for something, and not a representation of something.  
In fact, I suggest that we could think of Brook’s holy theatre as a critique of the 
theological process of transubstantiation;27 that is, I would argue that Brook’s holy 
theatre endorses a direct experience of transubstantiation (or metousiosis), by 
considering the metaphorical use of this theological process as problematic. In 
Poetics of Transubstantiation, Douglas Burnham argues that ‘[t]ransubstantiation, 
taken out of its theological context […] is a metaphor of the power and even the 
danger of metaphorical language itself’  (Burnham, 2005: 1; original emphasis). I 
suggest that it is the power of this metaphorical language, through which 
metaphysics are represented on stage, that Brook wants to challenge and 
destabilise. In other words, I argue that a deadly theatre is one that focuses on the 
power of metaphors; whereas a holy theatre is one that endorses direct and 
affective experiences, by creating what Derrida calls a sacred, yet non-theological, 
space (as seen in chapter 2). Addressing the question of a substantial (and non-
transcendental) encounter with metaphysics in theatre is, according to Brook, the 
most important undertaking of a holy theatre. 
At the same time, Brook holds that a holy theatre distorts realism in such a 
way, that it transforms a play into an event of creative contradictions. In a letter to 
                                                
27 Considering the concept outside of its theological context, Burnham suggests that, ‘[w]ithin 
recent European culture […] transubstantiation is the ‘metaphor’ par excellence of the dissolution or 
intermingling of identities, the exposure of closed systems of thought and expression to what has 
been excluded, the poverty of reductively material accounts of human bodies or experiences, and 
thus also of the giving of a voice to tongues, truths and visions more alien than any barbarian’ 
(Burnham, 2005: 9-10; original emphasis).  
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Grigori Kosintsev, while commenting on The Theatre of Cruelty 1965 production 
of King Lear, Brook writes:   
‘[W]e are searching to interrupt the consistency of style, so that the many-
levelled contradictions of the play can appear’ (as cited in Mitter, 1992: 136).  
In order to achieve this creative ‘inconsistency’, Brook explored a combination 
between a holy theatre and what he calls a ‘rough theatre’. A rough theatre is, for 
Brook, a ‘popular theatre, freed of unity and style’, a ‘theatre of noise’, as he writes 
(Brook, 1990 [1968]: 75-6). At the same time, a rough theatre is not a theatre that 
negates style, as Brook claims in his interview by Margaret Croyden, but a theatre 
that is devised on the basis of a ‘superstyle’ – just like Brechtian theatre, or the 
popular theatre of Littlewood (Croyden & Brook, 2003: 86). What Brook sought 
therefore, was a synthesis between the experience of metaphysics in theatre and 
the tangible relation that one develops to a – politically informed – popular 
theatre. In a sense, it could be argued that Brook’s theatre is a fusion of Artaud 
and Brecht; that is, an intersection between a sacred immediacy of holy theatre, 
and the ‘rough’ or secular intimacy of popular theatre. I argue that it is within this 
intersection that Brook’s theatre can be placed and understood.  
       
II. Orghast: a pre-symbolic performance? 
(a) The ‘International Centre for Theatre Research’ in context 
In 1970, Peter Brook and the French producer Micheline Rozan established 
the International Centre for Theatre Research in Paris (Le Centre Internationale de 
Recherches Théâtrales). Working with an international ensemble of actors, this was an 
experimental initiative,28 focused both on research and production that would 
operate independently of commercialised productions and conformist 
performance practices. Indeed, the cultural terrain of the late 1960s-early 1970s, 
in which the Centre was founded, was increasingly inviting for art projects whose 
aim was to raise political awareness through research; thus, to a certain extent, the 
International Centre for Theatre Research managed to occupy a privileged place 
                                                
28 Brook and Rozan had secured funding for at least three years from the French government, as 
well as from certain international foundations.  
 117 
within the French cultural milieu. The Vietnam War was rousing substantial 
reactions worldwide (especially after the revelation of the ‘My Lai massacre’ in 
1968) and, at the same time, avant-garde performance groups were progressively 
gaining ground in Europe and the United States. The sociocultural effects of May 
1968 were also beginning to emerge, as radical collectives and community art 
movements were organising political interventions in many parts of the world. To 
a significant extent, the resonance of these worldwide-effecting shocks was 
expressed and embodied in theatrical projects. In particular, the ‘Living Theatre’ 
of Julian Beck and Judith Malina had reached a creative peak, promoting a 
nomadic conception of politicised performances, while guerrilla performances by 
the ‘San Francisco Mime Troupe’ and the ‘Bread and Puppet Theatre’ were 
active all over the US. Also, Joseph Chalkin’s ‘Open Theatre’ had begun touring, 
while in Brazil Augusto Boal was internationally experimenting with audience 
participation with his ‘Theatre of the Oppressed’. At the same time, in Britain 
there was an explosion of theatrical ideas coming from the practices of agitprop 
groups like John McGrath’s ‘7:84 Theatre Company’, the ‘Red Ladder’ (a.k.a. 
‘Agitprop Street Players’), ‘Belt and Braces’ and ‘Monstrous Regiment’. 
Importantly, the Theatres Act 1968 had provided a fertile ground for the 
emancipation of theatrical expression in the United Kingdom, after abolishing 
censorship of the stage by the Lord Chamberlain’s Office. It was the ‘Age of 
Aquarius’ – a transitional era of self-determination, sexual revolution, 
‘recreational drug-taking’ and artistic freedom, that was sustained by the apparent 
‘economic boom’ in Britain and US (Kelly, 1984: 9-10). The challenges to artistic 
stratification and conformist morality grew stronger in the mid-late 1960s drawing 
on statements such as the Balinese saying: ‘we have no art, we do everything as 
well as possible’, that was popularised by Marshall McLuhan (McLuhan 1964: 
66). 
At the same time, the influence of post-Marxist critique, such as the second 
wave of feminism, the Frankfurt School and the rise of the debates of structuralism 
and poststructuralism, had been significantly felt both in performance contexts 
and in ethnographic work on avant-garde theatre practices. There emerged an 
important link between academia and Western dramaturgies, between critical 
theory and theatrical narratives, which had had a crucial impact on 
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reconceptualising the social trajectories of performance and its relation to cultural 
analysis. For instance, one of the first academic institutions for studying theatre 
and performance, namely the Graduate Centre for the Study of Drama had been 
established in Toronto in the mid-1960s. Moreover, important works such as 
Culture and Society by Raymond Williams that was published in 1958, inspired a 
large proportion of theatre practitioners to rethink the notions of art, culture, class 
and democracy in relation to socio-historical changes, as emancipated from 
transcendental connotations and essentialist dogmas that had detached the value 
of these concepts from everyday experience. It was also precisely within these 
revolutionary changes that performance studies emerged as an autonomous 
methodological plateau of cultural analysis, mainly through the works of the 
director Richard Schechner and his collaboration with the anthropologist Victor 
Turner. This synthesis between multiple (modern and postmodern) theoretical 
inputs and avant-garde theatrical practices produced and radicalised new ways of 
understanding theatre and performance. One of them was the advance of 
‘postdramatic theatre’. As discussed in chapter 2, this theatrical movement 
signalled a shift in the mode of perception that subordinated the importance of 
text and linear narratives of performance.  
Thus, it is not easy to say whether the late 1960s and early 1970s can be 
thought more as a period of ‘doing’ rather than as a period of ‘discussing’ within 
theatre and performance. What is evident though, is that the link between 
academic milieus and performance practices was gradually becoming stronger, 
raising questions of identity and subjectivity, ideas of interactive theatre and 
experimentations of the potential roles that dramatic texts could play on stage. 
Experimenting with different ways to ‘give theatre back to the people’ was, at that 
point, the most powerful and controversial question in the field. As Margaret 
Croyden argues, Peter Brook and his Centre in Paris were ‘in the middle of it all’ 
(Croyden, 2003: xi). In this explosive context, choosing sides in discourses of 
theatre and performance was extremely important. Croyden notes that,   
‘two camps were forming in the theatre: that of traditional naturalism, 
represented by the dominance of the playwright and the staging of 
conventional productions, and the experimental nonliterary theatre of images 
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and nonverbal behaviour, represented by the counter-culture groups that 
were flourishing in basements, studios, and storefronts’ (ibid: xii).    
Being a proponent of the second camp, Jerzy Grotowski was, at the same time, 
entering his paratheatrical phase29 of experimenting with interactive theatre. 
Sharing a mutual respect and a parallel understanding of theatre, Brook and 
Grotowski drew motivation from each other’s similarities and differences in 
pursuing diverse conceptions of performance practice through working with 
ensembles. The aim was to study and problematise the discursive and non-
discursive processes that operate between performers and audiences.  More 
specifically, as I mentioned in the first section of the chapter, Brook understood 
this process as an exploration of a pre-symbolic, pre-cultural process of expression. 
As Brook put it, the Centre was ‘seeking for what gives a form of culture its life – 
not studying the culture itself but what is behind it’ (Brook, 1987: 106). The 
International Centre for Theatre Research was, therefore, an attempt to create 
the conditions for researching the energy, the desire, the instinct or the ‘firing’ – as 
Artaud would prefer to call it – that operate prior to symbolic and 
representational discursive practices.  
Brook and Rozan invited artists from many parts of the world that had diverse 
theatrical backgrounds and different conceptions of what this artistic direction 
would entail. A multicultural group would ensure, for Brook, a certain ‘emptiness’ 
in regards to hegemonic preconceptions of forms in directing, performing and 
engaging theatre. Brook believed that the cultural differences amongst the 
members of the group would potentially result in theatre projects with less pre-
defined elements. While describing the process of selecting actors in an American 
Theatre (1970-71) interview, Brook commented:  
‘Partly for what they can do. They can’t come empty handed. Partly for how 
open they are toward what they can’t do’ (as cited in Smith, 1972: 31).  
Accordingly, one of the Centre’s intentions was to lower the importance of 
cultural significations in performance without however reducing ‘everyone to a 
                                                
29 Grotowski’s para-theatre experimented with ‘the isolation of a chosen group of people in a 
remote place, in an attempt to create a genuine encounter between individuals who meet, at first, 
as complete strangers and then, gradually, as they lose their fear and distrust of each other, move 
towards a fundamental encounter in which they themselves are the active and creative participants 
in their own drama of rituals and ceremonials’ (Roose-Evans, 1989: 154). 
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neutral anonymity’ (Brook, 1987: 106). I argue then that it was a question of 
emancipating performance from a power of discourse that is practiced through 
signs, repetition and representation; a question of the possibility of performance to 
become something other than what Schechner terms ‘twice-behaved’ pattern. I 
suggest that this question encompasses the ‘raison d’ être’ of this chapter’s analysis 
while addressing the non-representational potential of Brook’s theatre. I argue 
that Peter Brook was one of the first British directors that attempted to examine 
this question from multiple perspectives; that is, for example, through notions of 
being, space, time, memory and instinct. Probably, one of Brook’s most interesting 
attempts to raise this question and study its potential implications was a 
controversial performance entitled Orghast. In what follows, I provide a critical 
analysis of Orghast considering: (1) What can we learn from the project in relation 
to Brook’s way of challenging mimetic representation and linguistic normativity? 
(2) What were the project’s potentials in regards to theoretical claims and 
performance practices?          
 
(b) Orghast in context 
Orghast30 was the first public production of the Centre’s work and took place at 
the Fifth Shiraz International Festival of the Arts in Persepolis, Iran in 1971. The 
festival was founded in 1967 under the umbrella of the Shah’s regime, especially 
Empress Farah Diba, who was the main director of its artistic programmes. It was 
an international and intercultural festival that brought together Western and 
Eastern arts, music, theatre, dance and cinema – aiming at experimenting with 
the differences between these two ‘art worlds’ and finding ways in which they 
could inform one another through their meeting points. The rationale behind the 
festival’s founding was twofold: First, it embodied the long-term policy of 
                                                
30 The performance was divided in two parts and each of them was played twice in different sites of 
Persepolis. The first performance of Part I took place on the 28th of August, just after sunset, on a 
stage before the Royal Tombs of the Persian Kings Darius and Artaxerxes I, and it was repeated 
the following day before sunrise. Part I was a boldly concentrated, mystical and intimate 
performance that drew much of its ‘energy’ from the spatial conditions of the location. Orghast 
Part II was presented at Naqsh-e-Rustam, which was another royal burial site located six miles 
away from Persepolis. This part was far more epic and ‘explosive’, replacing the spectators’ 
immobility in Part I with an invitation to choose their own path within the performance, being 
simultaneously at the centre of the event, aside of it, outside of it or in between stages (Smith, 
1972). Due to the very limited documentation of the actual performance, I will focus more on the 
group’s theoretical frameworks of staging Orghast, than on its actual plot. 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Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (the Shah of Persia from 1941 to 1979) to 
modernise Iran while maintaining its independence from the West; a policy that 
resonated with Shah’s secular state (distinguishing Islam from the public sphere). 
It was believed that hosting a wide array of Western avant-garde artists in an 
international festival would make Iran look more tolerant and open to modernity.  
Secondly, one of the aspirations of the organisers was the eventual creation of an 
art centre that could invite residencies, both local and international, continuing 
the legacy of the festival and further developing Iran’s cultural terrain. Greek 
avant-garde composer Iannis Xenakis had designed plans for a ‘scientific research 
centre’ for the arts, but his proposal was not materialised because of political 
controversy and suspicion from Islamic enemies of the Shah. Indeed, the political 
complexity of the Shah’s regime, being an authoritarian and repressive state on 
one hand, and a target of increasing critique by the Islamists on the other, 
sabotaged the potentials of the festival. During the gradual decline of the Shah, 
and the approaching of the Islamic revolution (which eventually took place in 
1979), the sociopolitical condition of Iran was characterised by mistrust, tension 
and controversy. In this context, an international arts festival could not be 
sustained. At the same time, it is worth noting that the festival remains one of the 
most important 20th century attempts to bring together Eastern and Western art in 
an experimental context. As Robert Gluck notes, 
‘Iran in the 1970s presents a fascinating case study of how an authoritarian 
government can remain officially open to forward-looking Western ideas, 
while still strictly limiting its citizens’ free political speech. This unstable 
model could not survive for long, especially in the face of declining popular 
support’ (Gluck, 2007: 27).        
Peter Brook and the company experienced the unstable political condition of Iran 
mostly through struggling with a few bureaucratic obstacles, and as with the rest of 
the artists, through noticing police and army force in almost every part of Shiraz 
and Persepolis. Brook was criticised by the German critic Ernst Wendt and the 
Persian writer Saedi for allegedly supporting Shah’s regime after accepting to 
participate in the festival. After labelling these criticisms ‘naïve and hysterical’, 
Brook elaborated on the issue in an interview with Smith (Smith, 1972: 258):          
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‘It would be complete humbug for us to work in France as though we naively 
believed that there was no repression or police brutality there, and suddenly 
discover this in Iran. The desert island in which one can work outside a 
complex, largely repressive social machine does not exist’ (ibid: 259).                 
 Written by the British poet Ted Hughes, Orghast was a hybrid performance 
based on Hughes’s adaptation of Aeschylus’s Prometheus Bound, and further 
composed by fragments from Calderon’s Life is a Dream, scriptures of 
Zoroastrianism,31 and other Greek and Persian myths (Smith, 1972). Due to this 
plethora of different sources that were used in devising the narrative of Orghast, 
there was no fixed storyline that could impose a univocal experiencing of the 
performance, or even direct the audience towards perceiving an articulate 
conceptual content of the play. As Brook insisted throughout the project 
development, Orghast was and had to be approached as a ‘work in progress’, not 
as a finished production (ibid: 125). Thus, Orghast was a theatrical experiment 
whose implementation was its very performance in public – it was not a 
presentation of outcomes, but the research process itself.  
Since the process of elaborating myths and stories was based on collective work 
(Hughes collaborated extensively with Brook and the performers in many stages of 
the process), improvisation was central for stimulating ideas for the performance. 
For this reason, Brook and Hughes considered Prometheus Bound to be a useful 
starting point from which they could enable discussion and, potentially, 
production of ideas. Indeed, Aeschylus’s text offered multiple possibilities for 
experimentation: The repercussions of the ‘gift of fire’ to humanity by Prometheus 
and his subsequent punishment by Zeus, provided the conditions for a flexible 
dramatic platform on which the group could explore questions of pre-cultural 
expression. By considering ‘fire’ as a metaphor of ‘language’, Brook and Hughes 
attempted to build on the discourse of cultural refinement (culture Vs nature), 
through exploring the liminal condition between cosmological dyadic relations – 
i.e. God and matter, Light and Darkness, the spiritual and the material. Thus, 
along with scriptures of Zoroastrianism, the group also studied the Persian religion 
                                                
31 An ancient Persian religion and philosophy that dates back to the mid-fifth century BCE (in 
documented history). In Zoroastrianism, life develops around the constant conflict between Ahura 
Mazda who is the transcendental source of truth and goodness, and Angra Mainyu his evil antithesis. 
In Zoroastrian scriptures, it is argued that the role of humanity should always be directed towards 
the resolution of this conflict, and the ultimate prevailing of Ahura Mazda. 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of Manichaeism – whose doctrines were also based on the constant conflict 
between metaphysical dyads. The aim of this elaboration of ancient inputs was the 
potential discovery of an imaginary ‘silenced cosmology’, as Joanny Moulin (1996) 
put it; a discovery of a ‘lost’ ontology framed in pre-linguistic conditions of 
expression. As A.C.H. Smith described it, ‘[Orghast] was a controlled experiment 
in abstraction’ (Smith, 1972: 181).    
Brook was the main director of Orghast, being assisted in his task by Geoffrey 
Reeves from UK, Arby Ovanessian from Persia and Andrei Serban from 
Romania. Their collaboration with Hughes focused primarily on studying the 
possibilities of language as pre-symbolic communication. They were seeking for 
the conditions that would enable a non-articulated communication through 
paying attention to the affective potential of gestures, sounds and lights. In short, 
they were trying to merge verbal with non-verbal communication. For this reason, 
the group wanted to find or create a text for the performance, in which language 
would not function as a representation of content, but as its incarnation within the 
play. To this end, Hughes carried out extensive research on the hybridisation of 
syllables and phonemes – a process that was regularly in direct collaboration with 
the whole group – in order to invent a new language; namely, the Orghast-
language. This conceived language was used by the actors along with Ancient 
Greek, Latin and Avesta (an Ancient Persian language), which were also included 
in Orghast’s text. As Patrice Pavis notes, the fact that the Orghast-language was 
mixed with three ‘dead’ languages, shows that, ‘[t]he project was an attempt to 
return to the very source of language as incantatory sound, when an act of 
communication was synonymous with an act of communion’ (Pavis, 1996: 69).  
Thus, the aim of the Orghast-language was to produce a theatrical mode that 
could generate a physiological experience of the text; that is, a corporeal relation to the 
pulsations produced by the soundings of a language that was not meant to 
symbolise meaning, but rather to enact it in the language’s musicality and 
intonations. For this reason, the methodology of the pre-performance period was 
based on the process of onomatopoeia, which means working towards the creation of 
words that imitate the sounds that correspond to these words (see Chomsky et al, 
1983; Hervey & Higgings, 1992). A.C.H. Smith, who observed the entire project 
and dedicated a book to the performance (Orghast at Persepolis, 1972) notes that, 
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‘[t]he very words themselves embodied, in vocal form, the experiences they 
described’ (Smith, 1972: 39). So, this invented language was built on the basis of 
enacting, rather than representing, its content in its very form.   
It is worth noting that in this case onomatopoeia was both ‘directly iconic’, 
which according to Hervey and Higgins refers to the language in which ‘the 
phonic form of a word impressionistically imitates a sound which is the referent of 
the word’, and ‘iconically motivated’, which refers to an imitation of a ‘sound 
associated with the referent of the word’ (Hervey & Higgins, 1992: 75, original 
emphasis). For example, while the syllables ULL and ORG meant ‘swallow’ and 
‘life’ respectively, the word BULLORGA was used to signify ‘darkness’ (that 
which swallows life).32 Also, the word Orghast was a combination of two referents: 
ORG that meant ‘life’ or ‘being’, and GHAST that meant ‘spirit, flame’ (Smith, 
1972: 50-51). The following fragment is, according to Smith, one of the first that 
Hughes created, and as he notes, ‘[it] was exceptional in remaining unchanged 
right through to the performance at Persepolis’ (ibid: 50): 
BULLORGA OMBOLOM FROR 
darkness opens its womb 
 
IN OMBOLOM BULLORGA 
in the womb of darkness  
 
FREEASTAV OMBOLOM 
freeze her womb  
 
ASTA BEORBITTA 
icy chains 
SHARSAYA NULBULDA BRARG 
I hear chaos roar 
 
 
NILD US GLITTALUGH 
rivets like stars 
 
CLID OSTA BULLORGA 
lock up the mouth of darkness 
 
(c) Onomatopoeia: between language and music 
Let us now be a bit more analytical as to why Brook and Hughes chose to 
experiment with onomatopoeia. What were they looking for? As they both 
maintained, their primary intention was to devise a performance in which 
communication would occur directly; that is, by means of bypassing the human 
intellect – the linguistic performance of actors and the cognitive receptivity of 
spectators. In other words, Brook and Hughes wanted to create blocks of sound 
that could function as ‘emotional vibrations’, by surpassing the limitations and 
                                                
32 Of course, it is worth mentioning that the process of onomatopoeia cannot be the same in each 
cultural milieu, as the corresponding sound of an experience may differ in dissimilar socio-cultural 
contexts and historical periods. 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preconceptions of the human brain (Leiter, 1991: 234). Indeed, the notion of 
theatrical vibration, understood as an affective process that connects performers and 
spectators, is very useful here. As Nicholas Ridout points out in his 2008 paper 
Welcome to the Vibratorium, ‘[i]t is the idea of vibration that allow us to think this 
movement between [performers and spectators] as social and physical at one and 
the same time’ (Ridout, 2008: 225). In a sense, I would suggest that Orghast was 
meant to be performed within what Ridout calls a ‘Vibratorium’: that is, a 
theatrical space ‘before it becomes either theatron or auditorium, the theatre as 
sensory threshold that momentarily precedes, or temporarily closes, 
representation’ (ibid: 230).     
 Brook and Hughes wanted to explore a language that operates before the 
intellectual process of representation, constructing an intuitive event through a 
becoming pre-symbolic (or ‘vibratory’) mode of communication. The Orghast-
language was, then, a text that could function through its mode – i.e. through its 
overtones, intonations, pauses, mis-sounds etc. – in direct relation to the bodily 
responses of everyone that was present in the performance. I suggest that the basis 
of the Centre’s research with Orghast can be found in a sequence of questions, 
which Brook posed in The Empty Space: 
‘Is there another language, just as exacting for the author as a language of 
words? Is there a language of actions, a language of sounds – a language of 
word-as-part-of-movement, of word-as-lie, word-as-parody, of word-as-
rubbish, of word-as-contradiction, of word-shock or word-cry’ (Brook, 1990 
[1968]: 55)? 
Brook was interested in emancipating the ‘word’ from its conventional dramatic 
value and, in so doing, opening up its potential function within theatre. At the 
same time, the Orghast text was not essentially a negation of content, because the 
very process of using language in this onomatopoeic way was by itself a critique of 
the dichotomy between mode and meaning, manner and matter, form and 
content. Considered as such, Hughes’s invention was a language that explored the 
primal intensities that might exist before language itself: a language whose subject 
matter was the possibility of a pre-language.    
Thus, it seems to me that, on one level, the aim of the Orghast-experiment was 
closely related to the Artaudian understanding of performance as ‘fire’; that is, a 
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performance that fundamentally breaks with rational discourse and the stratified 
teleology of Occidental theatre, by embracing cruelty-as-force and desire (Artaud, 
1958). As I mentioned in the first section of the chapter, Artaudian theatrology 
played a crucial role in Brook’s directorial narratives – even if Brook would agree 
with Derrida that fidelity to Artaud is impossible. 
On a second level, I argue that we could think of Orghast in parallel to Deleuze’s 
and Guattari’s theorisation of the ‘body without organs’ (borrowing the term from 
Artaud). In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari stress the importance of 
conceiving the body as a non-stratified multiplicity, rather than singularity, that 
acts and performs through affection and difference (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004 
[1987]). In describing the process of becoming a body without organs, their 
analysis clarifies that the point of critique is the stratified organism of the body, 
rather than the organs themselves. Their theoretical project in relation to 
corporeality addresses an understanding of the body as an assemblage whose parts 
can operate autonomously, without corresponding or being ‘represented’ by a 
hierarchical process: a body without organ-ism. Similarly, Brook and Hughes did 
not intend to create a headless performer, an acephalic actor. Rather, they were 
interested in creating the appropriate conditions for a performance that could 
appeal in the human instinct through stimulating singular responses from the 
organs of the body (the stomach, the nose, the heart, the genitals etc.) and not by its 
organism as a whole. Thus, I argue that, in effect, their ultimate point of critique 
was not the intellect itself, but its hierarchical relation to the body: i.e. the 
stratified subjection of the body to the intellect.  
This is one of the reasons why Orghast was a text that was designed to operate 
more as a musical score than a dramatic script. As Hughes notes in a Times Literary 
Supplement interview in 1971, the group was looking for what was ‘mainly a way of 
hanging together musical moments’ (as cited in Smith, 1972: 44). Certainly this 
sounds like a very interesting, albeit vague, idea but what is significant, I argue, is 
to ask what is unique in conceiving and experiencing language as music; how do 
these two modes of expression interrelate? I suggest that this question is of great 
importance if we bear in mind that the complex relationship between music and 
language was at the core of the project’s intentions. 
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Hughes addresses this question by drawing on biology. Taking into account the 
biological function of the human body, Hughes argues that every human body 
engages ‘primal’ modes and structures of meaning. He goes on to note that, in 
looking for an ‘open and inviting language’ that could be ‘expressive to all people, 
powerfully, truly, precisely’, one has to unearth the musicality of language, together 
with its capacity to affect, to disturb and to engage with the complexity of the 
human body (ibid: 45). In explaining to Smith his idea of ‘unearthing’, Hughes 
writes:  
‘The deeper into language one goes, the less visual/conceptual its imagery, 
and the more audial/visceral/muscular its system of tensions. This accords 
with the biological fact that the visual nerves connect with the modern human 
brain, while the audial nerves connect with the cerebellum, the primal animal 
brain and nervous system, direct. In other words, the deeper into language 
one goes, the more dominated it becomes by purely musical modes […]’ 
(ibid).    
It is important to note that, in Orghast at Persepolis, Smith praises the theoretical 
model of ‘unearthing’ by simultaneously drawing a parallel between the Orghast 
experiment and the ideas of Levi-Strauss – in relation to music, mythology and 
language – as described in his book The Raw and the Cooked (1969). What seems to 
be the pivotal argument that Smith makes in this comparison is the extent to 
which the perpetual nature of music and mythology can transcend normative 
patterns of linguistic communication. He states that,  
‘[f]or Levi-Strauss, as for Hughes and Brook, myth and music alike are 
languages that can communicate before and below intellectual understanding, 
through their structure: the actual content is more of a restraint on the 
structure than vice versa’ (Smith, 1972: 118). 
Through Smith’s writing, it seems that Brook was interested in Hughes’s 
biological perspective of music, because he understood it as an appropriate 
framework according to which the group could experiment with the pre-symbolic 
origins of performance; a theoretical stimulus to begin with. At the same time, it is 
not clear in any documented source whether Brook justified his work with Orghast 
through biological arguments. In fact, he never used a biological vocabulary in his 
discussions of the performance. In his interview with Smith, Brook points out that, 
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‘in looking for the forms that speak directly we are, at the same time, looking for 
everything that can throw evidence on what can make an act of theatre more 
dense’ (as cited in Smith, 1972: 248). In making this claim, Brook stresses the 
importance of exploring theatrical methods which can materialise human 
intensities that operate on a pre-cultural (which is not essentially biological) level. 
In other words, Brook does not essentially argue for a ‘return to human nature’, 
but in the possibility of emancipating performance from linguistic codifications 
and references. It is precisely this possibility that Brook acknowledges in the 
relationship between music and language. For instance, while rehearsing Orghast in 
Persepolis, Brook asked the group whether they could define a musical song, and a 
Persian actor replied: ‘Something that comes from the heart’ – and Brook 
commented: ‘It can’t be defined in words […] When the heart wants to speak – or 
the stomach – it knows that words from the head aren’t enough’ (ibid: 113).  
Despite the very interesting elements that one can draw from Hughes’s idea of 
‘unearthing’, I argue that discussing the music-language relationship on a strictly 
biological basis is a limited way of approaching these two modes of expression. It 
is, I suggest, at least debatable whether biology can be distinguished from more 
socio-culturally oriented perspectives, especially in a theatrical context. Critical 
and philosophical studies of the relation between music and language can prove 
very helpful in regards to this question. Although I do not have the space to 
outline many of them in this chapter, in what follows, I will draw first on Adorno, 
and second on Deleuze and Guattari in order to elaborate on this question 
further. In fact, I will argue for an intersection between their accounts of musical 
expression and language.   
  In his essay, Music and Language: A Fragment, Adorno (1998 [1956]) observes a 
dialectical relation between language and music that concerns the question of 
intentionality. He argues that although normative conceptualisation is excluded in 
music, primitive epistemological concepts can be manifested in musical pieces in 
the form of ‘recurring ciphers’ (Adorno, 1998 [1956]: 2). For Adorno, these 
musical concepts operate outside a system of representation, because they become 
through tonality; they do not convey meanings, but they rather correspond to 
‘their own nature and not in a signified outside them’ (ibid). ‘Music creates no 
semiotic system’, Adorno highlights, before proceeding to argue that music 
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becomes a less intentional medium than language because musical and linguistic 
interpretation are two different things (ibid: 1). He notes that, 
‘To interpret language means: to understand language. To interpret music 
means: to make music. Musical interpretation is performance […]’ (ibid: 3).   
Therefore, Adorno distinguishes musical language from intentional language, but, 
at the same time, he argues that,  
‘the demarcation line between [them] is not absolute; we are not confronted 
by two wholly separate realms. There is a dialectic at work. Music is 
permeated through and through with intentionality’ (ibid: 2-3).   
In other words, Adorno holds that music is a language that constantly tends to 
interrupt intentionality through a dialectical relation to intentional language. It is by 
virtue of this dialectical movement that Adorno draws a theoretical mapping to 
‘true’ language – to a language which is not empty of content, but freed from pre-
defined meaning. He notes that,  
‘[m]usic points to true language in the sense that content is apparent in it, but 
it does so at the cost of unambiguous meaning, which has migrated to the 
languages of intentionality’ (ibid).   
Thus, Adorno’s account of the intersection between language and music is one 
that pays attention to non-intentional interruptions. His analysis correlates with 
the philosophical views of the Centre to the extent that both approaches argue for 
the existence of a musicality of language in the latter’s ‘true’ nature. However, by 
contrast to Hughes’s idea of ‘unearthing’, Adorno suggests a less ‘essentialist’ 
manner of explaining this intersection, and this is, perhaps, one of the reasons why 
he is not giving a biological dimension to the issue. Coming from a more 
sociological perspective than that of Hughes, Adorno is careful not to focus on a 
dichotomy between intentionality and contingency, but on their potential 
dialectic. Whereas, according to Brook and Hughes, the point of thinking music in 
parallel to language lies in the discovery of pre-cultural expression, and therefore 
to a negation of intentionality, Adorno’s account destabilises the essentialism of 
this ‘one-directional’ process, claiming that there is a constant interrelation 
between music and language. In a sense, I suggest that Adorno’s analysis describes 
music as being a deterritorialization of language, to the extent that language 
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always comes together with a prescribed meaning. From this perspective, music 
may be viewed as a deterritorialization of meaning. 
It is in a similar manner that Deleuze and Guattari discuss the function of 
music in A Thousand Plateaus. Their analysis examines the deterritorializing 
potentials of music – just like in other art forms – in relation to its own intentional 
lines of meaning. For music it is the refrain, or the voice itself, for painting it is the 
face, the portrait, that become elements of intentional expression through art. 
They note that, ‘[m]usic is a deterritorialization of the voice, which becomes less 
and less tied to language, just as painting is a deterritorialization of the face’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004 [1987]: 333). The refrain or the voice is, for Deleuze 
and Guattari, the content of music, not its origin. They argue that the refrain and 
the musical content (in other words the purpose of music), rather than emancipating 
the creative potentials of music, constitute ‘a means of preventing music’ (ibid: 
331). Yet, this ‘prevention’ of music is for Deleuze and Guattari an essential 
territorializing or reterritorializing force that generates the becoming of variations, 
the becoming of what escapes the intentionality of the refrain or the voice. In 
short, for Deleuze and Guattari, music pertains to a becoming-minor language 
through its capacity to constantly destabilise, to deterritorialize major meanings – 
meanings that become generalised by means of their normalisation. They focus on 
the capacity of music to become a minor language, suggesting that it is this 
becoming that gives musical potentials to language.  
Now, in comparing these accounts to what Brook and Hughes attempted to 
achieve with the Orghast-language, there are some critical points to be made. 
Brook and Hughes wanted to design a theatrical performance that would function 
as music on stage by, somehow, having become pre-cultural and non-intentional 
in the rehearsal process. I argue that by constructing a language that unifies 
through its musicality, the biological justification of the Orghast-language, limited 
the live potential of the experiment; that is, the becoming of language-as-music 
during the event. Hughes’s insistence on a strictly biological perspective implied a 
‘universalistic’ approach for the creation of a language ‘expressive to all people’ – 
a language based on a unified structure that could function in a rather ‘territorial’ 
manner. In other words, I argue that there is a certain clash between the aims of 
the project and its objectives: the theoretical model of ‘unearthing’ created the 
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conditions for what could be a ‘major metalanguage’ that potentially excludes, 
rather than produces pre-cultural possibilities in performance. In comparison to 
Brook’s insistence on immediacy and ephemerality, this theoretical approach was 
rather problematically inflexible. By employing this approach in devising the 
performance, I argue that the group did not endorse a productive interrelation 
between music and language – that could take place within and during the event – 
suggesting a negation of intentionality in favour of a musical, yet fixed, language. 
In so doing, the group’s aim was clear and coherent but at the same time, I argue 
that the possibility of experimenting on stage was significantly framed, and by 
extension, limited. Now, I suggest that it is crucial to look at the ways in which the 
group worked during the rehearsal period, which was, indeed, as important as the 
actual performance.  
 
(d) Towards the performance 
The group started working on the project in Paris on the 1st of November 1970, 
and continued the preparation in Persepolis as they arrived in Iran three months 
before the performance took place. Directed mainly by Brook and Reeves, the 
actors were focused on workshops that involved gestural practice as a way to 
develop ‘their level of physical consciousness’ (Smith, 1972: 33). The group 
experimented with a variety of exercises that intended to develop the ‘memory’ of 
the body. Particularly, the performance of the actors’ mnemonic capacity through 
gestures was an important objective of the workshops (Smith reminds us that in 
the field of music this is called ‘muscular memory’). Working alongside Ted 
Hughes’s phonemic research, the early rehearsals also involved experimentations 
with a wide range of glossological patterns33. The aim of this process was to 
develop ways of experiencing the Orghast-language not merely intellectually, but 
also bodily, through appreciating its musical overtones and physiological potential. 
Insisting on the importance of music, Hughes argued in an interview with Tom 
Stoppard in 1971 that, ‘[t]he greatest satisfactions of conversation are probably 
musical ones’, before highlighting that, ‘[t]his animal music is very different […] 
                                                
33 For example, the first improvisations were conducted according to the syllables 
BASH/TA/HON/DO, which were proposed by the actors for their musicality and intonations. 
The first invented vocabulary of the group was based on these four syllables and the language was 
called Bashtahondo. 
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from the conventionally ‘musical’ voice’ (as cited in Smith, 1972: 46). 
Interestingly, as the workshops continued, Hughes removed the English 
translation from the Orghast texts in order for the performers to approach them 
as ‘a coherent body of sounds, not semantic, or actable, meanings’ (Smith, 1972: 
115).  
All these experimentations with language, music and their relation to the body 
show that the pre-performance work – both in Paris and in Persepolis – was 
conducted more in laboratorial conditions, rather than as a typical rehearsal 
process. This was an important aspect of the group’s methodology, because it 
provided the conditions for a synthesis between the theoretical framework and 
ongoing practice. Furthermore, it promoted the ephemeral element of the 
performance, since there was neither straightforward rehearsals of a substantive 
script, nor a linear preparation for the actual performance. As Smith points out, 
Orghast had to become a play with ‘no reality except now’ (ibid: 35; original 
emphasis).       
It is worth noting that the group’s pre-performance process was based on the 
decomposition of linguistic and gestural patterns (i.e. Anglo-Saxon glossological 
phonemes and syllables) in order to create the conditions for the emergence of 
direct expression on stage. This process of decomposition was the group’s means 
to achieve a pre-cultural performance that would operate by intensity and affect. 
As noted above, Brook’s philosophy of theatre was always one that focused on the 
construction of pre-defined forms as a challenge for their deconstruction. In The 
Empty Space, he notes that,  
‘[i]n the theatre, every form once born is mortal; every form must be 
reconceived, and its new conception will bear the marks of all the influences 
that surround it’ (Brook, 1990 [1968]: 19)  
This movement from form to anti-form, from intentionality to contingency was at 
the core of the Centre’s research of a new politics of theatre. It was by virtue of 
this mobility, of this movement of constant deterritorialization that the notion of a 
transient, ‘living’ theatre was explored in the Centre – as opposed to a ‘deadly’ 
theatre of abstract repetition. To this end, Brook attempted to create non-
referential conditions of performing. He pushed the actors to concentrate on their 
psychic physiology, to try and clear their minds of anything rational, as a means to 
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produce instinctive vibrations with their body. Thus, it becomes evident that, as in 
Deleuze’s account of Bene’s theatre, Brook’s understanding of concentration 
follows a process of subtraction: a removal of elements that potentially becomes 
prosthesis rather than negation. He argues that, ‘[i]t is not a process of building, 
but of destroying obstacles that stand in the way of the latent form’ (as cited in 
Smith, 1972: 107). He goes on to argue that it may be difficult to locate such 
‘obstacles’, because they belong to the art of making theatre as constants. For 
instance, in talking about props and costumes, Brook notes that, 
‘as soon as an actor is given what he will wear on stage, his interpretation of 
the part is dictated, or at least limited. You have to deny the scenic conditions 
entirely to begin with’ (ibid).  
Therefore, the creation of a space empty of theatrical constants and codified 
invariants – the creation of an ‘empty space’ – was central to the rehearsal process 
of Orghast, in so far as it allowed for a musical and corporeal experimentation with 
language. In a sense, I argue that the pre-performance period was pivotal in 
creating the conditions for a production of theatrical anti-narratives because it 
allowed for continuous shifts in perceiving the relation between theory and 
practice. It generated constant variations within a non-linear research, which 
turned out to become an autonomous rehearsal process freed from its essential 
connection to a coherent production. In other words, I argue that the group 
achieved a destabilisation of the relationship between rehearsing and performing 
on stage, by focusing on the rehearsal process as if it were the performance itself.  
Now, I would argue that it is crucial to problematise the implications of the 
actual performance in relation to the aims of the group. I suggest that the staging 
of the Orghast-experiment shows the extent to which the performance maintained 
a sense of process, as the question of pre-cultural theatre is, I argue, a question of 
‘becoming’, rather than a static condition that can be achieved. It is a question of 
‘how to use’ affective interruptions of what codified representation implies. This is 
why I believe that the most important potential of the Orghast-language was to 
produce a glossopoeia, as Derrida understood it in his discussions of Artaudian 
theatre. 
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(e) Glossopoeia and affective performance 
As examined in chapter 2, one of the most insightful philosophical challenges to 
the relation between theory and theatre is that developed by Derrida in his 
discussion of the Artaudian theatre of cruelty. In his essay The Theatre of Cruelty and 
the Closure of Representation (2001 [1978]), Derrida offers a deconstructive analysis of 
Western theatre and examines its failure to problematise mimetic representation. 
Particularly, in discussing Artaud’s The Theatre and Its Double (1958), he suggests a 
departure from the dominance of speech by proposing the process of glossopoeia: 
that is, a language that operates prior to linguistic articulation. It is on this process 
that I intend to focus in the following paragraphs, as I suggest that it provides a 
useful approach to the critical analysis of Orghast.      
I would argue that the experimentation of the group could be understood as an 
attempt to transform onomatopoeia into glossopoeia. Before proceeding to discuss 
this transformation though, it is important to examine the relation between these 
two notions. The difference between onomatopoeia and glossopoeia is decisive as 
Derrida claims. In fact, he argues that what Artaud meant by mentioning 
onomatopoeia – that is ‘a visual and plastic materialisation of speech’ – was rather 
a call to the possibility of glossopoeia (Artaud, 1958: 69). Glossopoeia, as Derrida 
explains, should be carefully distinguished from mere invention of names or 
neologisms, implying that what Artaud was looking for, was a theatre that could 
function rather glossopoeically than onomatopoeically. He notes that, 
‘[g]lossopoeia, which is neither an imitative language nor a creation of names, 
takes us back to the borderline of the moment when the word has not yet been 
born, when articulation is no longer a shout but not yet discourse, when repetition 
is almost impossible, and along with it, language in general’ (Derrida, 2001 
[1978]: 302-3; original emphasis). Is, therefore, glossopoeia a liminal process of 
performance that operates between the symbolic and the pre-symbolic – not a 
non-performative, but a pre-performative way of expression? Derrida describes 
glossopoeia as ‘the shout that the articulations of language and logic have not yet 
entirely frozen, that is, the aspect of oppressed gesture which remains in all 
speech, the unique and irreplaceable movement which the generalities of concept 
and repetition have never finished rejecting’ (ibid: 302). Thus, Derrida describes 
glossopoeia as an ‘escape’ from the stratified structure of normative expression – 
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an escape whose manifestation becomes possible in so far as normative linguistics 
fail to restrain it.  
What then could be called a glossopoeic performance? Perhaps, some of the 
sounds that an infant makes in response to his/her direct environment, certain 
sounds of sudden fear or joy, or even the audible dialogue during erotic 
intercourse. Each one of these emotional responses that function mainly through 
intonation and resonance could probably be described as glossopoeic 
performances. They are instinctive responses, they do not essentially represent an 
encoded meaning, but at the same time they necessarily become within the 
linguistic and cultural context in which their subject performs them. Thus, I argue 
that they could be described as ‘mis-performances’ of language, in so far as they 
occur somehow ‘erroneously’ and incompletely – almost in a deviant manner – in 
relation to linguistic normativity and representation. For example, Artaud’s 
destratified voice – his notion of speech before words – is according to Derrida 
such a performance of language.  
Thus, I suggest that the potential of the Orghast-experiment can radicalised 
through the Derridean notion of glossopoeia. I suggest that, in a sense, this ‘mis-
performance’ of language was what Brook and Hughes attempted to trigger on 
stage through their onomatopoeic research both in Paris and Persepolis. Hence, 
the question is: To what extent did Brook create the conditions for the emergence 
of a glossopoeic performance through the use of Orghast-language? Given the 
complexity of the inquiry, my intention here is by no means to provide a 
straightforward answer. There is of course the intrinsic difficulty of examining a 
performance that took place nearly forty years ago, through limited 
documentation, that makes one’s arguments perhaps necessarily conjectural. 
However, Brook’s insistence on the possibility of a pre-cultural theatre, as well as 
the wide resonance of Orghast amongst theoretical works on intercultural and 
avant-garde performance validate the question and invite further discussion. For 
example, Patrice Pavis (1996) refers to Orghast as an experimentation with the 
capacity of performance to communicate ‘directly on an affective, pre-rational 
level, fusing form and content indissolubly’ (Pavis, 1996: 69). Also, in his review in 
The Times (1971), Irving Wardle talks of ‘a work intended to awaken the prelogical 
faculties and conjure buried music out of the earth’ (as cited in Smith, 1972: 237). 
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On a more critical vein, C. D. Innes (1993), questions the efficacy of Orghast 
arguing that it ‘was one-sided in its appeal’, pointing at the – significantly large – 
uneducated parts of the audience who, according to Innes, ‘found those dark 
primordial cries hilariously funny’ (Innes, 1993: 140). 
The extent to which the group actually achieved a pre-cultural performance is 
highly debatable. Indeed, the experimental nature of the performance would 
make it so. On one hand, the aim of the group was to raise the importance of the 
problematics of linguistic normativity rather than providing a clearly alternative 
theatrical model. On the other hand, Brook and Hughes wanted to discover a 
‘lost’ process of expression. In his interview with Smith, Brook asks accordingly:  
‘Do these fragments from other cultures not only suggest a different form of 
dramatic utterance? Do they also imply a fuller emotional range, that has 
somehow been lost on the way?’ (Smith, 1972: 249).    
It is then precisely this potential implication that I want to discuss here, by 
examining the interrelation between onomatopoeia and glossopoeia.  
I argue that the extent to which the process of inventing sounds (that 
correspond to specific significations) could create the conditions for a glossopoeic 
performance depends on some considerations. To begin with, I suggest that we 
have to examine the speculations that Brook and Hughes made when referring to 
‘direct communication of emotions’. It seems to me, that in order to reach this 
hypothetical state of ‘directness’ – that is, a mode of engaging that bypasses the 
logical faculties of the self – one has to somehow eradicate the normative function 
of communication itself, in as much as it implies subjective imposition and 
representation. Even so, how can communication occur directly – i.e as a non-
referential operation? Isn’t this operation an equivalent to non-communication? 
Following Lyotard, to create non-cognitive conditions of engaging art is to remove 
the intentionality of conceptual communication together with its universalistic 
nature (Lyotard, 1984). Lyotard argues that the universality of the ‘concept’ and 
the function of conceptual communication should be rejected within every plateau 
of artistic engagement. As Shaviro observes, Lyotard finds an intersection between 
Kantian thought and Adorno’s approach to art in relation to this issue. He notes 
that, ‘[a]ccording to Lyotard, Kant and Adorno share ‘a thinking about art which 
is not a thinking of non-communication but of non-conceptual communication’’ 
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(Shaviro, 2002: 15). Considered as such, direct communication is not an act of 
negating communication, but rather a process of destabilising the transmission of 
a presumed concept that is manifested as transcendence. Is there a difference, 
therefore, between direct communication and non-conceptual communication? 
Whereas the former affirms the potential implications of a ‘fuller emotional range’ 
(as Brook argues), the latter challenges the function of a concept by negating its 
fixed value (as Lyotard believes). In a sense, they are ‘two sides of the same coin’ in 
so far as they aim for less representability in the discursive act. Direct 
communication of emotions can be considered, then, as the affirmative ‘alter ego’ 
of non-conceptual communication.  
It seems to me however, that in the context of Orghast, the relation between the 
theoretical model of ‘unearthing’ and the group’s understanding of direct 
communication complicates the discussion a little more. In seeking to ‘unearth’ 
the musicality of language, Brook and Hughes were trying to generate the 
conditions of ‘direct communication’ by drawing theoretically on human nature; 
they implied a type of ‘unified being’ (i.e. the animal nature of humans) that could 
potentially frame the theoretical scope of the performance. As I discussed above, 
they were looking for a language that unifies, or as Hughes notes, ‘[for] a language 
belonging below the levels where differences appear’ (as cited in Smith, 1972: 45). 
I argue, then, that in Orghast, the group conceived a language that would negate 
the universality of concept, while simultaneously affirming the universality of an 
animal mode of expression. Considered as such, the Orghast-language can be 
understood as a language whose function was to normalise differences – a 
language that can be ‘expressive to all people’, as Hughes insists (ibid).  
If what normalises this language, if what makes this language ‘expressive to all 
people’, is its mode (i.e. its narrativity and intonations) and not an encoded 
concept, then the question is how does this mode operate in the first place. In 
many parts of his book about the performance, Smith relates the theoretical 
framework of Brook and Hughes to Levi-Strauss’s discussion of myths and music. 
Smith explains that, the Orghast-language – being a hybridisation of music and 
mythology – was meant to function unconsciously through its mode; and that is 
because, as Levi-Strauss notes, ‘[myths and music] operate in men’s minds 
without their being aware of the fact’ (Levi-Strauss, 1969: 12). Following Levi-
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Strauss, Smith claims that myths and music contain irrational narratives because 
they are inescapable continuums that exceed historical changes, cultural 
contradictions and differences, communicating meanings unconsciously through 
their mode. Smith states, accordingly, that, ‘myths […] define our unfreedom, 
obliterate linear time and history and substitute cyclical time, allowing no change’ 
(Smith, 1972: 118).  
In contrast to Smith’s analysis, I argue that the non-representational potentials 
of the Orghast-experiment can be found in theoretical discourses that challenge a 
trans-historical mode of engaging with art and language; suggesting non-
transcendental practices of interaction and receptivity. Rather than understanding 
myths and music as continuums that exist and function unconsciously through 
their structures, I suggest that they become consciously through constant cultural 
negotiation and difference. In other words, I argue that myths and music are 
conscious becomings – both culturally and historically specific. Is, therefore, 
glossopoeia – or what Brook and Hughes termed as ‘direct communication of 
emotions’ – an unconscious discourse? Interestingly, Artaud compared this 
destratified function of language to the language of dreams, but not to the 
Freudian conception of dreams as surrogates of suppressed desires rooted in libido 
– in the unconcsious id. Because, according to Artaud, ‘to believe that dreams 
themselves have only a substitute function, is to diminish the profound poetic 
bearing of dreams as well as of the theatre’ (Artaud, 1958: 92). Commenting on 
this, Derrida states that, ‘Artaud wants to return their dignity to dreams and to 
make of them something more original, more free, more affirmative than an 
activity of displacement’ (Derrida, 2001 [1978]: 306).  
Thus, in contradistinction to Smith, I argue that the appearance of differences 
or changes does not imply a rational or normative way of engaging with art, in so 
far as difference and change are understood as productive relations and not as 
negative separations. In a sense, I would argue that being conscious is not 
essentially being rational. I suggest, therefore, that if communication is achieved 
through unconscious patterns of expression, then it becomes a representation of 
trans-temporal significations (or as Levi-Strauss would say, of floating 
significations) that are created outside of the event in question. By corresponding 
to unconscious codifications of meaning, communication becomes a 
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transcendental transmission of ‘messages’ to be conveyed. I suggest therefore that 
the pre-cultural potential of Orghast is not a question of unconscious 
communication, but a question of becoming-affective within the ‘here and now’ of 
the performance; that is, a question of affective creation.  
Indeed, I believe that the Deleuzian notion of affect is a very useful theoretical 
tool for examining Orghast’s experimentation with theatrical communication. The 
difference between affect and conceptual (or even unconscious) communication is 
decisive. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari write:   
‘L’ affect (Spinoza’s affectus) is an ability to affect and be affected. It is a 
prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state 
of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that 
body’s capacity to act. L’ affection (Spinoza’s affectio) is each such state 
considered as an encounter between the affected body and a second, affecting, 
body […]’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004 [1987]: xvii, original emphasis).    
Importantly, this prepersonal state corresponds neither to a transpersonal (as Jung 
would argue), nor to an unconscious plane of the self. In a sense, I argue that the 
notion of affect is a tool that suggests a conscious and non-conceptual communication. In 
contrast to Hughes’s idea of ‘unearthing’ and Levi-Strauss’s account on myths and 
music – that rely on a subliminal understanding of physiological existence – the 
notion of affect proposes an interface of intensities and forces that operate not 
exclusively within a subject, but also in between subjects. Thus, following the 
Orghast-experiment, I suggest that the process of onomatopoeia can trigger a 
glossopoeic performance in so far as it becomes affective; that is, in so far as it 
actualises affective potentials, rather than becoming a medium of a direct 
communication that transmits subliminal or transcendental significations by 
separating them from the very process of their transmission. I argue that the 
notion of ‘unearthing’ and the discourse about the unconscious levels of 
communication do not push the critique of the transcendental aspect of 
conceptual communication far enough.  
Thus, to sum up, I argue that the purpose of the group’s process-based work in 
decomposing glossological patterns was not partly materialised. While Brook 
wanted to present a live performance that could interrupt and challenge linguistic 
normativity and mimetic representation, the staging conditions and the biological 
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theorisation of Orghast seem to have subjected this potential to an one-directional 
pursuit of a pre-cultural event. In other words, I argue that the group’s absolute 
and teleological focus on achieving a direct, pre-symbolic performance by 
provoking the ‘death’ of conceptual communication somehow limited the 
conditions of possibility for glossopoeia’s emergence as a process (as a becoming) 
during the performance. I suggest that glossopoeia emerges in the form of an 
interruption of linguistic normativity rather than as a hegemonic and telelogical 
mode of communication. This is indeed one of the most radical possibilities of 
theatre. As Ridout notes, ‘theatre can be a way of interrupting communication, 
and re-conquering its function as a means of social gathering – a communal 
function even’ (Ridout, 2008: 227). I argue that by moving towards this communal 
or ‘re-ligious’ potential of theatre that Ridout identifies, glossopoeia should be 
considered as a movement, as a ‘line of escape’, as a constant ‘turning away’ from 
conceptual communication. Particularly in Orghast, I argue that glossopoeia could 
be understood as the emergent interrelation between musical expressivity and 
onomatopoeic neologisms. This is the reason why I argue that there should not be 
a clear distinction between the laboratorial process of the pre-performance period 
and the actual performance. In fact, I suggest that the actual performance could 
have been an extension of its rehearsal, since Orghast’s aim was on one hand to 
experiment, and on the other hand to break down the barriers of linear 
rehearsing. Is this extension possible? If yes, then I suggest that we need to rethink 
the function of theatre as an incomplete process that performs research, and not as 
an aesthetically polished product of textual representations.  
 
(f) The glossopoeic body: ‘mis-performing’ critique 
As a way to conclude the discussion about the resonance of the Orghast- 
experiment, and while keeping with the arguments described in the previous 
sections, I would like to give a brief account of the way in which the glossopoeic 
body could perform critique. Before doing so, it is worth noting that the Orghast 
performance can be understood as an experimental harbinger of the postdramatic 
paradigm, as it attempted to actualise the subordination of the ‘sign’ in favour of a 
non-representational critical process.  
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I argue that the glossopoeic body can be described as an incomplete 
multiplicity (rather than a singularity) that functions through intensity and 
transgression. This incompleteness derives from the body’s confrontation with 
normativity, to the extent that the latter endorses an idea of corporeal finitude and 
perfection. It is also precisely in its incomplete condition that the body’s 
transgressive potentiality lies, since an incomplete body wields the power to be 
radically multiplied. The glossopoeic body is a body that affects the performance 
and is affected by the performance. As such, it functions as a multiplicity in so far 
as it negates on one hand any hierarchical condition of being, and on the other in 
as much as it resists the normative individualism of performing. Thus, the 
glossopoeic body embraces the Artaudian ‘expression in space’ by transgressing 
the boundaries that separate the space from the body. It embodies the space 
within it, and it is embodied in the space that demarcates the subjects that affect 
or become affected. Therefore, the glossopoeic bodies fade out the limits between 
corporeality and spatiality in as much as they intermingle with space and with one 
another. In other words, paraphrasing Artaud, the glossopoeic body ‘expands in 
space’ in order to affect and to be affected. I argue that, understanding the body 
an incomplete and transgressive multiplicity, suggests understanding space as 
existent within the body, and of the body as immanent in space. In fact, the 
glossopoeic body is partly what Bakhtin terms as a grotesque body. In Rabelais and His 
World, Bakhtin notes that it,  
‘is unfinished, outgrows itself, transgresses its own limits. The stress is laid on 
those parts of the body that are open to the outside world, that is, the parts 
through which the world enters the body or emerges from it, or through 
which the body itself goes out to meet the world […] The unfinished and 
open body […] is not separated from the world by clearly defined boundaries; 
it is blended with the world, with animals, with objects’(Bakhtin, 1984 [1968]: 
26-7). 
In Bakhtinian terms, the pre-cultural potential of Orghast would probably depend 
on its capacity to create a sensation of ‘carnival’; that is, a space in which a body 
‘collides’ with another through a ‘loss’ of subjectivity. Within a carnival, the 
importance of subjectivity is subordinated, and it is in a similar way that the 
glossopoeic body creates the conditions of possibility for a ‘becoming of the 
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between’, and not for a becoming-complete subject. The glossopoeic body is a 
body that cannot be normalised either as a subject or an object.      
Alongside this Bakhtinian understanding of corporeality I argue, therefore, that 
bodies that find interruptions within a performance, in which they interact 
glossopoeically, expand in space in order to reach other bodies. The subjection of 
normative speech and conceptual communication, the subordination of 
transcendental and absent meanings activates a transgressive body – a body that 
extends its outputs in order to affect and to be affected. The glossopoeic body is a 
body that strives to become meaningful, however never attains a final meaning; 
and it is this lack of finality in the entirety of the performative act, as well as its 
becoming that makes this body creatively ‘dysfunctional’ in standardised 
performance settings. Indeed, this negation of finality also suggests its imperfection 
not only in terms of the discursive act, but also in regards to the body’s movements 
in space. The glossopoeic body, like the grotesque body, performs outside of 
geometrical unities, beyond normative conceptualisations of spatiality, e.g. 
Aristotelian theatrical unities. It inevitably ‘mis-performs’, and it is by virtue of this 
‘mis-performance’ that glossopoeia disrupts normativity and destabilises orthodox 
movement. It is a diminutive body, yet its potential augmentation transgresses the 
conventional models of perfectionist expression. It ‘mis-performs’, it ‘mis-behaves’ 
in relation to what conformist models of communication define as a perfect or 
final performative act. In this sense, it attains a constant incompleteness of its own 
possibility, and that is why it is a becoming body of presence: a body of living 
metaphysics, as Derrida would claim. Its incomplete condition allows the body to 
become multiple, to become other, to become animal, to become one with space. 
It is then by virtue of these liminal moments or interruptions that the glossopoeic 
body reaches its potential in performance.  
 
Conclusion 
The challenge of pre-cultural expression was one of Brook’s most revolutionary 
contributions to the increasingly politicised theatre of the 1970s. Many theatre 
scholars questioned the extent to which a pre-cultural theatre can be put into 
practice, let alone justified. Others, like Patrice Pavis, claim that Brook’s challenge 
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was an ultracultural one, since it ‘involves an often mythic quest for the origins and 
the supposed lost purity of the theatre’ (Pavis, 1996: 6). From whichever 
perspective one chooses to approach Brook’s theatre, one cannot fail to consider 
his theatrical project as a process of research on the problematic expansions of 
cultural normativity. This research, alongside with Grotowski’s ‘Theatre 
Laboratory’, influenced a large part of British directors: Peter Hall, Trevor Nunn, 
Deborah Warner, Simon McBurney amongst others.  
In this chapter I attempted to trace and critically examine Brook’s pursuit of 
what he terms a ‘holy theatre’. In doing so, I considered the extent to which Brook 
created the conditions for this metaphysical notion of performance to be staged, 
rather than symbolised. Particularly, in the first section, I contextualised Brook’s 
theatrology by discussing the resonance of his work The Empty Space within theatre 
theory and practice. Focusing on Brook’s approach to both describing and 
devising theatre, I argued that his combination of a holy and a rough theatre 
should be understood as a search for experiencing magic not as a metaphor, but as 
a substantial encounter with metaphysics on stage. Further, in the second section 
of the chapter, I drew on Derrida’s critique of mimetic representation, on 
Adorno’s understanding of musicality and also on Deleuzian ‘affective’ ontology as 
a means to discuss the potentiality of the Orghast performance. It is, I suggest, by 
virtue of this theoretical fusion that the question of a non-representational, 
transient performance can be explored thoroughly. It is, furthermore, not a 
coincidence that this intellectual blending becomes much more effective when it 
runs alongside Artaudian thinking – since, indeed, Orghast’s potentiality lies in 
what Artaud calls ‘spectacle acting not as reflection but as force’ (Artaud, 1970: 
297). I attempted to show that Brook’s proposal to devise a non-symbolic play that 
embodies meaning by creating it at the very moment of its performance was a 
very interesting, yet not an unproblematic one. I argued that the extent to which 
the Orghast language could produce a pre-cultural event is not a biological question 
of unconscious expression, but a question of affective interruptions and corporeal 
transgression. Problematising ways of decomposing intentional expression and 
normative language in theatre remains explicitly important and complicated. 
However, despite their complex oscillation between theory and practice (and 
perhaps a certain utopianism) I believe that, Brook and Hughes managed to raise 
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the problematics of linguistic normativity and mimetic representation within 
Western theatre, especially at a time when the authority of the dramatic text and 
the apolitical conformism of linear performances were under serious scrutiny. My 
intention in this section was to examine and challenge the International Centre’s 
theoretical frameworks, to capture the methods of their practice and raise some 
issues that, in my view, required further analysis. In the end, I argue that the 
experimental nature of Orghast can be found less in the performance itself, and 
more in Brook’s ‘need’ to examine pre-cultural expression from a biological to a 
metaphysical perspective. As he highlights in The Empty Space, ‘if the need for a 
true contact with a sacred invisibility through the theatre still exists, then all 
possible vehicles must be re-examined’ (Brook, 1990 [1968]: 54). 
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Chapter 5 
 
Promenading in fragments: the case of Punchdrunk 
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IV. Punchdrunk and the political: the question of fragmentation    
 
 
I. Introduction: Lehmann and the postdramatic turn 
 
‘Theatre is no longer a mass medium. To deny this becomes increasingly 
ridiculous, to reflect on it increasingly urgent’ (Lehmann, 2006 [1999]: 16).   
What has theatre become in the turn of the 21st century? To speak about a 
general framework of contemporary theatre practices could be problematic since 
we lack the time and distance required for a comprehensive reflection. On the 
other hand, to disregard the need for critical responses to the ongoing 
development of theatre and performance is to ignore the importance of a 
distinctive level of art practices that operate for and within what we call ‘the 
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political’. In what follows, I want to shortly elaborate on the ‘postdramatic 
paradigm’ in theatre as conceptualised by Hans-Thies Lehmann in his 1999 
(2006) work Postdramatic Theatre. In doing so, I want to offer a broad and critical 
prologue of my case study on the London-based theatre collective Punchdrunk 
and their immersive approach to performance.  
To understand the turn to a ‘postdramatic’ approach to theatre making, one 
has to look at the changing conditions that made it possible. The most important 
of these shifts in theatre history is surely the gradual separation between theatre 
and drama. Indeed, this separation is one of the most crucial developments in the 
history of modern theatre; not only because it changed the ways of devising and 
practicing theatre, but also because it produced new possibilities of thinking about 
performance whilst relating it to ongoing theoretical discourses. Implicit in this 
separation is a departure from the interchangeable use of these two terms (drama 
and theatre) as abstract designations of performance. What is their difference 
though? If we have to theorise a ‘postdramatic’ notion of theatre, we already 
assume a distinction between drama and theatre that made this break possible. In 
short, for clarity’s sake, I consider drama as an art form that can be defined by its 
focus and dependency on literary texts and their staging potentials. On the other 
hand, what I conceive as theatre is an act of performing which focuses on the 
spatio-temporal actuality of the ‘here and now’. Probably this seemingly subtle 
difference is not enough to justify a clash between drama and theatre – in any 
case, their historical coexistence is in itself a verification of a valid and congruent 
relationship. However, I suggest that it is important to map out the conflictual 
dynamics of this relationship as a means not only to dissociate theatre from 
drama, but also to understand the new questions that performance has faced 
during the turn to 21st century.         
To trace the signs of this historical shift we have to look back at least as far as at 
the beginning of the 20th century, as the decline of the elements that comprised 
the established forms of dramatic theatre became apparent. This period, or as 
Lehmann calls it, this ‘crisis of drama’ had begun in 1880 (Lehmann, 2006 
[1999]). It was roughly around this time that the predominance of dramatic 
literature was modestly being questioned within theatrical environments. In 
Postdramatic Theatre, Lehmann writes:  
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‘What is being shaken during this crisis and subsequently declines is a series of 
previously unquestioned constituents of drama: the textual form of a dialogue 
charged with suspense and pregnant with decisions; the subject whose reality 
can essentially be expressed in interpersonal speech; the action that unfolds 
primarily in an absolute present’ (Lehmann, 2006 [1999]: 49).  
For example, Edward Gordon Craig was among the first directors to challenge the 
compatibility of theatre and drama, proclaiming in the ‘First Dialogue’ of The Art 
of Theatre (2009 [1911]) that Shakespearean texts should not be staged at all. In 
fact, in an attempt to explain his own staging of Hamlet (which according to Craig 
was a failure), Craig claimed that it was the only way to prove his argument 
(namely that Hamlet cannot be performed). Later on in the 20th century, 
Pirandello’s breakthrough theatre (that can be considered as the harbinger of 
absurdist theatre), Gertrude Stein’s idea of ‘landscape plays’ and Artaud’s ‘theatre 
of cruelty’ can all be understood as radical attempts to deconstruct the ‘grand’ 
textual form and the temporal absoluteness of dramatic theatre. Theatre was in 
the midst of a groundbreaking transformation; the shifting conditions of 
performance began to profoundly renegotiate the dramatic narrative and the 
spatio-temporal linearity of theatrical representation.   
Importantly, the critical objections to textual sovereignty within theatre were 
directed not only at the dramatic theatrical models per se, but were equally 
skeptical towards the repercussions that these models were promoting on stage. As 
Lehmann notes, “[d]rama’ is not just an aesthetic model but carries with it 
essential epistemological and social implications’ (Lehmann, 2006 [1999]: 48). I 
would also add that these implications became socio-ontological in so far as they 
suggested particular forms of existing socially, and provided specific cultural ‘tools’ 
that interpret the social and political reality. Two of the most notable associations 
of dramatic theatre are on the one hand the supremacy of the performative ‘hero’ 
– the sovereign subject of theatre; and, on the other hand, the representation of 
‘grand narratives’ (of a world) through language. In other words, the sociocultural 
structure of dramatic theatre was driven first by a will to focus on representing an 
unchanging image of the ‘individual’, and secondly by a tendency to communicate 
sociopolitical concepts through abstracting and generalising the specificities of 
minimal action on stage. In a sense, then, dramatic theatre can be understood as a 
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medium that, even though operating at and for the present, was largely dependent 
upon a continuous non-present, upon a symbolic temporal dimension (or an 
‘absolute present’ as Lehmann calls it) that constantly required a special decoding 
of meanings.  
The postdramatic shift became possible due to certain changing conditions 
within artistic mediums and frameworks. One of the most important landmarks 
was the emergence of cinema, which produced new discourses and generated an 
immense experimentation within theatre. As Lehmann puts it, ‘[u]nder the 
impression of new media, the old ones become self-reflexive’ (ibid: 51; original 
emphasis). Theatre began to renegotiate its own conditions of becoming, and this 
process pushed it further away from the dramatic elements that used to confine it. 
The autonomisation of theatrical layers, which became possible as directors and 
theatre theorists stressed the importance of artistic decomposition, brought about 
a new theatrical ‘avant-gardism’ that shed light to the micro-cosmos of the mise en 
scene (audience, space, lights and so on). At the same time, the productively 
indeterminate concepts of theatricality and performativity were challenging the 
boundaries of pictorial representation within art contexts, blurring the boundaries 
between ‘art’ and ‘life’. In post-World War II Europe the plays of Beckett, Brecht, 
Ionesco and Sartre began to change the mode of perceiving theatre, redefining the 
role of dramatic texts in performance. At the same time, in the United States, 
John Cage, Merce Cunningham and Allan Kaprow were exploring alternatives to 
linear performance narratives. During the 1960s, the ‘theatre of the absurd’ 
became extremely popular within – mainly academic – discourses of performance 
and its links with existentialism promoted the articulation of a strong critical attitude 
towards the uniformity and immobility of meaning in dramatic theatre. New 
forms of theatre emerged, such as environmental theatre (Richard Schechner), 
documentary theatre and the Happenings, all of them highlighting the importance 
of space (site-specificity), as well as the possibilities of the ‘unexpected’ in audience 
participation.  
Thus, the essential unity between text and stage began to fade. Theatre was 
moving away from the dramatic text not only in order to abandon the latter’s 
restrictions, but also in order to create the conditions for a freer fusion of all the 
available theatrical elements. The text was subordinated not in order to be 
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discarded, but to become, in a sense, ‘minorised’; that is, the text obtained the 
possibility to be used differently, beyond its linguistic and cognitive value.  Hence, 
a more open-ended relation between what is written and what could be performed 
came into view. Lehmann offers a theorisation of this emerging theatre – a 
description of the ‘postdramatic paradigm’: 
‘The aim is no longer the wholeness of an aesthetic theatre composition of 
words, meaning, sound, gesture, etc., which as a holistic construct offers itself 
to perception. Instead the theatre takes on a fragmentary and partial 
character. It renounces the long-incontestable criteria of unity and synthesis 
and abandons itself to the chance (and risk) of trusting individual impulses, 
fragments and microstructures of texts in order to become a new kind of 
practice. In the process it discovers a new continent of performance, a new 
kind of 'presence' of the 'performers' (into which the 'actors' have mutated) 
and establishes a multifarious theatre landscape beyond forms focused on 
drama’ (ibid: 56-7).   
I argue that the ‘postdramatic paradigm’ is pivotal in the attempt to 
conceptualise a notion of political critique that operates beyond dialogical and 
narrative modes of theatricality. The process of abandoning unified forms of 
dialogue in performance – i.e. teleological dramatic discourses – while seeking to 
create a less stratified theatre is indeed a complicated one, and it could even be 
seen as a de-democratisation of theatre. To explore this point further, one can 
note that the structural function of theatre (from Greek tragedies to the present) 
has always been about producing an ‘embodied’ idea of democracy and political 
representation through the ‘art’ of dialogical exchange. The fixed linguistic model 
of questioning and answering, or even the rhetorical mode of inquiring into 
universal and particular social realities was considered to be the only egalitarian 
way of devising theatre, and by extension, of promoting the ‘democratic ideal’. 
Therefore, the question of what happens to theatrical critique when the 
dominance of dialogue and representation in performance is renounced is, vitally, 
a politically ‘unsafe’ question that can, however, potentially enrich our 
understanding of critical practice in general. This is one of the main reasons why 
the development of postdramatic theatre offers a very useful area of analysis for 
this thesis.   
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The proponents of the postdramatic shift in theatre attempted to deconstruct 
narrativity and dialogue to the extent that these forms of engagement with 
audiences were suggesting complete, unified and teleological outcomes – either 
ideological, moral, political and so on. Fragmentary and incomplete discourses, as 
well as the theatrical force of bodily affections became a more ‘adequate’ and 
radical medium to approach theatrical expression and political action. In dramatic 
terms, the unity of time, place and plot, as well as the transmission of self-identical 
meanings in the act of performing were under serious scrutiny in favour of a 
theatre that was affirming ‘less intentionality – a characteristic of the subject – 
than its failure, less conscious will than desire, less the ‘I’ than the ‘subject of the 
unconscious’’ (ibid: 18). At the same time, these fragmentary forms of theatrical 
engagement were being conducted within a positive or productive plateau of 
thinking and doing; that is, they were seeking to create an inclusive spectrum of 
possibilities beyond the negativity and ‘impossibility’ of the modern avant-garde. 
In this sense, these postdramatic discourses gave new dimensions to the practice of 
critique since rather than being based exclusively on language, they were 
operating through affirming a wide range of intensities, i.e. the bodily responses of 
actors and spectators, the experiencing of plot discontinuity and absurdity, the 
articulation of the entire mise en scène (space, light, atmosphere, new media etc.) 
as a site-and time-specific event and so on. The postdramatic shift was, therefore, 
a change in the mode of devising and experiencing a performance that attempted 
to subtract the rigid elements of dramatic theatre, in order to release their full 
potentials – in order to connect them to the mise en scène of the event. I suggest 
that from a postdramatic perspective, the practice of critique in theatre can be 
understood not as a judgmental process that rests in representing sociopolitical 
conflicts or facts, but as a truly creative and positive operation that produces the 
conditions for dissident voices to emerge. In postdramatic theatre, critique ceases to 
be one of the principal aims of the performance, and whereas this seems to be a 
rather apolitical turn, I argue that by contrast it is a micropolitical one. A 
postdramatic performance attempts to actualise politics within a theatrical event 
by considering critique as the ‘fire’ that drives the play’s potential engagement 
with the audience.  
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In what follows, I will focus on the work of Punchdrunk – a theatre collective 
based in London that has created site-specific and promenade performances since 
2000. Partly in keeping with the elements that comprise the postdramatic 
condition in theatre, I intend to discuss the philosophy and practice of 
Punchdrunk approaching them as a theatrical group that belongs to the wider 
postdramatic realm by means of what they propose, rather than by strictly 
following a postdramatic trend or movement.   
 
Methodological points  
The purpose of this chapter is to capture the possibilities of critique that have 
developed within the recent emergence of what has been called ‘immersive 
theatre’, by looking at the performance practice of the Punchdrunk collective. I 
will argue that contemporary/postdramatic theatre has been largely reshaped by 
the ‘plastic’ notion of immersion, and this chapter attempts to draw out both the 
conditions and the potentials of this reshaping. It is not my intention to provide a 
theorisation of ‘immersive theatre’, although I aim to frame this approach under a 
specific contextualisation and theoretical scholarship. Hoping that my 
argumentation will not be interpreted as an attempt to theorise a personally 
aspired notion of performance (as this is not my intention either), I offer a critical 
analysis of a theatre that cries out for theoretical articulation while simultaneously 
distancing itself from academic scholarship.  
For the implementation of this chapter I have collected qualitative data that 
has complemented my archive research (newspaper articles, interviews and 
journal articles) on Punchdrunk to a significant extent. Maintaining the case-study 
approach of the thesis, I used two forms of qualitative methods to gather this data: 
that is, participant observation and in-depth interviews. Working as a volunteer in 
the construction of the site for the Punchdrunk show ‘The Duchess of Malfi’ 
(2010), I was able to observe and become involved in the complex process of 
designing the performance which took place in a huge vacant space in East 
London. Most importantly, through witnessing two of the rehearsals that took 
place on-site, and through experiencing the actual performance, I am able to 
articulate a richer idea of Punchdrunk’s work than the one I had in my first 
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encounter (as a spectator) with the group in ‘The Masque of the Red Death’ 
(2008). My intention in being involved in the designing process of the performance 
was neither to ‘solve’ the philosophical ‘puzzle’ of Punchdrunk, nor to discover a 
supposedly ‘magical secret’ of their immersive approach to theatre. Rather, I was 
interested in observing – while being an active part of it – the ‘becoming’ of a 
Punchdrunk performance, as a means of finding the appropriate ways in which I 
could critically discuss and thoroughly examine Punchdrunk theatre in relation to 
my thesis. Thus, in what follows, I offer an analysis of Punchdrunk theatre by 
placing my archive research, my observation notes and a – mostly Deleuzian – 
theoretical framework under discussion. This is complemented and enriched by 
the data collected from two extensive interviews with Maxine Doyle (associate 
director and choreographer), and Colin Marsh (strategic associate).  
 
II. What do Punchdrunk do?  
Punchdrunk was founded by Felix Barrett in 1999. Since then, the company 
has created numerous productions that range from radical adaptations of classic 
plays to contemporary performances and installations. From Shakespearean tales 
and Webster’s tragic elements to Chekhov’s seriocomic mystery and Poe’s gothic 
atmospheres, Punchdrunk has been focusing on staging ‘immersive’ – mostly neo-
Victorian – performances, rather than devising ‘conventionally’ perceived theatre. 
As a Guardian 2009 editorial observes, ‘Punchdrunk is a theatre company that 
stages experiences, not plays’ (‘In praise of … Punchdrunk’, 2009: para. 1). It is 
indeed this element of immersion that distinguishes Punchdrunk’s theatrical 
project more than anything else; but, at the same time, it is this element that often 
makes a spectator, a critic or a researcher obtain an ambiguous or obscure idea of 
what this group is actually offering to the British theatre world. For instance, 
Josephine Machon (2007) opens her paper on Punchdrunk by highlighting the 
apparent impossibility of articulating an analytical response to the company’s 
work through language. In a similar vain, Gareth White introduces his discussion 
of Punchdrunk’s ‘masked spectator’ arguing that, ‘Punchdrunk takes a peculiar 
approach to the problem of audience participation, and offers their audiences 
strange encounters with their work’ (White, 2009: 219; my emphasis). What is then 
so strange and ineffable about Punchdrunk theatre?       
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Punchdrunk occupy large industrial spaces such as warehouses, art centres and 
abandoned buildings to present their – fundamentally – site-specific work. In 
staging their performances, the group often uses the entire space of a building, 
which the spectators are invited to explore by wandering around its halls, rooms 
and corridors. With a certain traditionally perceived ‘theatrical irony’, 
Punchdrunk instruct their audiences – and not the performers – to wear masks while 
promenading the performance space. While the action evolves around them, the 
masked spectators are progressively left isolated and disoriented, becoming free to 
choose whether they will follow specific performers, explore rooms that have been 
transformed into performative spaces, ‘go with the flow’, or draw their personal 
mapping of the space and experience it at their own pace. In each case, what 
initially characterises the audience’s presence in a Punchdrunk performance is, 
firstly, an invitation to constant movement – that is encouraged by the performers 
and the set itself – and, secondly, a pursuit for an encounter with something or 
someone that will either enhance the spectators’ agential possibilities, their 
potential ‘specta(c)torship’, or reconfirm their comfort as distanced theatre-goers. 
What the audience foremost experiences in a Punchdrunk production is an 
interesting and mysterious theatrical promenade: a promenade performance. 
Punchdrunk is an important part of contemporary ensemble theatre. The 
company shares many features and attributes with other theatre groups that have 
flourished during the first decade of the 21st century. The site-specific narratives, 
the advanced use of digital technologies (or, in the case of Punchdrunk, the 
influence of new media, cinema and video games in creating detailed immersive 
environments), the focus on empowering and enabling the audience’s agential 
possibilities with less and less instruction and the dream-like atmospheres are all 
elements that most contemporary ensemble theatres have in common. Most 
importantly, as Paige McGinley argues in her 2010 article ‘A New Generation of 
Ensemble Performance’, many of these companies have ‘similar approaches to 
storytelling and employ dramaturgical structures that hinge on networked 
spatiality, rather than on linear teleology’ (McGinley, 2010: 12). McGinley 
highlights the significance of the pre-performance periods for many ensemble 
works that, ‘[o]ften by necessity and often by design’ become long processes of test 
and experimentation (ibid). Indeed, Punchdrunk’s plays are designed, rehearsed 
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and prepared for quite a long time before the actual performances take place. But 
also in terms of organisation, Punchdrunk share a similar principle of structure 
with many other ensemble theatre companies. While one can easily observe a very 
collaborative process at work during the rehearsals, and an ‘emancipatory’ feeling 
of working with a ‘collective’ (rather than with a company), the management and 
leadership of the group are both structurally firm and very professional. This sense 
of hierarchy (that could partly be a result of a relatively insecure funding, as in the 
case of almost all ensemble companies), albeit in a non-traditional expression, and 
its frequent interchange with the radicalism and experimentation of a theatre 
collective was a very interesting experience that I encountered during my work 
with the group.                   
One of the most interesting achievements of Punchdrunk is their capacity to 
engage audiences that would not essentially choose to include theatre and 
performance art in their social activities. Punchdrunk, as well as other theatre 
companies similar in scope (e.g. Shunt, Angels in the Architecture) transform the 
spaces they inhibit into ‘bizarre’, though immensely inviting, sites for social 
interaction and discovery. There is something about this process that makes the 
theatrical experience more tangible and thus more accessible; especially for young 
audiences whose perception of the ‘theatrical’ has been shaped within a 
multiplicity of artistic representations that do not essentially stem from the 
traditional theatrical ‘stage’. As Andy Field wrote in the Guardian, ‘[t]here are 
echoes of the nightclub, the theme park, the house party, the festival – social 
environments more familiar to many than the traditional theatre’ (Field, 2009: 
para. 6).  
Furthermore, this kind of avant-garde theatre groups seems to occupy an 
increasingly accepted position within British theatre. They blur the boundaries 
between artistic contexts and forms that were previously unfamiliar with each 
other: theatre and dance, cinema and performance, art installations and acting, 
are only some of the creative intersections that these groups embrace. Lyn 
Gardner argues in her review of Punchdrunk’s ‘Tunnel 228’ that,  
‘[w]e are living through an extraordinary era in British theatre. The stage, the 
gallery, the dance floor and even social gaming are all edging closer to each 
other, creating meeting points where sparks fly’ (Gardner, 2009: para. 1).  
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Gardner captures an important momentum in British theatre; it is one that opens 
up the political scope of performance, while unavoidably yielding questions of 
theatrical proximity and interactivity. I argue that this creative intersection that 
Gradner observes played a significant role on one hand in questioning and 
challenging interactive theatre; and on the other hand, it redefined theatrical 
experience paving the way for what is called ‘immersive theatre’.    
 
An ‘immersive’ theatre?  
Punchdrunk’s theatrical project creates the conditions for the emergence of 
interactive experiences between performers and spectators. The group’s 
productions encourage proximity and direct contact as a means to achieve 
interactive performances. As a result, the promenade of the audience frequently 
affects, or is affected by the action that progresses within the space. The 
Punchdrunk performers invite contact, on a somatic, cognitive, spatial or 
psychological level, and in doing so, they challenge the spectators as much as the 
spectators challenge the performance itself. From this perspective, the mise en scènes 
of Punchdrunk can be understood as ephemeral landscapes that are produced by 
the co-existence of, and the interaction between performers and spectators within 
a performative space – that is, a space that functions as a huge installation, or as 
an assemblage of tiny ones.  
Indeed, the resonance of the transformed space, as well as of the entire mise en 
scene that Punchdrunk create, is pivotal in conceiving the group’s performances 
beyond the reproduction of the performer-spectator binary in a merely 
‘unmarked’ style. Gardner suggests that, ‘the fascinating thing about this 
immersive theatre experience is its duality – something in the way it works allows 
you to be both spectator and participant simultaneously’ (Gardner, 2007; para. 2). 
Without disagreeing with Gardner here, I argue that, at the same time, it is 
precisely this duality that Punchdrunk attempt to first destabilise, and secondly 
expose, by creating the conditions for a theatrical experience that becomes 
through immersion. In other words, in so far as the group’s performances become 
immersive, there is no clear identity position that a spectator (and even a 
performer) can occupy or perform. In this sense, the roles of ‘spectator’ and 
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‘performer’ become less important, precisely because everything (i.e. the set, the 
space, the smell, the sounds etc.) within the performative space becomes equally 
important. One of the most important memories of my experience, both in The 
Masque of the Red Death (2008) and in The Duchess of Malfi (2010), was a 
displacing sensation of feeling neither as a spectator nor as a performer; not even 
as a combination of the two. There was something in the way in which the 
performance was structured that made these roles seem less relevant, and thus less 
available to me. There was something creative and productive in my incapacity to 
understand and follow a specific way in which I could ‘be’ within the space. I was, 
in a sense, immersed in the play. I would argue then that to be immersed is to let 
one’s subjectivity be destabilised, and by extension transformed into new agential 
possibilities that are produced from ‘losing’ rather than ‘finding’ oneself. From this 
aspect, immersion can be understood as a ‘becoming-other’ potentiality. In a 
Guardian article, Matt Trueman manages to capture this potentiality:  
‘Not content with watching, I wanted to feel [the performance’s] force, its 
warmth, its wetness. That desire to experience more fully is at the heart of 
immersive theatre, which can place us in situations that we are unlikely to 
encounter in our everyday lives, rather than merely placing them before us. It 
can treat us to the experiences of someone else’s lifetime’ (Trueman, 2010: 
para. 2; my emphasis).  
Trueman’s account is an endeavour to find articulation for these non-verbal 
qualities of contemporary British theatre that affirm experiences beyond the 
dialogical exchange between theatrical subjects. It is through the process of 
immersion in the entire mise en scène that Punchdrunk create possibilities for a new 
form of theatrical engagement. Interestingly, as Trueman seems to imply, this 
immersive experience becomes possible through a positive sense of displacement – 
a productive sensation of ‘losing oneself’ and experiencing the event through the 
eyes of another. In reviewing The Masque of the Red Death (2008), Judith Mackrell 
witnesses a very similar emotional response. She writes:  
‘What I found thrilling was the feeling I’d been cast adrift in someone else’s 
dream, or even a film, and that I was gradually becoming a character in it’ 
(Mackrell, 2008: para. 2).     
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Thus, in looking at Punchdrunk’s project, one can observe and justify a wide 
shift in framing and shaping the processes of interactive theatre during the 2000s. 
This challenging shift became possible in direct relation to past discourses of 
performance: If the 70s were a turning point from ‘observing to communal 
participation’, if the 80s were an era of live performance and shocking effects, and 
if the 90s reinforced the postdramatic stream within interactive performances, 
then the 00s were the period of immersive theatrical experiences. What is unique about 
this latter period, of which Punchdrunk is an integral part, is that never before had 
theatrical groups and directors experimented so widely with the concepts of 
interactivity, proximity and with what we might ambitiously call a ‘total’ 
experience. The ‘fruits’ of this experimentation led to a gradual dismissal of 
interactivity and dialogue as ends in themselves – as the ultimate aims of theatrical 
performance. The ‘political’ question of performance was no longer concerned 
only with the way that dialogical exchanges could be achieved; but also with the 
conditions under which these exchanges can emerge, with the ways in which they 
can be decomposed, and most importantly with the ‘minor’ experiences that every 
constituent element of a performance could offer. From this perspective, the 
obscure and vague concept of immersion offered new possibilities to the politics of 
performance – it paved the way for a new conception of performative presence 
that transgressed the boundaries of unified narrative and linear interactivity. It 
produced the conditions of a presence that is not a product of external impulses 
and subjectivities, but of intensities that become possible through the spectators’ 
and performers’ submergence into the performance. This quality of immersion is 
well portrayed by Vanhoutte and Wynants (2010) in Mapping Intermediality in 
Performance: 
‘Distinct from the two-dimensional linear perspective of the viewer looking at 
an image in drawing, painting, and photography, the immersive perspective 
enables the viewer to see from within the image’ (Vanhoutte & Wynats, 2010: 
47).  
If we think of this point in relation to theatre, we could metaphorically argue that 
interactive theatre has moved from the point of discussing how to paint the image 
‘together’, to the point of co-existing in the same image whilst painting it at the 
same time. Thus, viewed from this analogy, the ‘immersive turn’ was a turn to 
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experience as emancipated from transcendence. It destabilised the separation 
inherent within theatrical conditions that used to define a performance, by shifting 
the mode of perceiving from the exterior towards a mode of experiencing from 
within the event.  
In the following sections I introduce some key points of Punchdrunk theatre 
that will provide useful insights for discussing its critical possibilities. In focusing on 
the ways in which Punchdrunk work, I want to describe the elements that 
compose their performances with a view to raising some critical points in relation 
to their practice.  
 
III. Punchdrunk’s theatrical elements 
From the beginnings of Punchdrunk project, Barrett’s initial aim has been to 
shake and transform the stratified and submissive mode of spectatorship in British 
theatre. As a theatregoer, he had identified a problematic repetition in the manner 
in which performances were structured and presented to audiences, that made 
him obtain a polemical attitude against many familiar theatrical conventions. 
Barrett observed that both the individual and shared preconceptions amongst the 
audiences were so many and so unchallenged that were diminishing the potential 
of the spectators to engage with, experience and respond to a performance. In a 
2007 interview with Josephine Machon, Barrett notes:  
‘It’s too familiar, too structured. And because of this familiarity, it kind of 
stops you responding to it […] you forget about it, as if it never really existed, 
because you compartmentalise it into ‘theatre’’ (Barrett & Machon, 2007: 
n.pag.).  
By looking at multiple ways to deconstruct the commonsensical implications that 
had been confining the force of theatrical experience, Barrett conceptualised a 
spatial dramaturgy that could ‘empower the audience, [and] make the audience 
the epicentre of the work’ (ibid). For Barrett, one of the most important processes 
that had to become possible was a shift from experiencing theatre only 
intellectually to the creation of a more instinctive and physical theatrical presence. 
In a 2009 interview with Machon he argues that, ‘by allowing the body to become 
empowered […] [the spectators] are physically involved with the piece’ (Machon, 
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2009: 89). Barrett wanted to revolutionise the concept of spectatorship, 
transforming it from a subjugated condition into a presence ‘loaded’ with 
theatricality. Therefore, his aspiration was to instill agency in the audience by 
means of devising a performance in which the spectators would be able to move, 
to discover, and also to be shocked, to be exposed, to feel; in a word, to experience 
the performance directly. As Maxine Doyle notes, ‘in Punchdrunk work you feel 
the dancing, you feel the breath and you have a visceral response to it’ (Machon, 
2009: 90; original emphasis). Both Barrett and Doyle argue that focusing on the 
audience as much as on the performance, the space, the text, the set, the lighting, 
is a vital prerequisite of stimulating such theatrical experiences. It is, then, the 
destratifying process of approaching every constituent element of a performance 
as a productive layer of a theatrical event, that, according to Barrett and Doyle, 
generates this immersive potentiality; it is a process that becomes possible through 
assimilating the multiplicity and complexity of theatrical layers.  
Thus, far from being driven by their hypothetical importance or a supposed 
hierarchical order, I will now look at some of these layers more thoroughly, 
specifically for the distinctive quality they offer in the Punchdrunk theatrical 
project. These are: the performance space; the use of masks for the spectators; and 
the use of dancers in the performance. I argue that analysing these elements or 
processes, and putting them into context, is key to understand the uniqueness and 
specificity of Punchdrunk theatre.    
 
(a) Creating a ‘smooth’ space: the spectator as a nomad 
The transformation of empty spaces into dense and performance environments 
is an artistically meticulous process in Punchdrunk theatre. From the early stages 
of a production, the group looks for multiple ways to take advantage of each 
space’s potentials (its history, its intensity, its smells etc.). Punchdrunk create 
spatial conditions that foster the play’s intensity, whilst allowing for a performance 
to emerge from within these conditions. In short, they construct an assemblage of 
installations within which the performance evolves. In his 2007 discussion with 
Machon, Barrett explains:  
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‘I was very interested early on in installation, just as a word. I didn’t use it as 
an art-world definition but more to define space that is inherently theatrical 
and yet has no performance within it; meaning that it’s a space that you walk 
into and something hits you. There’s an impact, you feel something and it 
creates some sort of emotional response. I’m a firm believer that every space 
you go into is saying something; there are echoes in the walls. All we do as 
company is draw those out’ (Barrett & Machon, 2007: n.pag.).      
Indeed, the early stages of a Punchdrunk production involve researching the 
possibilities and particularities of the chosen spaces. Each space has some very 
specific sensual qualities, which need to be ‘set free’ in order for the performance 
to work immersively. Barrett notes that one of the primary tasks of Punchdrunk is 
‘harnessing the power of the space, making the building work to its potential’ 
(Machon, 2009: 92). Although they work together, Barrett and Doyle approach 
this process quite differently. Barrett develops an instinctive relation to space, from 
which he is able to articulate the direction of the play. He points out that,  
‘The space is all-important and the way we build the work is about our 
instinctual response to it […] you don’t have time to think about it, you let 
your body dictate to you what the show’s going to be’ (ibid).  
On the contrary, Doyle takes on a much more intellectual – or perhaps more 
orchestrated – method of developing the performance according to space. She 
notes:  
‘What the building gives me is framings, so I start to see things in relation to 
framings. When I’m in the studio with the performers we’re creating the 
language in a neutral space but I know where that language is going to be 
located within that world. During the rehearsal process quite often I’ll say, 
‘don’t worry about that, the space will solve that problem’, it’s almost a cliché 
but it really does’ (ibid: 92-3). 
When these two different approaches intermingle creatively on site, then the 
respective space becomes the appropriate place for what will not only host, but 
also become a Punchdrunk show; because it is the combination of assembling 
imaginative worlds and dreamlike atmospheres with a rigorous ‘anti-narrative’, it 
is the fusion of linear framings (according to which Doyle works) with the non-
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linear spatial approach (according to which Barrett thinks of installation), that 
makes Punchdrunk able to contain the abstractness of the space and transform it 
into a theatrical installation. This synthesis of approaches became obvious to me 
not only in observing the conditions of the group’s rehearsal and design process, 
but also in experiencing the performances as a spectator. While I could identify a 
sequential narrative that structured the plays, the creatively fragmentary action 
that I experienced kept instilling a deconstructive effect in my attempts to follow 
the plot of the performances.       
Thus, the spaces in which the group devises and performs its plays become 
labyrinths loaded with theatricality; they become sites of mystery producing a 
goth-like spatiality that actively ‘participates’ in the general sensation of the 
performances. As Machon points out, ‘[w]ith a Punchdrunk event, the space 
invites you to interact with it, has its own quality and ambience, without the 
performers’ (Machon, 2007: n.pag.). Barrett underlines that, ‘[the] space speaks to 
you, you create your own world within it – space becomes alive and charges the 
imagination’ (as cited in Machon, 2007: n.pag.). Certainly, one can experience 
this quality of theatrical space in many different types of theatre, whether 
postdramatic or not. Despite their multiple differences, theatre directors and 
collectives pay significant attention to the ‘affective’ potentialities of space. Now, 
more often than not, this process is of a ‘territorial’ nature in the sense that space 
is measured and tailored in order to fit an anticipated effect. It becomes a striated 
platform on which subjects are invited to experience a theatrical play by sitting on 
a chair or by walking around. From this perspective, space does not really interact 
with the audience, but rather projects its intensity to them without allowing for the 
spectators’ traces to be visible within the space. Thus, conventionally, space 
becomes a predefined place in which an event occurs.      
 However, in a Punchdrunk performance there is a distinctive process that 
suggests a new relation between space, theatrical power and the body that breaks 
this dichotomising line between space and event. The main reason for this is that 
the sense of performativity, embodied in the spaces that Punchdrunk create, is not 
only the product of a design process that takes place, either instinctively or 
structurally, before the event. It is also the becoming of a presence that affects 
both the spatiality of the space and the choreography in various ways; that is, the 
 162 
presence of the audience and its relation to every constituent element of the mise en 
scène. As the audience’s agential possibilities are significantly increased compared 
to traditionally performed theatre, the physical presence of the Punchdrunk-
spectator becomes a vital ‘part of a choreographic landscape’, being, at the same 
time, a part of the architecture, a part of the building, a part of everything that we 
understand and experience as space (Doyle, personal interview, 2010). In my 
personal interview34 with her, Maxine Doyle notes:   
‘The idea of the audience becoming part of a choreographic landscape is 
something that we discovered by accident […] We discovered it by accident 
when Felix and I first worked together and we observed what was happening 
when you have a really highly physical language related to a performance’ 
(ibid).   
At the same time, this potentiality of the audience is made possible by means of 
experimenting with, and sometimes blurring, the boundaries between normality 
and irregularity; that is, between the safety of spectatorial distance and the 
unpredictability of proximity. In other words, what enriches the intensity of the 
performance is not only the spectators’ capacity to be near the action, but also 
their ‘felicitous’ or ‘infelicitous’ attempts to avoid the performers, to avoid 
exposure to something which is theatrically unexpected, frightening or undesired. 
Doyle notes that,  
‘sometimes there’s a way of preservation, the audience have to avoid a 
moment physically just to be safe. And also there’s a sort of sense I think 
sometimes of the audience testing those boundaries and sometimes you see a 
shift between, I think, a desire to be near and then a kind of … an agreement 
amongst the audience in terms of polite distances of watching’ (ibid).  
From this perspective, the agency of the audience can be understood as ‘floating’ 
between subjugation (to theatrical conditions of power, producing in them e.g. 
politeness) and a subversive sense of subjectivity that becomes possible through 
crossing the boundaries of theatrical normality. In other words, there takes place a 
process of interpellation (in Althusserian terms), as the ideological references that 
raise these ethical, normative and stratified boundaries always precede the 
                                                
34 Interview took place in October 19, 2010 at the Punchdrunk offices, Platform 6, Village 
Underground, 54 Holywell Lane, London EC2A 3PQ, England.  
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construction of the spectator-as-subject. However, at the same time, the 
uncanonical conditions of the performance itself give the audience the possibility 
not only to subvert the power that these boundaries imply, but also to convert 
their own (the spectators’) passivity into a renewed theatrical force. Crucially, the 
spectators become a part of the choreographic landscape by means of what they 
do, by inviting, or being invited to contact and interact, but also by means of how 
they try to avoid this from happening. In my first experience as a member of the 
audience in a Punchdrunk show (The Masque of the Red Death, 2008), I 
remember putting myself in a dilemma, regarding the extent to which I could be 
intimate with the performers (or the other spectators). What I found unique and 
interesting in ‘battling’ this dilemma was to observe other spectators 
problematising similar questions. In other words, I could sense a collective 
recognition of struggling to find the best way to walk around and experience the 
space and the performance; which turned out to be a creative, rather than a 
prohibitive, experience. This act of ‘avoiding’ the performance (or each other) at 
certain moments was, I suggest, quintessential in making interaction more 
possible. Because, although one could think of this ‘avoidance’ as a process that 
carries an essential negative connotation, a denial to participate, or even a 
complete disapproval of the performance, I would argue that it also paves the way 
for the construction of a theatrical subject that ‘becomes’ through the 
performance, one that is positively and productively mobile; or, following 
Deleuze, it allows for the creation of what could be called a ‘nomadic spectator’.  
In A Thousand Plateaus (2004 [1987]), Deleuze and Guattari describe the 
nomadic-subject as a presence that acts in a constant movement in-between 
established coordinates or points of reference. They argue that, while the nomad 
acknowledges the existence, as well as the usefulness of these points, s/he 
subordinates their importance in favour of continuous movement within the 
‘intermezzo’, the path, i.e. the space in-between them. For Deleuze and Guattari, 
the nomad crosses the boundaries of reference by means of movement – s/he is 
‘the Deterritorialized par excellence’, as the only condition that reterritorializes 
him/her is movement in itself (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004 [1987]: 421). Likewise, 
in a Punchdrunk performance, there is scarcely any sort of ‘escape’ from the sense 
of labyrinth into which the spectators move. The spectators are lost in a micro-
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cosmos which cannot provide them with the reterritorialization of comfort zones, 
but rather invites them to create their own sense of safety within a 
deterritorializing space. For example, when an audience member avoids an 
encounter with a performer, s/he does so from within a deterritorialized position 
– that is, from within a condition that is neither static (in scenic terms, as s/he 
simultaneously alters the scene by this avoidance), nor safe (in terms of intensity, as 
the moment of avoidance is a moment of exposure at the same time). Thus, it is 
not a process of ‘stepping back’ (where ‘back’ would signify a safe point of 
decompression), but of stepping elsewhere as a means to perform a different choice 
of movement; a different kind of exposure.  
I argue, therefore, that one cannot exclude the impact of the presence of both 
performers and spectators when discussing Punchdrunk’s production of spaces. 
Actually, what I am suggesting is that Punchdrunk-spaces allow for a nomadic 
conception of spectatorship precisely because they make possible a fusion between 
performers, spectators and space – or, in other words, space functions in such an 
immersive manner that what one visualises, perceives and experiences as spatial, 
affective and physical is significantly extended, with no specific distinguishing lines 
that could make someone assume that, e.g. ‘this is a quality of the space’ or that 
‘that is a quality of the audience’s presence’ etc. Space functions as a plateau on 
which theatrical subjects are nomadic ‘becomings’ immersed in its intensity – and 
hence creating the conditions for this space to be perceived as being ‘in motion’, 
as a site that constantly changes character and dynamics, even though its primary 
structure appears to be solid and striated: to become what Deleuze and Guattari 
call a ‘smooth space’ that emerges within a ‘striated space’. Their difference, as 
described in A Thousand Plateaus, is a matter of the way in which presence (or 
‘occupation’ of the space) is achieved. A ‘striated space’ is a ‘metric’ space – a 
space that is ‘counted in order to be occupied’, whereas a ‘smooth space’ is a 
‘vectorial, projective, or topological’ one: a space that is ‘occupied without being 
counted’ (ibid: 399). Indeed, Punchdrunk spaces are designed and organised 
(counted) in order to be occupied by performers and spectators; yet, at the same 
time, this organising process ‘fails’ to hold back the ephemeral and nomadic 
potentials of a Punchdrunk event. On the contrary, it creates the conditions for a 
dis-organising and destratified spatial synthesis that emerges through the constant 
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movement of performers and spectators. As Tamsin Lorraine points out while 
discussing Deleuze’s notion of ‘smooth space’, ‘a subject who orients himself with 
respect to movements, rather than a retrospectively created construct of space, 
experiences space not in terms of a totality to which it is connected […] but rather 
in terms of pure relations of speed and slowness […] that evoke powers to affect 
and be affected, both actual and potential’ (Lorraine, 2005: 254). Thus, I would 
argue that Punchdrunk theatrical sites become ‘smooth spaces’, acquiring a 
‘tactile’ potential, because of the nomadic movement of spectators and performers.     
 It is, therefore, important to understand the spatial dramaturgy of Punchdrunk 
in direct relation to the presence of performers and audience. The qualities of the 
space and their merging with the intensity of the event-in-progress demand this 
type of analysis. Now, moving on, I want to introduce another important 
theatrical element that, while sustaining the notion of ‘nomadic spectatorship’, 
gives rise to several complex questions that require further examination: that is, 
the fact that the audience wear masks. The use of this simple theatrical prop is 
central to the Punchdrunk-project – especially to the way in which audiences and 
performers affect the mise en scène. 
 
(b) The paradoxes of the mask: voyeurism revisited  
In his review of The Masque of the Red Death (2008), Ralf Remshardt writes: ‘The 
distancing and dreamlike effect of witnessing everything through the mask […] 
led, in my case, to a pleasant sense of disembodied half-presence, a bold childlike 
curiosity, and a reckless disregard for personal space’ (Remshardt, 2008: 641). 
Through this revealing observation, Remshardt captures the intensity that the 
masked spectators add to the performance. The condition of being masked is 
certainly a complicated one, as it opens up a wide spectrum of possibilities that 
alter the meaning and function of spectatorship. As in Remshardt’s case, the 
masked spectator witnesses a loss of his/her habitual sensory perception, only to 
acquire an excitingly disbalancing and ‘carnivalesque’ way of experiencing an 
event. Since the spectators’ spatial awareness is slightly destabilised, and since 
their responsiveness cannot be conveyed through facial expressivity, their physical 
language (their bodily expression) is augmented in parallel to the choreographic 
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movements of the performers. Being a masked spectator engenders a physical 
connection with the choreography, as well as with the space. As Machon puts it, 
‘the [masked] audience also adds an architectural dimension within the space’ 
(Machon, 2007: n.pag; my emphasis). My personal experience as a masked 
spectator was very intriguing. Although, at the beginning of the performance I felt 
strangely ‘trapped’ when I was instructed to wear it almost at all times, the mask 
gradually became a part of my body’s way to deal with what I was watching. It 
became a very active element in my attempt to experience and participate in the 
performance. I realised that while reducing my facial responsiveness, the mask 
simultaneously enhanced my capacity to focus, to follow and experience the action 
in a camera-like manner, as a voyeur. In his 2007 interview with Josephine 
Machon, Barrett notes that, ‘[t]he mask allows you to function as a voyeur, as a 
camera because you’re more aware of where you’re looking, what you choose to 
see and your peripheral vision is slightly affected’ (Barrett & Machon, 2007: 
n.pag.). In my personal interview with her, Doyle takes this argument a bit further, 
by highlighting the collective recognition that the act of watching in a voyeuristic 
manner receives in Punchdrunk performances:  
‘It is also a really public acknowledgment that theatre in any form is 
voyeuristic, and we don’t like to acknowledge that as a public when we go to 
the theatre and sit in chairs, and sit in a dark space and look. [In Punchdrunk 
performances] [y]ou are publicly being a voyeur, other people can see you 
being a voyeur, but they don’t know who you are because they can’t see you’ 
(Doyle, personal interview, 2010)   
Considered in this sense, the very process of watching others performing by 
wearing a mask becomes a shared and legitimate mode of performing voyeurism – 
especially because it takes place within the intensity of such intimate encounters 
(as those that are created between the Punchdrunk performers and spectators). In 
other words, the act of voyeurism is somehow freed from its ‘deviant’ 
manifestation as an ethically forbidden intrusion; on the contrary, it is encouraged 
acquiring the potentials of stimulating theatrical engagement. According to Doyle, 
what is interesting here is the tension that emerges amongst spectators and 
performers as a result of, not only watching the event as voyeurs, but also of 
watching each other becoming voyeurs:  
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‘If you are watching a scene which is violent, or has a really strong sexual 
drive […] you can leave but you choose to stay. People know that you are 
choosing to stay and see’ (ibid).  
Indeed, the feeling of sharing a sense of ‘guilt’ for insisting on watching e.g. a 
violent scene, or even for moving closer to the action in order to have a more 
detailed look, was interestingly new for me as a theatregoer. These were the 
moments when I felt the relation between an art gallery (in which I can stare at 
certain paintings or sculptures for hours with no specific worry) and a 
performance (in which I take into account the fact that I am watching human 
beings) more strongly. In a sense, at certain moments the performers were treated 
as objects or artworks moving in space.      
Although it has not been extensively discussed in modern theatre scholarship, 
there are several analyses that address the question of voyeurism, mostly by 
drawing on the Freudian idea of voyeurism and scopophilia as a vicarious act rooted 
in the childhood desire to gaze. What seems evident in these accounts is a 
substantial change in approaching the act of spectatorial voyeurism in relation to 
the past. It is worth noting that the pre-Victorian and the Victorian eras are 
considered as important points of reference in analyses of voyeurism. For instance, 
Davis observes that during these periods ‘spectatorship could encompass not only 
decorum and propriety but also voyeurism and desire’ (Davis, 2007: 61). 
Considering the ways in which voyeurism was justified in the 18th century, West 
highlights that there took place ‘a kind of scrutiny of the body which could 
displace or confuse lustful voyeurism with cultivated admiration’ (as cited in Davis, 
2007: 61). Also, Thomson underlines the ‘patriarchal conventions of the Victorian 
theatre’ in regards to voyeurism, that disallowed any ‘natural woman’ to gaze at a 
man in a sexual or ‘amoral’ way (Thompson, 2006: 250). It could be argued 
therefore that in the pre-Victorian and Victorian periods, the act of voyeurism was 
both a ‘taboo’ and a ‘raison d’être’ in theatrical performances. However, it was 
not until the achievements of modern avant-garde that the boundaries of 
theatrical voyeurism were extended, and gazing was liberated from its ‘amoral’ 
implications. In The Life of The Drama (1964), Eric Bentley highlights the ‘non-
innocent’ agential possibilities that the spectators acquire while gazing at 
performers, concluding that ‘if one took from theatre the element of voyeurism, 
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the occasion would lose much of its appeal’ (Bentley, 1969 [1964]: 56). Robert 
Leach reconceptualises the issue, arguing for the socially ‘contractive’ nature of 
voyeurism within theatre and performance contexts. He states that,  
‘watching the play is also importantly a private pleasure. The situation licences 
voyeurism: in the special circumstances of the theatre, in the privacy of the 
darkened auditorium, the individual may indulge in the ‘gaze’, which is 
impossible in most social situations. Here no guilt is attached – indeed, this is 
what the spectator has, in a sense, come for!’ (Leach, 2008: 176; original 
emphasis)          
From this perspective, the very process of ‘licensing’ voyeurism is crucial, and 
differs according to dissimilar cultural milieus. For instance, as Doyle points out in 
my personal interview with her, it is very interesting to observe ‘English audiences 
wanting permission’ and seeking for what delineates the borders between what is 
allowed and what is not (Doyle, personal interview, 2010). She notes that the 
performance ‘gives you permission to make decisions as to how you want to read a 
show, how you want to place yourself within it […] and to be really curious’ (ibid).  
Most accounts of theatrical voyeurism place the discussion within a feminist 
terrain, arguing for the de-traditionalisation of conventional watching and the de-
objectification of the image of woman that used to be perceived as a passive 
‘spectacle’, available exclusively for male gazing (Case, 1990; Carlson, 2004). 
Although discussing the complex gender implications produced within such 
theatrical contexts exceeds the scope of this chapter, it is, I suggest, of great 
significance to understand the influence of feminism (and post-feminism) in the 
production of these discourses that destabilised the conventional analogy of 
spectatorship (subject  object). As Carlson argues, ‘the importance of at least 
calling attention to, if not successfully subverting, the power relationships involved 
in traditional spectatorship has led many performers in one way or another to 
‘turn the spotlight’ on the (male) spectator and challenge his invisibility’ (Carlson, 
2004: 185). He cites the British performance artist Catherine Elwes, affirming her 
view that ‘the establishment of the women performer as a speaking subject’ (in the 
1980s and early 1990s) produced a radical potentiality that challenged the 
traditional mode of representation in spectatorship (ibid):  
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‘The living performer, Elwes suggests, can expose the (male) spectator ‘to the 
fearful proximity of the performer and the dangerous consequences of his 
own desires. His cloak of invisibility has been stripped away and his 
spectatorship becomes an issue within the work’’ (as cited in Carlson, 2004: 
185).  
Advocating the affective and intimate possibilities of theatre and live 
performance, Elwes clarifies that this potentiality is ‘impossible in representations 
offering permanently fixed and objectified images of women, such as the cinema, 
painting or sculpture’ (as cited in Carlson, 2004: 185). Barbara Freedman makes a 
similar claim, taking the argument one step further; she notes that, ‘[w]hereas film 
is obsessed with seeing one’s look, as in Hitchcock films which repeatedly distend 
and peer within the space of their own voyeurism, theatre is fascinated by the 
return of one’s look as a displacing gaze that redefines as it undermines identity’ 
(Freedman, 1990: 73-4).  
Thus, it can be argued that the capacity of theatre to constantly problematise 
and always reinvent the function of spectatorship passed through a feminist 
agenda that claimed for the de-objectification of the ‘other’, challenged the 
theatrical politics of identity and radicalised the emergent power relations of 
performance. Within this shift, there emerged a ‘post-Freudian’ notion of 
voyeurism that destabilised the model which is described by Wells as ‘a world 
divided into the active ‘lookers’ and the passive ‘looked at’’ (Wells, 2004: 171). It is 
this notion of voyeurism that live performance endorsed, especially during the 80s 
and the 90s, and it is on the basis of this endorsement that Punchdrunk speak of 
and invite a voyeuristic style of spectatorship in their shows. In Punchdrunk 
performances, the objects of the watching, the ones that are gazed at, are 
theatrical subjects whose construction, or ‘becoming’, is made possible within an 
experience which is not only intersubjectively voyeuristic, but also anti-
authoritarian; that is, voyeurism is achieved without any implications of control or 
exercise of power over an objectified body, while, at the same time, the masked 
voyeur can also become a spectacle to be watched. In my personal interview35 
with him, Colin Marsh, the producer of Punchdrunk, notes accordingly that, 
                                                
35 Interview took place in October 13, 2010 at the Punchdrunk offices, Platform 6, Village 
Underground, 54 Holywell Lane, London EC2A 3PQ, England.  
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‘the performers can appear to see right through you as if you weren’t there 
and then they can choose to absolutely see you. So you are always in this kind 
of slightly destabilised situation whereas you are not really sure whether you 
are being noticed or not’ (Marsh, personal interview, 2010).              
Thus, the Punchdrunk spectators can become ‘ghosts’, they can become a 
spectacle, or even observers – they can feel greatly noticed or unnoticed, visible or 
invisible. In short, the mask gives them the opportunity to become ‘other’. In 
Postdramatic Theatre, Lehmann gives an account of mask’s potential which is very 
relevant to Punchdrunk theatre:  
‘The pleasure in dissimulating oneself under the mask is paired with another, 
no less uncanny pleasure: how the world changes under one’s gaze looking 
out of the mask, how it suddenly becomes strange when seen from 
‘elsewhere’. Whoever looks through the eyes of a mask changes his gaze into 
that of an animal, a camera, a being unknown to itself and the world. Theatre 
is transformation at all levels, metamorphosis […]’ (Lehmann, 2006 [1999]: 77; 
original emphasis).  
Now, considering the condition of being masked and yet exposed, the tension 
of being a voyeur but also a ‘spectacle’ for watching, and the experience of 
wearing a mask as a ‘becoming other’ potentiality, I suggest that there are some 
questions that require examination. I argue that these questions take the form of 
paradoxes with regards to the subjectivity and agency of a masked audience. The 
first point I would like to consider is the extent to which the use of mask creates a 
strictly homogeneous audience; an audience that cannot escape sameness. In his 
discussion with Josephine Machon, Barrett notes:  
‘We’ve had a number of criticisms in the past, saying that theatre is about 
building a community, the audience as a group who are there to experience 
something together. And we’ve been criticised for alienating audiences by 
using the mask as a device. The mask allows you to work for yourself if you 
want to, but equally, they encourage you to feel all the more a unity because 
you’re all made the same’ (Barrett & Machon, 2007: n.pag.).  
Indeed, it is possible to look at the use of mask from both perspectives: While a 
masked spectator may appear to be an isolated agent, whose relation to other 
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spectators-agents is significantly repressed, s/he also participates in a shared 
experience of ‘being masked’ that unifies the members of the audience and 
strengthens their engaging conditions. Without abandoning the problematisation 
of this contradiction, I would like to ask something different that specifies the issue 
a bit more: i.e. is there space for difference to emerge within the generation of this 
theatrical homogeneity (whether produced by means of alienation or through a 
community spirit)?36 In reformulating the issue as such, I consider the mask-
question as one that should be examined beyond the ‘alienation-or-sameness’ 
binary. In other words, rather than attempting to resolve a hypothetical dilemma 
between isolation and unity, I suggest that it is crucial to examine the engaging 
possibilities that are created within an – initially at least – homogeneous masked-
audience.  
It is evident that the mask as a theatrical device offers to the spectator, to a 
significant extent, the sense of anonymity. The spectator-subject obtains the 
capacity to step outside of him/herself and thus perform a different self, or even 
many different selves, since the mask hides his/her face – one of the most 
significant sources of human expressivity. In my personal interview with him, 
Colin Marsh depicts the instant shock of the Punchdrunk-spectator with regards 
to this emotion: ‘Suddenly it’s like, well nobody knows who I am, I can do 
anything, I’m not used to being able to do anything’ (Marsh, personal interview, 
2010). At the same time though, it seems to me that while the performance evolves 
it becomes evident that the mask cannot eliminate the ability to connect and 
engage with others. The presence of each one of the audience members is felt 
differently, precisely because every one of them behaves and responds differently. 
While at the beginning of their theatrical promenade all the spectators overtly 
share something (a white mask), something that produces a sense of sameness, the 
process of attempting to understand one another is not blocked; it is, nevertheless, 
altered. It certainly becomes more problematic, but also more challenging. The 
process of engaging with each other acquires a divergence from, and a de-coding 
of the signs produced by facial expression and language: it becomes affective, not 
                                                
36 During my spectatorial experience, both in The Masque of the Red Death (2008) and in The 
Duchess of Malfi (2010), this question kept revolving in my mind for two reasons: First, I observed 
the interrelation between the movements of the audience members in space; and secondly, I 
gradually became aware that the audience was not behaving in a uniform way. 
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only in the sense of bodies’ proximity, but also in terms of destabilising the act of 
understanding itself. In other words, the desire to engage with one another is freed 
from the essential precondition of understanding one another. The latter is 
subordinated in favour of an affective exchange that maintains a sense of mystery, 
a sense of doubt as far as identities are concerned. The question ‘who is?’ is 
replaced with the question ‘what one does?’ or ‘what one becomes?’  
I argue, therefore, that to think of the mask explicitly as a device that creates 
the conditions for the emergence of a collective whole that acts identically, is to 
make a biased and totalising postulation. Considering the masked audience as a 
unified entity that behaves in standardised patterns is failing to see multiplicity 
within a whole, difference within ‘one’. I argue that the use of mask is, crucially, a 
radical process that should not be examined in relation to totalising effects and 
static conditions of theatricality (e.g. complete alienation or complete unity); on 
the contrary, I suggest that the mask should be understood as a mobile medium 
which, while challenging the power relations and the unification of identity, 
creates fertile conditions for a perpetual possibility to ‘become other’. Instead of 
considering the use of mask as a neutralising process – as producing a theatrical 
state that compresses differences – I suggest that we should understand it as a 
possibility that generates movement, reinforcing what I have already called a 
‘nomadic spectatorship’. In other words, I argue that the capacity to become 
other, the potentiality that actualises this metamorphosis, is made possible not by 
means of neutralisation or uniformity, but by means of movement (i.e. becoming) 
and multiplicity. Paradoxically, the mask (this traditional theatrical prop) creates 
the conditions for this kind of movement because it exposes the way in which 
identities are constructed in traditional theatre. It diminishes a specific faculty of 
human expressivity in order to activate and set in motion a becoming-spectator – 
that is, a becoming other. Following Deleuze’s discussion of Bene’s theatre (as seen 
in chapter 2), I argue that the mask operates as a medium that subtracts elements 
of power, only to augment the intensities and the ‘speed’ that drive the desire for 
theatrical engagement. Thus, from this perspective, the Punchdrunk-mask is 
rather an active than a neutralising theatrical element; an element that introduces 
‘speed’ and movement to the performance rather than creating immobile and 
totalising conditions of spectatorship. 
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(c) Separation and proximity: Punchdrunk’s dancers 
On the other hand, and despite this non-totalising potential of the mask, I 
argue that to avoid accounting for the separation that the mask produces would be 
to approach the mask-experience partially. The masked ones are always the 
spectators; the unmasked ones are always the performers. If in traditional theatre 
the separation between performers and audience is achieved spatially (auditorium 
– stage), in Punchdrunk performances it is achieved performatively, through the 
mask. To be more precise, it is the visual contact between subjects that perform 
their character (masked or not) within the space that distinguishes the audience 
from the performers, and not the specific part of the space that they inhabit. Thus, 
as Barrett highlights in his discussion with Machon, ‘a clear division is established 
between audience and performers yet you’re allowed to get as close as you want’ 
(Barrett & Machon, 2007: n.pag.). Considered in this sense, the effect that the 
mask produces complicates the power relations in Punchdrunk performances. 
One would expect that a theatre group that attempts to ‘empower’ the audience 
and enable its responsive outputs would try to eradicate the lines that divide the 
theatrical subjects (performers) from the theatrical objects (spectators). On the 
contrary, these lines continue to exist and, even though they are not spatially 
structured, they are absolutely visible. Indeed, at least initially, one can feel the 
distance between spectators and performers in Punchdrunk plays. Especially in the 
beginning of the performances, there emerges a sense of mystery and a ‘chase and 
catch’ game between the play and the audience that introduces this distance.     
What is important here, however, is that while the conventional division 
between performers and spectators remains intact, there are two factors that 
destabilise and destratify the power relations that such a division traditionally 
implies. In other words, I want to argue that there are two crucial elements in 
Punchdrunk theatre that prevent the emergence of domination of one part of the 
performers-spectators binary (if we can conceptualise it as such) over the other. 
The first one is evidently the emergent proximity between these two parts that 
increases intensively while the performance evolves. The spectators can be as close 
to the performers as they choose and, at the same time, the performers do not 
encounter the audience only as a group (or groups) of watchers, but also as 
autonomous agents of theatricality within the event. Interestingly, it seems that the 
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extent to which spectators become autonomous agents in the performance 
depends on the level of proximity and immediacy they develop in relation to the 
performers; that is, the closer they get, the more independent they become. Thus, 
the spectators’ involvement in the show is not only a question of aesthetic choice, 
but also an action that positions them ‘politically’ within the performance. 
Crucially, the audience is able not only to create their own sense of perspective, 
but also to be actively involved in the production of what is perceived and 
experienced through the play. In my interview with him, Colin Marsh notes: ‘I 
think what makes the company’s work unique is definitely more about the sense of 
ownership of their own experience that the shows give the audience’ (Marsh, 
personal interview, 2010). Considered as such, the audience is not subject to any 
external power or control that would impose a specific sense of being in the 
performance. On the contrary, it is the absence of such a regulation that ‘allows’ 
the spectators to initially feel lost and disoriented, and then to begin acquiring an 
interesting sense of co-authorship over the development of the play. I argue that 
this potential of the audience decomposes any sense of hierarchy that could 
emerge due to the obvious separation between the performers and the spectators. 
Moreover, this potential is largely reinforced in the performances, since 
Punchdrunk do not construct their plays based on a specific ‘model’ of interactive 
theatre. As Marsh highlights, ‘it’s a funny dichotomy because of course it’s 
interactive but it’s not structured as interaction’ (ibid). This means that the 
spectators can feel relatively free in the space in terms of rules and regulations. 
This also means that the spectators obtain the capacity of ‘becoming-others’; 
precisely because there is nothing and no one in the performances that forces 
them to become something specific, i.e. to perform a particular identity. When 
discussing about the role of interaction in Punchdrunk shows, Marsh clarifies that,  
‘it’s not consciously built in and it’s not encouraged; we are not saying to the 
audience ‘you have to join in, you have to participate’. We are saying 
actually, ‘you could float through this like a ghost if you feel like it […]’’ (ibid).  
Indeed, becoming ‘ghosts’ within the space is in a sense the possibility that 
Punchdrunk encourage for both the performers and the spectators. The way that 
the space is designed gives them this opportunity, because everyone can easily 
appear and disappear; everyone can transform him/herself into something else 
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according to what part of the space s/he is in, or according to whom s/he 
encounters. It is worth noting here that some of the most interesting experiences 
as a spectator of Punchdrunk performances were precisely the moments when I 
could feel emancipated from having and performing a definite role (either self-
imposed or not); the moments when I felt strangely ‘connected’ to a communal 
sense of self-transformation or self-exploration during the plays. In other words, 
the collective feeling of becoming-ambiguous was to me an interestingly new way of 
engaging with a performance.         
Thus, the way that the spectators experience the performance and make their 
presence felt in the space is pivotal in understanding how a Punchdrunk play 
operates anti-hierarchically in terms of the relation between audience and 
performers. At the same time, the role and the contribution of the performers in 
this destratifying experience is vital. The performers are mainly dancers and not 
actors. For Punchdrunk, this is an utterly deliberate choice rather than a random 
aesthetic practice. As Marsh notes in my personal interview with him, ‘[Felix 
Barrett] made a conscious decision in 2002 to effectively stop working with actors, 
because he felt constrained by the conventions and also the expectations of how 
an audience receives a story verbally as opposed to any other way’ (Marsh, 
personal interview, 2010). Punchdrunk performers do not tell a story; they 
embody the physically expressive possibilities of a story. Doyle explains:  
‘The main thrust of the work […] is choreographic, and it is about creating, it 
is about writing with the body […] It is about working with bodies that have a 
sort of ability to develop the subtle syntaxes that you need in language. So we 
do work with language but it is a language of the body, it is a writing of the 
body […] (Doyle, personal interview, 2010). 
From this perspective, Punchdrunk do not abandon the linguistic and intellectual 
possibilities of human expression, but rather reposition the ‘channels’ through 
which these possibilities manifest themselves. When I asked Doyle in what ways do 
Punchdrunk approach a potential intellectual reception of their work by the 
audience, she replied that, ‘it’s not that it’s an unintellectual or non-intellectual 
way, it’s just that intellect, we feel, is not just located in the brain; it is located in 
lots of different places, physically, and that’s what we want to […] encourage’ 
(ibid).  
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Surely, dancers are able to perform in a much more immediate and physical 
manner than traditionally trained actors. In particular, since the work is mainly 
presented in a non-verbal way, it makes absolute sense to have dancers (speaking 
bodies) performing and not actors. However, it is not only this practicality that 
produces the need for dance in Punchdrunk performances; the motives that 
‘demand’ dancing in the shows extend well beyond the absence of spoken 
language and structured dialogue. Dancers can perform in such a direct way that, 
in a sense, they ‘prevent’ the audience to sit back and methodically reflect on what 
they see and experience. In other words, with their movement and performance in 
space, the dancers do not allow the spectators to step out of the ‘here and now’ of 
the event; they do not allow an escape from movement and immersion in the play. 
In his interview with Machon, Barrett notes that,  
‘actors tend to work with their head and dancers just ‘do’; their response is 
immediate and from their bodies. Whereas with actors, there’s always a beat 
before they respond. As a result it doesn’t tune at the same level. It takes ten 
times the amount of work to coax an actor into that world. Dancers, physical 
performers, build from the floor up; they are living, breathing, one and the 
same with the space from day one’ (Machon, 2009: 97).  
Indeed, the question of space is crucial. When I was informally discussing with 
Hector Harkness (assistant director for The Duchess of Malfi), he was convinced that 
no one could fill these large spaces in a more expressive, as well as immersive, 
manner than dancers can. I argue that dancers are able to expand their bodies in 
space, they can actualise the Artaudian ‘expression in space’ precisely because 
they can become one with space. They are the physical extensions of space and 
space is the extension of their movement. Moreover, dancers are the main source 
of one of the most cinematic effects that Punchdrunk produce: i.e. the constant 
and immediate change of scale in their performance. They can use an entire room 
to perform an act that is so intimate in terms of space (e.g. sharing a secret, or 
praying), that the eye of the spectator is continuously deterritorialized. The 
swiftness of sudden and large movements in space, the immediacy of spatial – as 
well as temporal – variations produce a strange, dream-like terrain that 
deterritorializes both spectators and performers. For example, in The Duchess of 
Malfi (2010), there was a gigantic bed in the space that was used as the Duchess’s 
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bedroom. This bed was so domineering in the room that I was uncertain as to 
how the performers could make their presence felt in that space. Gradually, I was 
surprised to see that the swift and spatial ways in which the dancers used their 
bodies, and their experimentation with this difference in scale, made me have 
flashing impressions that they were bigger and that the bed was smaller.  
Thus, returning to my previous discussion about separation and distance, I 
argue that the choice of dancers is a very crucial one in the dehierarchisation of 
the performer-spectator relation in Punchdrunk performances. The ways in which 
dancers perform, as well as the ways in which they ‘negotiate’ their presence in 
space, generate destratified and spontaneous immersive experiences; and, by 
extension, they produce renewed possibilities for a genuinely critical practice of 
spectatorship. If, hypothetically, the performers were traditionally trained actors, it 
is highly probable that the distance between them and the audience would be 
much more visible and hierarchically structured. As the expressive outputs that 
actors use are based mostly on their linguistic and vocal faculties, their encounters 
with the spectators would take very specific and closed-up formations – e.g. large 
or small circles of spectators attending a scene. Thus, the play would be 
transformed from a promenade performance (with movement and speed) into a 
static event with ‘snapshots’ of theatre.37 I argue that the actors’ presence in space 
would be much more heightened in relation to the spectators, exactly because of 
this immobility and the absence of variations. The more static one performer is, 
the more time there is for a spectator to reflect on his/her presence and 
subsequently admire his/her performance as a subjected and passive viewer. On 
the contrary, dancers do not ‘allow’ the audience to admire them, because their 
performance and movement in space is so fast and immediate that their identity as 
performers becomes fluid and mobile. The spectators do not even have the time to 
observe and appreciate movement, as they are ‘living’ and embodying this 
movement – they are immersed in this constant change and variation that the 
dancers produce. The dancers can disappear, they can become a genuine part of 
the space, and most importantly they can physically ‘play’ with their identity: they 
                                                
37 The risk of this transformation was evident in specific scenes with extensive dialogical exchanges 
between the performers. In such scenes the spectators were more static and the event was 
becoming less participatory.    
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can become elves, ghosts, pixies, i.e. ambivalent creatures that destabilise the 
typical notion of a unified identity – in short, they can become ‘multiplicities’.  
Thus, the extent to which a Punchdrunk performance becomes destratified – 
acquiring potentials of critique-as-process – relies firstly on the arrangement of 
theatrical elements, as well as on the way in which power relations are constructed 
and negotiated within the event. Spectatorship becomes active and critical 
because performance occurs through variations, movement and speed. At the 
same time, the performers are able to operate as ‘becomings’ or as ‘multiplicities’ 
precisely because the agency of the audience increases progressively. It is, 
therefore, this bidirectional process that creates the conditions for what I would 
call a ‘disunified synthesis’ between performers and spectators; that is, a creative 
contradiction that drives the performance’s intensity and establishes its political 
disposition.  
 
III. Punchdrunk and the political: The question of 
fragmentation   
            
Following on from my discussion about the way in which power relations are 
constructed and become destratified within the events that Punchdrunk create, it 
is, I suggest, crucial to examine the political dimension of the company’s theatre 
on a more explicit basis. Focusing on Punchdrunk’s insistence on assembling 
fragmented dramatic narratives, and hence creating a terrain on which 
disintegrated experiences become possible, I want to inquire into the political 
implications of theatrical incompleteness with view to encapsulating the group’s 
contribution to the practice of performing critique with a non-representational 
approach.  
Punchdrunk do not devise their performances based on a concrete ideological 
framework or a specific political agenda. Perhaps one would argue that they do 
not belong to the type of theatre that could claim to be ‘political’ or ‘politicised’ in 
the long-established sense of the term; that is, the scope of their performances 
could be considered as incompatible with representations or enactments of 
sociopolitical conflicts, and many theatre critics have several objections towards 
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their allegedly obscure aestheticism and discontinued theatrical methods. Without 
disregarding the problematisation of this argumentation, I will suggest that 
Punchdrunk reinvent both the concept and the practice of politics in theatre; they 
do so by challenging the limits of narrative uniformity, while proposing a notion of 
critique as an immersive and fragmentary experience. 
According to Lehmann,  
‘[t]he theatre of sense and synthesis has largely disappeared – and with it the 
possibility of synthesising interpretation. Recommendations, let alone 
prescriptions, are no longer possible, merely partial perspectives and 
shuttering answers that remain ‘works in progress’’ (Lehmann, 2006 [1999]: 
25).    
Lehmann makes a good point in contending that the notion of theatrical teleology, 
together with its limiting implications in theatre practice, is a part of drama that 
has been challenged and subverted by the postdramatic turn. Indeed, final causes 
and ideological – or even aesthetic – conclusions have been replaced by unfinished 
and open-ended problematisations that become enacted in performances and 
installations. In keeping with this postdramatic shift, the theatre of Punchdrunk is 
a theatre that neither provides ‘answers’, nor even straightforward ‘questions’. It is 
a theatre that reinstates the notion of experience in the politics of performance art – 
it is also a theatre that, in a way, ‘depoliticises’ performance without, however, 
promoting an apolitical project; that is, Punchdrunk contribute actively in the 
undoing of major political outcomes in theatre art, favouring a minor or 
micropolitical approach in their work. I argue that Punchdrunk suggest a 
theatrical operation that does not extend beyond its incomplete and fragmentary 
character, while maintaining a sense of a ‘total’ (i.e. immersive) event. It is, I 
suggest, on the basis of this paradox that their contribution to the politics of 
performance manifests itself.  
In discussing the political possibilities of Punchdrunk with both Doyle and 
Marsh, I was astonished by the particular interest and excitement that they 
genuinely showed in their responses. They both seemed to enjoy the complexity of 
the political potential they believe Punchdrunk has, and they both agree on the 
utterly political form of theatre that Punchdrunk creates. Interestingly, they do not 
consider the company’s way of presenting plays only as a stimulus for making 
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choices, but also as an engaging process that forces the audience to position 
themselves politically within the performances. Doyle notes that, ‘the form pushes 
you as an individual to question your place within the world that [Punchdrunk] 
create’ (Doyle, personal interview, 2010). In a similar vein, Marsh highlights that,  
‘[Punchdrunk’s theatre] can’t escape being political […] Because of the deal 
that it’s offering the audience […] it’s empowering people individually, if you 
like, to examine themselves in a deeply political way […] You cannot avoid 
engaging […] and that of course is a totally political facet’ (Marsh, personal 
interview, 2010). 
In this sense, I suggest that the way in which Punchdrunk approach the notion of 
politics in performance differs significantly from directors and collectives of the 
past. For instance, both Littlewood and Brook – although being immensely critical 
of it – did not manage to entirely break with the Brechtian politics of theatre; i.e. 
the effect of distance and ‘alienation’, the choice of participating in a shared 
theatrical experience and so on. On the contrary, Punchdrunk do not offer 
choices according to which one can politically reflect on what one experiences, but 
they rather create theatrical events within which one cannot ‘escape’ political 
engagement. It is the force of this immersive effect that distinguishes Punchdrunk 
from the ‘mechanics’ of political theatre as being conceived and practiced in the 
past. As Doyle points out when discussing the spectatorial experience in the 
performances,  
‘you are in a constant state of interrogation about the decisions that you make 
as an individual and sometimes I think that takes away from the political or 
the thematic grand narrative clout of the work because […] you can be lost as 
a viewer in the work’ (Doyle, personal interview, 2010).  
Indeed, the critical possibilities of being lost within a theatrical event compose the 
political terrain on which Punchdrunk engage with audiences. According to 
Doyle, it is the emotional destabilisation of feeling lost, worried and disoriented 
that enables the spectator to experience the performances as political events – as 
events in which critique is being staged and performed. Recalling the discussion 
she had with a spectator of Punchdrunk’s adaptation of Faust (2006-7), Doyle 
notes:  
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‘In order for him to go forwards in the evening and have any sort of 
experience, he had to work out where he was, work out the structure of the 
building and the organisation. And that shocked him as a person because he 
realised actually, there was a fear there about being lost and there was a fear 
about not being in control […] So I think that’s quite political, I think to put 
an audience into a place to try, constantly be putting an audience into a place 
where they are unsure, curious, maybe fearful, maybe excited, maybe aroused 
in a sensual way, and none of things being specific intentions but just 
emotions that we play with’ (ibid).        
Thus, the spectators are initially invited to participate in a shared experience in 
which, interestingly, participation is not negotiable. Although nobody dictates to 
anybody what to do or how to behave and ‘be’ in the performances, the 
conditions under which these performances take place generate the deconstruction 
of dialogical narrative, produce audience animation and variations of 
experiencing a theatrical event, and enable the critical potentials of performers 
and spectators.  
I argue that one of the most important reasons why these immersive conditions 
engender new possibilities of critique is their fragmentary and incomplete 
character. With their disconnected theatrical sequences Punchdrunk challenge the 
audience’s dependency on complete and finite performances. This dependency 
on, or the need of receiving a finished artistic product – or, at least, a product that 
has clear and teleological outcomes (either intellectual, moral, political and so on) 
– is seriously questioned in the theatre of Punchdrunk. When discussing the 
options that the Punchdrunk-spectator has, while promenading the performance 
space, Ralf Remshardt points out that,  
‘[a]t any of these mostly disconnected though often startling points of 
encounter with one of the several narratives, the viewer’s alternative was to 
follow the actors to other venues in the hopes of completing the story, or to 
continue on with his exploration in an aleatory manner (my choice)’ 
(Remshardt, 2008: 642).   
But is there a story to be completed by the spectators? According to Doyle, this is 
in fact a realistic possibility as, in comparing a Punchdrunk performance to a 
‘jigsaw’ that can be eventually put together by the audience, she makes clear that 
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during the performance ‘there is a real shift and real drive towards one place’ 
(Doyle, personal interview, 2010). Indeed, the grand finales of the shows, in which 
performers and spectators come together to witness and participate in a 
spectacular ‘catharsis’, could be considered as the resolutions or the completions 
of the events. At the same time, however, I argue that these finales function more 
as ‘explosions’ of theatre, than as linear dramatic conclusions. Doyle notes that, 
ideally, Punchdrunk would want the audience to  
‘complete the work themselves a year later. It absolutely is about something 
that’s just cooking and things are never finished, life never stops, things are 
never resolute, it’s never final, there are always questions.  And I think a really 
important thing for us in this world is spontaneity, it’s really essential that the 
audience feel like this moment they are witnessing is happening for the first 
time and now, in the moment, and it’s just for them. That sense of presence – 
yes, and liveness’ (ibid). 
Furthermore, what is important, I suggest, is the extent to which the audiences are 
able to make the intellectual and narrative connections that would lead them to 
this ‘one place’. In other words, I argue that the non-linear and fragmented form 
of Punchdrunk performances does not essentially show the way to specific 
ideological outcomes or endings of the story. If the performances can be 
considered as ‘jigsaws’, then they are extremely complicated ones with no obvious 
or easily understandable sequences of meaning – with no essential causal 
explanations that lead to a determinate finale. Doyle insists, however, that,  
‘in order for the nonlinear nature of it to be, and the fragmentation of it to 
work in this dream-like, chaotic, Lynchian, Mulholland Drive-esque kind of 
way, the linear nature of the narrative is rigorous.  Otherwise it would just be 
a mess; if we had no structure then what you would encounter as an audience 
is a complete mess. But what actually makes the work I think slightly 
disarming and unusual and pervasive and why it kind of lives and haunts itself 
with you is because these strands of narrative come together’ (ibid). 
Thus, what Doyle argues is that the fragmentary and incomplete narratives of 
the shows become interesting and potentially radical because, on one level, they 
are actually parts of an assemblage; and on a second level, because Punchdrunk 
provides the audiences with the opportunity to see the connections of this 
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theatrical assemblage coming together in the finale of the shows. In this sense, I 
suggest that Punchdrunk’s fragmented theatre achieves in setting the audience’s 
presence in a constant motion – a deterritorialized state in which they do not have 
the necessary time or information to reflect on what they experience – while 
offering them instances of sense that operate in a rather spooky and shocking 
manner. In other words, Punchdrunk manage to ‘play’ with the audience’s desire 
to complete a respective story, and embrace the force of this desire transforming it 
into a an active part of their performance. As Marsh points out, ‘people want to 
complete it, but the can’t quite’ (Marsh, personal interview, 2010). In clarifying 
the issue, Marsh continues:  
‘I think any artist or any work that is trying to just remind you that […] 
there’s a myriad of possibilities, is work that I am certainly more interested in 
personally.  And I can enjoy going to see or hear or look at something that 
feels very finite and final and definitive […] but it is not as satisfying as 
something that leaves you wandering, carrying on wandering […] 
Punchdrunk does manage to sort of trick the audience out of their normal 
comfort zone, ‘oh I know what this is about.  Oh, I’ve seen this before.  Oh 
yes, I know what they’re doing’ (ibid).  
Considered in this sense, I argue that there is a critical question to be asked in 
relation to Punchdrunk’s understanding of the ‘political’ in their performances. As 
raised in the introduction of the thesis, it is the question of the opposition between 
knowledge and ignorance as examined by Ranciere in The Emancipated Spectator 
(2011 [2009]). Although the Punchdrunk spectator is not the calm and rational 
observer that Ranciere criticises – since the immersive form of the performances 
transforms him/her into an active participant of a shared experience – this 
‘jigsaw-like’ narrative, that both Doyle and Marsh refer to, could be seen as a limit 
that separates a performer and a spectator on the basis of the former’s knowledge 
and the latter’s ignorance. This positioning is visible not only during a spectator’s 
encounter with a performer, but also in the finale of the shows, when apparently 
some of the narrative clues of the play come together. In this sense, following 
Ranciere, the Punchdrunk performer is always ‘one step ahead’ from the 
spectator, introducing ‘a new form of ignorance’ between the latter and 
him/herself (Ranciere, 2011 [2009]: 8). Hence the question is: How could 
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Punchdrunk challenge this opposition between knowledge and ignorance, without 
abandoning a sense of structure in their plays? How could they work with a 
narrative that destabilises this problematic positioning with regard to performers 
and spectators? In line with Doyle and Marsh, I agree that Punchdrunk 
performances are political because they endorse a political form of theatre – a form 
that invites and produces immersive, incomplete and non-representational 
experiences. Having said that, I argue that Ranciere’s question of the opposition 
between knowledge and ignorance is directly relevant to the political framework 
that Punchdrunk performances could endorse and follow.     
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I. Introduction 
In the case studies my main concern was to articulate some important 
theoretical claims in relation to critique as practiced in performances, to focus on 
‘openings’ of sociopolitical and philosophical inquiries within theatrical spaces and 
to provide a historical-critical analysis of some of the practices in 20th century 
performance that rethought the critical function of theatre beyond mimetic 
representation and teleological ‘products’ of ideology. My task in conducting these 
critical case studies was not only to offer specific theatrical instances that 
challenged the normative methods of engaging with audiences and destabilised the 
theatrical politics of representation, but also to trace the becoming of new 
processes in theatre art that endorsed the potentials of non-representational 
theatre and the always ‘incomplete’ and productively transient emergence of the 
‘political’ in postdramatic performances.  
My intention was not to account for theatre practices that function within, 
claim to belong to, or even respond to an ‘extreme’ avant-garde scene of 
performance. There is no doubt that the contribution of revolutionary possibilities 
and the unique experimentation of avant-garde theatre groups that have received 
limited credits from mainstream media have played a very significant role in the 
development of critical practices within performance. My principal aim, however, 
was to critically examine some theatre projects that attempted to address a broad 
public and achieved a wide recognition at the time of their existence. At the same 
time, I want to make clear that the choice of these specific artists that constituted 
the objects of my research was not made on the basis of a supposedly hierarchical 
antithesis to ‘less mainstream’ practices in terms of significance. In other words, I 
do not claim that the importance of Joan Littlewood’s, Peter Brook’s and 
Punchdrunk’s theatrical projects can be somehow ‘calculated’ on the basis of their 
wide acknowledgment, just as it would be unjustifiable to overlook the 
contribution of less acknowledged artists because they received less recognition 
from critics and audiences. As I have argued in chapter 3, I am interested in 
popular forms of theatre that radicalised the problem of representation and 
explored the presence of the ‘political’ in different ways. From this perspective, the 
objects of my research were chosen on the basis of their capacity to ‘negotiate’, but 
also to challenge the limits of what is considered to be mainstream in theatrical 
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settings. In other words, rather than degrading the contribution of the less 
favoured theatre groups (which have, however, frequently enjoyed the affirmation 
of many academic theorists), one of my intentions was to offer a new ‘reading’ of 
the work of directors and collectives whose practice was often (retrospectively or 
not) framed as too ‘ordinary’, in an attempt to emancipate their projects from 
being associated to conventional and typicalised practices.  
In keeping with the problematisations raised in the case studies, this last 
chapter is an attempt to theorise and explore the specificities of these ‘lines of 
thought’ that I consider to be pivotal in the ‘becoming’ of critique in performance 
- the proper conceptualisation of which has not been given the necessary attention 
throughout the thesis due to archive analysis. As I have highlighted in many parts 
of the thesis, my purpose is neither to propose a specific form of theatre, nor to 
offer a spectrum of theorems that would somehow shape and frame an ideal 
conception of performing critique. Rather I want to further elaborate on these 
processes of theatricality that have not only conditioned and affirmed, but have 
also produced and radicalised the potential for critique in theatre as a non-
representational and incomplete process. In doing so, my aim is to push the 
boundaries of theoretical preconceptions – on the basis of which theatre and 
performance practices are often structured and framed – in directions that 
destabilise the canonical conditions of enacting and staging critique, while 
generating possibilities of destratification of performance and denormalisation of 
political discourses. Thus, although I am not suggesting an explicit mode of 
theatre-making, the objects of my critical analysis are both specific and clear.  
There are two concepts that will make this task possible, and that I will 
elaborate upon here: the first one is the notion of non-representational 
performance, which I consider to constitute a direction (a line of thought), rather 
than a static condition that can be permanently attained; and the second one is 
the idea of ‘incompleteness’ as a tool of theatrical practice that introduces creative 
variations and indeterminate acts of critique in performance. I suggest that the 
thorough analysis of these two concepts, along with justifications and clarifications 
of their necessity in performance contexts, can offer a greater understanding of 
‘what critique could become’ in plateaus that subvert political normativity and 
ideological determinacy.  
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II. What is a non-representational performance?  
As I have tried to clarify in many parts of the thesis, the problem of 
representation in theatre and performance is more than just a theoretical or meta-
theoretical obstacle to be overcome by academic scholarship. It is a part of the 
continuum that Deleuze identifies as being the source of ‘true problems’ when 
analysing Kant’s thought on Ideas. Deleuze notes that, ‘true problems are Ideas, 
and […] these Ideas do not disappear with ‘their’ solutions, since they are the 
indispensable condition without which no solution would ever exist’ (Deleuze, 
2004 [1968]: 215). I would suggest, then, that the problem of theatrical 
representation is an idea; that is, the problematisation that makes this problem 
possible is composed by productive conditions of change, rather than only 
limitations and negation. Having said that, I would argue that the politics of 
representation in performance is the ‘becoming’ of the problem of representation, 
as well as its metamorphosis into a critical discourse. Now, the extent to which this 
discourse becomes ‘unforceful’ and static – and hence incapable of producing 
change – depends on whether it is subjected to normalisation, neutralisation, 
stereotypical treatment and ‘major’ political languages. Considering as given my 
constant will to theoretically break with all of the aforementioned implications, in 
what follows I want to offer a contribution to the politics of representation in 
theatre by analysing the potential of non-representational performing in the 
politics of theatre and performance. More specifically, I am interested in 
examining some particular ‘areas’ of thought that challenge the normative ways of 
representation in performance, while raising questions of interpretation, bodily 
expression, communication, theory and reality. What are the aspects of a non-
representational approach to theatre and performance?  
 
(a) The question of the ‘of’ and postdramatic approach  
Commenting on the central elements of Occidental theatre, John Rouse notes:  
‘Most productions here continue to be productions ‘of’ a preexisting play text. 
Exactly what the word of means in terms of theories and practices is, however, 
far from clear. On the one hand, the ‘of’ of theatrical activity is subject to a 
fair degree of oscillation; on the other, this oscillation takes place only within 
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the authority of cultural norms that condition both theatrical production and 
audience perception. The relationship between text and performance is, in 
other words, a question both of the possible and the allowable’ (Rouse, 1992: 
146; original emphasis).  
Although Rouse refers explicitly to dramatic and ‘performance texts’38 as adapted 
from theatre groups, his observation makes a crucial point regarding the entire 
domain of representation and its function in Western theatre: It highlights the 
incapacity of the latter to surpass the spheres of authority and normative 
significations, even in attempts to interpret or reinterpret and restage preexisting 
texts, political discourses, social conflicts and historical memories. I would add that 
this ‘struggle’ of Western theatre applies equally in its attempts to create meaning 
within performances, since the deconstruction of normative ways of enacting and 
representing meaning becomes an extremely complex task for the regular 
processes and conditions of theatre on the basis of which ‘theatrical sense’ is 
produced. Thus, from this perspective, the question of the ‘of’ in theatre and 
performance is, to a great extent, a question of challenging the normative 
associations made in the processes of interpretation and representation – 
associations that function as ‘exterior’ abstractions to theatrical presence and 
transcend the ‘here and now’ of live performance. Of course, this is not to suggest 
that memory, signs, historical links and other means of communicating meaning 
should be essentially held ‘responsible’ for the limitations that cultural norms 
promote and maintain. Rather, it is their given importance in the context of 
theatre and performance, as well as the subsequent stratification of a theatrical 
process, that creates the conditions for the production of static, self-identical 
meanings and the normalisation of political discourses.  
At the same time, as I have shown in the case studies of the thesis, there have 
been many theatrical projects in British theatre that have challenged the authority 
of abstract signification and mimetic representation. Working with different means 
and in dissimilar historical contexts, these directors and groups shared a political 
‘desire’ to thoroughly address and subsequently respond to the question of 
                                                
38 Rouse uses the notion of ‘performance text’ ‘conceived of as a complex network of different types 
of signs, expressive means, or actions, coming back to the etymology of the word ‘text’ which 
implies the idea of texture, of something woven together’ as theorized by Marco De Marinis in 
Dramaturgy of the Spectator (De Marinis, 1987: 100). 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representation in British theatre. Although one can observe a wide range of 
dissimilarities between the theatrologies of Joan Littlewood, Peter Brook and 
Punchdrunk, I argue, however, that they all share a crucial element of critique 
that affirms a non-representational approach to political theatre and, by 
extension, introduces postdramatic elements to the act of performing. It is worth 
noting that even though ‘postdramatic theatre’ is a relatively recent conception of 
performance, one that could possibly exclude Littlewood and Brook, I suggest that 
it is important to understand the postdramatic shift neither as a historical period, 
nor as a condition in theatre, but rather as a possibility of performance to 
challenge the normative power, as well as the dogmatism, of Texts (i.e. of 
dramatic texts, of Discourses, of Ideologies, of Culture and History) and their 
representation on stage. In this sense, I argue that the possibilities that accompany 
a postdramatic approach coincide with the political ‘desire’ to actualise a non-
representational way of performing.  
 
(b) The problem of representation and the destratified body  
But how can we understand a non-representational approach, especially in a 
context that traditionally privileges representation as the most powerful and 
adequate medium of communication and political exchange? In other words, how 
viable and concrete could a non-representational approach to theatre be? My 
analysis so far demonstrates the longevity of this discussion in theatre, and justifies 
the extent to which normative representation has been rendered problematic in 
diverse performance directions. As discussed throughout the thesis, several theatre 
practitioners and theoreticians have thoroughly addressed the question of a non-
representational approach to performance in similar or different ways. Eugene 
Ionesco and Antonin Artaud are two notable directors whose theoretical views not 
only address specific aspects of challenging the mimetic nature of representation in 
theatre, but also map out a non-representational politics of communicating 
through performance. Romanian-French playwright Eugene Ionesco, who was 
the first proponent of the theatre of the absurd, and one of the first directors of 
existentialist plays, was interested in subverting the conformist manner of 
theatrical performance and its reception, arguing for a break with over-
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generalising meaning through representation. In his 1953 essay Notes on the Theatre, 
he asks:  
‘But how does one manage to represent the non-representable? How do you 
represent the non-representational and not represent the representational? It is 
all very difficult. Let us try at least to “particularise” as little as possible, to 
dematerialise as much as we can, or else do something different: invent a 
unique event, unlike and unconnected with any other event; create an 
inimitable universe, foreign to all the others, a new cosmos within the cosmos 
with its own laws and consistencies, an idiom that could belong to nothing 
else (Ionesco, 1995 [1953]: 53-4; original emphasis).  
Indeed, Ionesco’s idealism offers a very useful and comprehensive description of 
how the problem of representation in theatre can actually become a creative 
possibility. He argues that theatre should emancipate itself from the 
representational conditions that maintain the production of self-identical 
meanings, suggesting the autonomisation of a theatrical process and the 
affirmation of the performance-event. Evident in Ionesco’s account is the 
complexity, as well as the imprecision, that follow on from attempting to theorise a 
process that rejects the power of representation. Yet, it is on the basis of this 
imprecision or obscurity that many cultural and theatre critics speak of creative 
challenges to normative systems of signification. In a sense, the process of 
understanding a way of engaging with audiences that differs radically from 
normative and mimetic representation cannot be possible by using either the 
theoretical tools or the same level of linguistic clarity required in analyses of signs 
and conventional communication. In other words, since a challenge to 
representation is simultaneously a destabilisation of communication itself, then the 
analysis of such a challenge would entail different, and frequently imprecise, 
communicative means.  
In The Theatre and its Double (1958), Artaud somehow manages to merge the 
above questions in one. He writes:  
‘How does it happen that in the theatre, at least in the theatre as we know it 
in Europe, or better in the Occident, everything specifically theatrical, i.e., 
everything that cannot be expressed in speech, in words, or, if you prefer, 
everything that is not contained in the dialogue (and the dialogue itself 
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considered as a function of its possibilities for “sound” on the stage, as a 
function of the exigencies of this sonorisation) is left in the background? […] 
how does it happen that the Occidental theatre does not see theatre under 
any other aspect than as a theatre of dialogue’ (Artaud, 1958: 37; original 
emphasis).  
As discussed in chapter 2, Artaud’s critique of representation has been both 
polemical and inspiring. By identifying the limitations of spoken language and 
linear dialogue, Artaud looked at the possibility of creating a mise en scène that 
would embrace a ‘physically poetic’ way of performing. He argued for the 
creation of a ‘concrete physical language’ in theatre; a language ‘intended for the 
senses and independent of speech’ (ibid). In a similar way to Artaud’s longing for 
this unique theatrical language, Ionesco argued for the creation of ‘a world that 
could be nothing but [one’s] own, irresolvable but still in the end able to be 
communicated, substituted for that other world with which other people could 
identify themselves’ (ibid: 54; original emphasis).  
Thus, taking these arguments into account, we can map out one of the aspects 
of a non-representational approach to theatre as a response to the incapacity of 
sign-based or logocentric communication to convey and actualise affective and 
emotional experiences. In a sense, this response highlights the limits of speech as a 
representational means of expression, shifting the discussion towards more 
physical and corporeal ways of engaging with theatrical performances that favour 
a non-representational approach.  
In his 2008 essay Like a poor player: audience emotional response, non-representational 
performance, and the staging of suffering in Macbeth, Michael David Fox suggests that a 
challenge to representation is in effect a privileging of the affective qualities of the 
performing body. He notes that, ‘[n]onrepresentational performance heightens 
audience emotion because it foregrounds, and therefore heightens the audience’s 
somatic experience of, the reality of the actor’s physical and emotional presence’ 
(Fox, 2008: 209). Fox’s notion of the ‘non-representational’ stresses the emotional 
‘vibrations’ that a performance can activate through the development of a 
corporeal interaction between audience and performers. He makes an interesting 
point arguing that embodied experience is an important feature of theatrical 
challenges to representation and signification (ibid). Following the theory of 
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anthropologist Thomas J. Csordas, Fox goes on to underline the critical 
possibilities of becoming ‘attentive to and with’ our bodies, understanding them as 
subjects (and not objects) that interact in space (Csordas, 2002). Brook’s Orghast, 
with its invented language and the subsequent decomposition of normative 
communication, can be thought as a good example of this kind of performance. 
Also, Punchdrunk’s immersive theatrical approach could be partly understood 
through this description of the ‘somatic experience’ that becomes possible in 
promenade theatres that challenge the traditional modes of contact between 
performance and audience. 
Now, thinking about this idea of the ‘somatic’, I want to elaborate on a concern 
about corporeal theatre that has been raised by several theorists of performance. I 
suggest that the example of Fox’s and Csordas’s accounts on how the body 
functions in performance is characteristic of the seemingly absolute way in which 
many theories of embodiment have celebrated the ‘triumph’ of physical theatre 
over linguistically-based narratives. Spackman observes in her 2000 article Minding 
the Matter of Representation: Staging the Body (Politic) that, ‘[the] foregrounding of the 
body as an artistic means of expression that is deemed capable of exceeding the 
bounds of established (and specifically, linguistically dominated) discourse and its 
consequent politicisation as a site of cultural disruption, has marked avant-garde 
theatre practice throughout [the 20th] century’ (Spackman, 2000: 8). At the same 
time, I argue that while focusing on the critical possibilities of embodied 
experience (which Csordas terms ‘somatic modes of attention’), this foregrounding 
has frequently failed to take into account the authoritarian or politically instructive 
qualities of the performing body. As Auslander notes, ‘to posit the body as an 
absolute, originary presence beyond signification is neither accurate nor 
theoretically defensible’ (Auslander, 1997: 8). By favouring the qualities of the 
body almost as ‘unmistakeably’ non-representational and essentially pre-cognitive, 
several theorists have proposed an attention to inter-bodily sensations as an 
alternative to representation and textuality, without however taking into account 
the capacity of the body to act and perform in representational or textually 
dogmatic ways. For instance, Ness raises an interesting objection to an 
understanding of the performing body as essentially transient and ephemeral. She 
notes that, ‘[the] recuperability [of the body] – and the remembering it entails – 
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call into question the claims of radical ephemerality that typically have been 
attributed to corporeal performance phenomena, both in post-structural theory as 
well as in theoretical discourses that preceded it’ (Ness, 2007: 26). In other words 
therefore, I argue that it is highly questionable to consider the body-in-
performance as an unconditional solution to the problem of representation.  
Following the Deleuzian analysis of the BwO (as discussed in chapter 4), I 
suggest that we cannot think of a non-representational function of the body 
without dis-organising the body-organism itself. From this perspective, non-
representational and non-textual relations are only possible between bodies that 
are in the process of destratification (thinking of BwO as a human body). Thus, I 
argue that we should not think in terms of oppositions such as ‘human body Vs 
representation' – since human bodies can also function and perform in codified 
ways that directly or not respond to significations – but we should rather address 
the problem of stratification as existent within every organised (i.e. hierarchical) 
entity that participates in the act of performance. I suggest that elevating the body 
to a level of 'pure' expression, to a level on which mimetic significations are in a 
process of being excluded, involves a decomposition of the body's capacity to act 
and perform as a unified and organised substance. In short, one of my responses 
to the problem of mimetic representation is not 'something' (i.e. the performing 
body and its multiple expressivity), but a 'process' (i.e. the destratification of the 
performing body and its ‘becoming-non-representational’).  
To sum up, I want to suggest that embodied theatrical experience can be 
understood as a process that destabilises the abstract codifications of 
representation in so far as the performance disorganises the bodies’ capacity to 
function as unified and hierarchical entities; and, in doing so, it creates the 
conditions for bodies to also interrelate affectively (as well as to come into contact 
with other non-human bodies in space), rather than only through signs and codes.  
 
(c) Becoming a non-representational element in performance  
In keeping with this discussion, it is important to emphasise the notion of 
‘becoming’ in our understanding of the ‘non-representational’ and the ‘non-
mimetic’ in theatre and performance; not only because it underlines the mobile 
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mode of breaking with theatrical systems of signification, but also because it 
redefines the engaging possibilities of theatrical elements that have been 
considered as supplementary to performances.  
In Only Entertainment (2002), Richard Dyer argues for a reaffirmation of what he 
terms ‘non-representational signs’ in the affective level of experiencing music (and 
more specifically musicals). He notes that, apart from the representational signs 
used in performances, ‘we also recognise qualities in non-representational signs – 
colour, texture, movement, rhythm, melody, camerawork – although we are much 
less used to talking about them’ (Dyer, 2002: 20). Although Dyer’s formulation of 
‘non-representational signs’ is questionable – since to label these elements as 
affective qualities that become possible through the process of signifier-signified-
signification (i.e. the process that defines a sign) is a rather paradoxical postulation 
– his observation is important in discussing the difference between what is (non)-
representational and what can become (non)-representational in theatre and 
performance. For example, I would argue that the extent to which e.g. a 
combination of colours, or a movement can be considered as representational (or 
non-representational) elements of performance depends on their potential 
association to references that are essentially external to the ‘here and now’ of the 
event. Thus, what we should ask is: What makes a theatrical element non-
representational? After suggesting that both representational and non-
representational elements are ‘largely iconic’, Dyer points out that, ‘whereas the 
relationship between signifier and signified in a representational icon is one of 
resemblance between their appearance, their look, the relationship in the case of 
the non-representational icon is one of resemblance at the level of basic 
structuration’ (ibid: 20-1). While Dyer identifies a similar function in the way we 
perceive something through representation or not, he differentiates the 
representational from the non-representational on the basis of ‘being’ rather than 
on ‘becoming’. I argue that there are no elements that can be considered as being 
a priori representational or not. Rather, any theatrical element can obtain the 
capacity to function in a representational or non-representational way. In this 
sense, I argue that there is no such thing as ‘being (non)-representational’, but only 
‘becoming-(non)-representational’.  
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Now, more particularly, I would suggest that an element of performance 
becomes non-representational in as much as it destabilises the normative systems 
of resemblance and the level of associability to what is conceptually absent (that is, 
not present within the event). Furthermore, and from this perspective, I argue that 
the differentiating line between a representational and a non-representational 
quality, element or process should not be drawn on the basis of the relation 
between signifier and signified. Rather, it is by virtue of reducing the level of 
resemblance that the possibility of becoming non-representational is actualised. In 
this sense, what matters is not only the acknowledgment of the signified as a 
singular and independent entity, but most importantly it is the decomposition of 
the closed system of signification and its transformation to a ‘becoming’ (or to the 
Deleuzian rhizome) that introduces a non-representational approach to 
performance. In short, I argue that labelling a theatrical element as non-
representational is problematical because it excludes the mobile, fragmentary and 
the productively incomplete character of that which becomes non-
representational. Hence, colour can be a non-representational becoming; 
movement can be a non-representational becoming; melody can be a non-
representational becoming, and so on. At the same time, it is crucial to suggest 
that in theorising a non-representational approach to theatre and performance we 
should not draw a demarcating line between the affective and the sign as such; but 
we should rather disconnect the non-representational experience from the 
hierarchical structuration and the power implications of systems of signification 
that are intrinsic in our understanding, as well as in our use, of signs. It is by virtue 
of this disconnection that a non-representational approach to theatre and 
performance can become possible. 
 
(d) Non-representational theories  
My use of the term ‘non-representational approach’ is, in a sense, a way of 
insisting on the mobile, non-static and ‘nomadic’ character of radical challenges to 
mimetic representation in theatre and performance. While the complexity of 
framing this approach and transforming it into a substantial theory or discourse is 
evident, there are several theoretical projects in contemporary social theory and 
human geography that have attempted to implement this task.  
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In his description of what he terms ‘non-representational theory’, Nigel Thrift 
identifies affects and sensations as ‘concept-percepts’ alternative to signs and 
significations (Thrift, 2008: 12-3). Thrift’s thesis emphasises that social theory 
needs to pay attention to practices – which he mostly understands as 
‘performances’ (e.g. he is particularly interested in dance) – in order to come into 
contact with experiences of human geography that become possible through 
affective relations, rather than through representation. In making this argument, 
Thrift proposes that if theory wants to follow its own potential as a developing and 
always-current platform of observation, critique and understanding, it should 
embrace and affirm the ‘pre-cognitive’ and ‘playful’ becomings (which he 
identifies as non-representational) that occur in performances and everyday 
practices. He goes on to argue for a ‘radical empiricism (the lived immediacy of 
actual experience, before any reflection on it)’ which in being different ‘from a 
sense-perception or observation-based empiricism’ (ibid: 5), creates the 
appropriate conditions for exploring ‘modes of perception that are not subject-
based’ (ibid: 7). Also, in keeping with Thrift’s theoretical agenda, John-David 
Dewsbury (2003) elaborates on non-representational theory suggesting that acts 
and practices of ‘witnessing’ map out spaces prior to reflection and thinking; and 
in so doing they generate ‘knowledge without contemplation’.  
Although Thrift’s and Dewsbury’s theoretical projects have been confronted by 
several critiques that challenge their conceptualisation of a non-representational 
theory, it is worth noting that such critiques are mostly conducted on a formalist 
basis. For instance, Smith (2003) suggests that Thrift should not exclude 
Baudrillard’s thought on the non-representational, arguing that the latter provides 
us with a theoretical framework through which we can develop multiple non-
representational theories, rather than an all-encompassing non-representational 
theory (Smith, 2003). According to Smith, while Baudrillard’s theories of simulacra 
can become adequate critiques of representation, providing us with non-
representational tools, Thrift’s project is rather anti-representational. Similarly, 
Lorimer (2005) attempts to depart from certain terminologies and linguistic 
constructions of non-representational theory, suggesting the term ‘more-than-
representational’ as a more appropriate and realistic one.  
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What all these discourses on non-, anti- or more-than-representational 
theory(ies) have achieved is not essentially to mark a specific turning point in social 
theory, human geography and performance – since their theoretical trajectories 
are not only directly informed, but are also strongly bound to poststructuralist 
debates on the politics of representation as well as to many questions that have 
already been posed by performance studies; they have, however, managed to 
reinforce the challenges to theoretical plateaus that still inquire into impersonal 
and affective phenomena by using representational tools of observation and 
critique. In a sense, they re-pronounced the ‘end of theory’ as a closed-up 
platform that is essentially bound to representation and textuality, by proposing 
more practiced-based approaches to the ways of engaging with sociopolitical 
reality; approaches which in destabilising the canonical conditions (i.e. cognitive, 
reflective, mimetic, representational etc.) of exploring human and non-human 
experience and interaction, produce a politics of presence – ‘a politics of opening 
the event to […] more action, more imagination, more light, more fun, even’ 
(Thrift, 2008: 20). As Thrift points out, ‘[non-representational work] has tried to 
enhance ‘performance consciousness’ […] by turning to examples of the 
intensification of presence provided by the performing arts – art, sculpture, 
theatre, dance, poetry, music’ (ibid: 148).  
 
(e) The question of the ‘real’ in perfomance: Beyond enactment 
towards a post-Freudian theatre?  
Considering the questions addressed by ‘non-representational theory’ as a part 
of a wider context of examining challenges to normative representation, what 
interests me the most in this thesis is the political potentiality of the ‘real’, the 
‘present’ and the ‘actual’ – within theatre and performance – as radical 
alternatives to the ‘absent’, the ‘external’ and the ‘phantasy’. I want to argue that 
the political potential of critique in performance is actualised when the latter 
becomes a real event of theatrical presence that unfolds beyond representation (as 
a becoming-non-representational), but also beyond enactment. Following Eli Rozik’s 
(2008) critique of Schechner’s theory of performance (1977; 2002; 2003), acts of 
enactment should be clearly distinguished from performances:  
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‘In contrast to Schechner’s notions, a fundamental distinction should be made 
between ‘performing an action’ and ‘enacting an action’ […]. While 
‘performing an action’ reflects the intention of changing a state of affairs in 
the real world […], ‘enacting an action’ reflects the intention of describing 
and evoking such an action in a fictional world […] (Rozik, 2008: 213).  
Rozik makes a crucial point in relation to the way in which we can think of the 
process of enactment in theatre and performance contexts. He separates two 
notions (enactment and performance) that the wide scholarship of performance 
studies has thus far considered as one; namely that enactment is a performance in 
as much as performance can be an enactment (Schechner, 2002; Taylor, 2003). 
Rozik reminds us that the act of enactment becomes possible as a descriptive and 
evoking process that bears little relation to the reality and the presence of a 
performance. In so doing, I suggest that his argument becomes an indirect critique 
of the opposition between enactment and normative representation as 
conceptualised by performance studies.  
According to Diana Taylor, ‘[performance studies] sought to bridge the 
disciplinary divide between anthropology and theatre by looking at social dramas, 
liminality, and enactment as a way out of structuralist notions of normativity’ 
(Taylor, 2003: 6). In parallel to Rozik’s critique, I argue that understanding 
practices of enactment as a radical and structurally subversive response to the 
problem of normative representation is at least questionable; because, to a certain 
extent, the process of enactment is based on a transcendental relation of the 
human subject of performance with itself. It seems to me that to enact something 
is to act out a fictional image of thought, by evoking and interpreting this image 
through the representational capacities of the individual. In this sense, to enact is 
to represent, in so far as the process of enactment follows an individualistic code of 
recalling images of thought that function as external elements to the 
spatiotemporal reality of an event. In other words, to enact something is to act out 
an ‘absence’; it is to ‘touch upon’ the actualisation of creating something new (an 
experience, a sensation, an emotion and so on) while maintaining the 
structuration of normative representation intact. Hamilton’s (2007) understanding 
of enactment in theatrical contexts is insightful on this matter. He notes that,  
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‘[t]heatrical enactment is the social practice in which audiences attend to the 
physical and verbal expressions and behaviour as well as the ‘non-expressive’ 
movements and sounds of performers (human or mechanical) who, by those 
means, occasion audience responses to whatever the performers arrange for 
the audience to observe about human life (for example, stories and characters, 
or sequences of images and/or symbolic acts’ (Hamilton, 2007: 59).  
Indeed, this account is quite descriptive of the reason why enactment cannot be 
thought outside normative systems of representation and signification. 
Interestingly, whereas Hamilton’s aim is to consider the process of enactment as 
an engaging relation between performers and spectators, I argue that his 
definition does the opposite; that is, he makes clear that enactment becomes 
possible on the basis of absent elements, according to prearranged exteriorities, 
rather than as a productive relation or difference that is born within a 
performance. Even if we can consider enactment as a relation between performers 
and spectators, I suggest that it is a relation that occurs according to, and because 
of, the existence of a common understanding of or a common emotional response 
to something external to the ‘here and now’ of the event.  
At this point, I want to make clear that it is not my intention to negate or to 
diminish the function of enacting, or that of memory and imagination (although I 
am not implying that these notions coincide) within theatre and performance 
contexts. On the contrary, I think that these processes can play a very crucial role 
in the critical possibilities of a theatrical performance. What I am examining here 
though, is the extent to which we can think of theatrical performances as political 
events that function as ‘becomings of the real’, bearing a minimum relation to 
external, transcendental or fictional elements (discourses, ideologies, 
commonsensical codifications, significations and so on). Furthermore, my 
understanding of the ‘real’ in performance settings is not one that stands in 
contrast to something ‘unreal’ in terms of pureness, truth or value – since ‘unreal’ 
or illusionary experiences can function as extraordinary deterritorializations of 
normative patterns of reality that become possible within the presence of a 
performance (e.g. the composition of myths by Hughes in Brook’s Orghast). Rather, 
it stands in contrast to abstract notions of reality that manifest themselves as 
imitations of meaning and/or as phantasies that precede or surpass the 
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performance itself. From this perspective, the need for ‘real’ performances is one 
that stresses the importance of the destabilisation of mimetic representation as a 
way out of instructive politics and normalised critiques. For instance, as Ridout 
writes 
‘[t]he audience-performer reciprocity […] is not ‘merely’ imaginary. It is real, 
it is constitutive of the performance and its reception (Ridout, 2008: 223).   
From this perspective, it makes sense to argue that a non-representational 
approach to theatre would simultaneously entail a break with psychoanalysis to 
the extent that the latter – as an ontological framework and a theoretical discourse 
– favours an always-representational image of the self – one that is essentially 
constituted as a result of abstract exteriorities and repressed desires. Elizabeth 
Wright (1996) discusses this issue in relation to the theatre of Artaud and Brecht, 
considering their theatrical projects as post-Aristotelian, but also as post-Freudian. 
She writes: 
‘Post-Freudian theatre, which must, of course, include the avant-garde theatre 
of Artaud and Brecht, dispenses with any notion of the arts as a safety valve 
for repressed wishes […] In particular the post-Freudian theatre in its 
postmodernist form makes a radical break with the old idea of sublimation. 
Far from the arts being regarded as a safe channel for the redirection and the 
consequent taming of destructive and aggressive drives, artistic texts are 
suspected of being a medium of seducing the spectator/reader into a given 
pre-ideological structure’ (Wright, 1996: 177).  
Wright makes an interesting point in identifying what she terms ‘post-Freudian’ 
theatre as a critique of textual dogmatism which, in turn, suggests a break with a 
transcendental ‘beautification’ of emotions, desires and subjectless drives; a break 
which not only challenges, but also subverts the codified normalisation of affective 
experiences in theatre and performance. At the same time, her account is to some 
extent an explanation of the connectives between the ‘non-representational’ and 
the postdramatic paradigm. She notes that,  
‘[t]his theatre is radically anti-individualist, challenging the privileging of an 
intending individual as origin of meaning. In this, it has absorbed the 
performance tradition, a dramatic form based on a semiotic understanding of 
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theatrical practice, a non-narrative, non-representational theatre in which the 
traditional forms, genres and practices are abandoned and the professional 
distinctions of actor, playwright, director, stage-manager, scene-shifter, 
spectator are eroded. The fictitious unity between voice and world is shown 
up by making speech compete with other elements on stage, such as music, 
sound effects, gestures, sets, props, lighting, mime, mask’ (ibid).  
Thus, in line with Wright’s argument, I suggest that it is through destabilising the 
hierarchical structure of a theatrical process that we can understand ‘what is ‘real’ 
outside representation’ in performance settings (ibid: 175). In other words, I argue 
that it is by virtue of their decomposition that the power relations of performance 
are transformed into ‘real’ affects as opposed to transcendental relations.  
Considered as such, the question of creating a non-representational theatrical 
space is also about thinking how to emancipate the performance stage from being 
associated to what Lyotard calls as a ‘disreal space’. In his 1974 essay Beyond 
Representation, Lyotard suggests that places such as ‘temple, theatre, the chambers 
of politics and doctors’ surgeries’ are ‘disreal spaces’ (Lyotard, 1989 [1974]: 156). 
He goes on to clarify that such places can be conceived as ‘autonomous spaces no 
longer subject to the laws of so-called reality, regions where desire can play in all 
its ambivalence, spaces where for the ‘proper objects’ of desire are substituted 
accepted images, which are assumed to be not fictions but authentic libidinal 
products that have simply been exempted from the censorship imposed by the 
reality principle’ (ibid: 156-7). Although Lyotard identifies an almost revolutionary 
potential in the ‘disreality’ of these places, I argue that it is a potential that is 
entirely based on fantasy; that is, it is possible to set up such a distinction on the 
basis of a transcendental relation between what happens e.g. during a theatrical 
performance, and a ‘real’ world that is forever outside.  
A theatrical stage is not a ‘disreal space’ when liberated from an abstract, 
codified and stratified relation to an external reality. It can be a ‘real space’ 
provided that it functions as a destratified body that becomes non-representational 
within the performance-event. Therefore, the question of emancipating the 
theatrical stage from a certain ‘disreality’ is fundamentally a question of undoing 
the stratified structure of representation, along with the capacity to interpret 
theatrical experiences as the products of phantasies or as the responses to external 
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censorships. Once again, Deleuze’s conception of BwO is very relevant at this 
point:  
‘The BwO is what remains when you take everything away. What you take 
away is precisely the phantasy, and significances and subjectifications as a 
whole. Psychoanalysis does the opposite: it translates everything into 
phantasies, it converts everything into phantasy, it retains the phantasy. It 
royally botches the real, because it botches the BwO’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 
2004 [1987]: 168).  
Deleuze suggests disorganised assemblages as the alternative to the hierarchy and 
the power relations that normative representation puts into practice. He proposes 
a ‘real’ theatre of presence; a theatre in which the spectators relate to the 
performance and the performance relates to the spectators with no mediations or 
interpositions. In a sense, Deleuze argues for an end to relating to anything 
‘unreal’, i.e. either external, abstract or transcendental. As Laura Cull puts it, 
‘Deleuze’s concept of theatrical presence, as a non-representational relation 
between audience and event, suggests one context in which we might apprehend 
ontological presence as becoming – the perpetual variation or difference-in-itself 
that, for Deleuze, constitutes the real’ (Cull, 2009: 5).  
To sum up therefore, I argue that the question of a non-representational 
approach to theatre and performance is crucially a question of a ‘real’ theatre of 
presence. As discussed in this subchapter, the possibility of such an approach to 
theatre and performance is actualised when the mise en scène functions as a non-
representational becoming, i.e. with variations and interruptions that destabilise 
the normative structure of representing meaning as a transcendental and self-
identical truth. This means that the performance ‘loses’ its capacity to be a 
complete or finished product, becoming a fragmentary and, frequently, 
indeterminate event. It is on the politics of this ‘incompleteness’ that I want to 
focus in what follows, with view to examining some important aspects of critique 
conceived as a non-teleological practice.  
 
 
 
 204 
III. Incompleteness and indeterminacy as tools of critique  
The political potentials of ‘incompleteness’ were discussed in many parts of the 
thesis emphasising theatrical practices that challenged, for similar or different 
reasons, any notion of teleology in their production of performances. Such 
practices were often framed as ‘works in progress’ (e.g. in the case of Peter Brook), 
fragmented plays (e.g. in collectives like Punchdrunk, Shunt or Forced 
Entertainment) or even unexpected and impromptu happenings with no specific 
resolution, ‘telos’ or any sense of Aristotelian catharsis. Throughout the thesis 
however, the notion of incompleteness has been treated as a ‘cathartic’ answer, or, 
to be more precise, it was presented paradoxically as a final resolution of the 
problem of representation in theatre and performance. My intention in what 
follows is to give the question of incompleteness a more specific theoretical 
treatment, with a view to argue for its critical potential in performance contexts. 
At the same time, I am not interested in drawing an exclusive theoretical space in 
which we can conceive the notion of incompleteness. Rather, in properly 
contextualising this ambivalent notion, I want to discuss its political possibilities by 
examining it not as an end-in-itself, but as a radical beginning of understanding 
the becoming of critique in performance.  
I suggest that the notion of incompleteness in theatre and performance can be 
addressed in a twofold manner: both as a movement towards the becoming of a 
non-representational performance and as a ‘tool’ of critical practice. In a sense, 
there is no significant difference between these two ways of examining the concept 
(in fact they interrelate), except that the latter is perhaps a more general and the 
former a more particular one. What I want to argue is that the question of 
incomplete performance is a radical question that reinvents the politics of 
performing critique, introducing insightful ways of understanding theatrical 
experience beyond subjectification, ideological dogmatism and representation. In 
doing so, I want to emphasise that the potential vagueness, as well as the 
obscurity, that may surround the concept of incompleteness constitute, in a sense, 
both its productive possibilities and its problematic implications. It is for this 
reason that theorising incompleteness is such a complicated and demanding task. 
At the same time though, it is a task that can shed more light on the critical 
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possibilities of performances through considering their lack of ideological and 
political integrity as a creative force rather than as a pointless confusion. 
Incomplete practices are not new to theatre and performance. We could trace 
the desire for a theatrical ‘unfinishedness’ back to commedia dell’arte in the 16th 
century, the Restoration comedies of 17th and 18th century, the public and street 
theatre of 19th century and so on. However, it is during the 20th century that 
performances began to be intentionally less conclusive, with fewer determinate 
processes and didactics, and more engaging ways of presenting plays. From the 
‘biomechanic’ experiments of Meyerhold, to Grotowski’s poor theatre, and from 
the reinvention of Marxist radicalism in the theatre of Brecht and Boal, to 
Artaud’s deconstructive poetics, theatrical narratives began to acquire (to a lesser 
or greater degree, according to each group or director) a sense of questioning that 
destabilised the classical model of catharsis or that of finite outcomes. Although 
some of these directors (such as Brecht and Boal) promoted a theatre that always 
followed specific ideological and political lines, it is worth mentioning that the 
focus shifted from providing fixed answers to raising more open-ended questions – 
or at least, issues that needed to be discussed ‘with’ the audience. Moreover, the 
shift to performance and postmodern art in the late 1960s and early 1970s was 
pivotal to further emancipating theatrical plays from teleology and determinacy, 
introducing elements of surprise, deconstructions of texts, fragmentation of 
narratives, happenings and what Elinor Fuchs calls the ‘desubstantiation’ of 
cultural practices; that is, a ‘material and ontological’ ‘theme’ of the postmodern 
condition that replaced the idea of the ‘subject’ as a fixed essence with a discussion 
about becomings, imageries and incomplete subjectivities39 (Fuchs, 1996: 3). It was 
therefore the rapid development of applied theatre and the advance of site-specific 
performances that somehow transformed the relation between the on-stage action 
and the audience, establishing new ways of experiencing theatre; introducing 
‘openings’ that embraced and affirmed doubt rather than certainty, interruptions 
rather than continuity, disunification rather than consistency and so on. 
Thus, ‘incomplete’ and ‘indeterminate’ practices began to be increasingly 
considered as renewed ways of engaging with audiences on a much more intimate, 
                                                
39 In 1985, ‘desubstantiation’ (Les immateriaux) was the subject matter of an exhibition that was 
partly curated by Jean-Francois Lyotard at the Pompidou Centre in Paris (Fuchs, 1996).  
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as well as politically relevant, level. As Anthony Jackson observes, ‘this 
‘incompleteness’ is likely to be at once a dramaturgical strategy, a philosophical 
belief and a recognition of the way ‘reception’ and ‘engagement’ work in practice’ 
(Jackson, 2007: 271). Indeed, the discussion of incompleteness is resonant with 
questions of ‘spaces-in-between’ in cultural and art practices. Following Wolfgang 
Iser’s concept of ‘indeterminacy’ in literature, Jackson argues that an incomplete 
approach to theatre and performance reveals ‘the ‘creative gaps’ […] that draw 
the reader or audience in to an active, collaborative relationship with the text’ 
(ibid). In his 1971 essay Indeterminacy and the reader’s response to prose fiction, Iser 
challenged the way in which the process of interpretation is attained with regards 
to literary texts. He argued against the abstract subtextual meanings that manifest 
themselves ‘behind’ the texts as fixed and self-identical truths, suggesting that the 
readers have an active contribution in the making of these indeterminate and 
open-ended experiences that are created between them and the texts (Iser, 1989 
[1971]). We could perhaps understand Iser’s notion of indeterminacy alongside 
what Derrida theorised as the becoming of the between – the ‘subjectile’ (a term 
conceived by Artaud) – in the relation of the painter with the canvas (Derrida & 
Thevenin, 1998). While criticising his own drawings, Artaud used this hybrid term 
(composed by the words ‘subjective’ and ‘projectile’) to describe the liminal space 
that gives support, sustains or even ‘betrays’ artistic creation. In The Secret Art of 
Antonin Artaud, Derrida elaborated on this concept further, emphasising the 
ontological possibilities of an inexact field, understood beyond the subject-object 
binary that ‘has no consistency apart from that of the between’ (ibid: 71).  
 
(a) From incompleteness as transcendence to incompleteness as 
presence 
I suggest that this broad discussion on what happens in-between art practices is 
fundamental in our understanding of these ‘invisible’, incomplete and 
indeterminate relations that become possible not as absent abstractions or 
transcendental generalisations, but rather as present experiences that are created 
within an event. The ways in which a performance is related to its spectators – 
and vice versa – construct a liminal space which needs to be rendered a becoming 
of presence; that is, it needs to be acknowledged as a creative, expressive and 
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mobile space. Because, it is worth noting that in conceptualising the possibilities of 
spaces in-between, the boundaries that divide a politics of presence from a politics 
of transcendence can potentially be fine and fragile. For example, it is interesting 
to examine Merleau-Ponty’s argument on the incomplete ‘blanks’ of art and 
language. He notes that,  
‘language is expressive as much as through what is between the words as 
through the words themselves, and through what it does not say as much as 
what it says; just as the painter paints as much by what he traces, by the 
blanks he leaves, or by the brush marks that he does not make’ (Merleau-
Ponty, 1973: 43; original emphasis).  
Merleau-Ponty’s account highlights the contribution of gaps, interruptions, 
pauses, of unfinished and blank spaces, in the production of meaning as a shared 
experience; as an element that injects agency to the reader, the spectator, or user. 
As Helen Nicholson comments, following from this argument, ‘those gaps are 
‘expressive’, they invite ‘multiple interpretations’ and offer ‘an aesthetic space in 
which meanings are made’’ (as cited in Jackson, 2007: 271). What is important 
here though is the way in which we understand the function of such incomplete 
spaces. I argue that if we understand these ‘gaps’ as spaces in which meaning is 
produced, then these ‘gaps’ are not a sign of a ‘lack’ to be filled; these incomplete 
spaces are not completed, occupied or territorialised through representation. The 
very incompleteness of such spaces not only conditions, but also becomes the 
creation of meaning in itself, as an experience of presence. I would argue that this 
is the difference between creating meaning and discovering meaning; because the 
former, as an act of presence, is not a completion of a gap. In his research on the 
theatre of Beckett, Les Essif makes a relevant point; his interest is ‘to examine 
ways in which emptiness is meaningful as emptiness, and ways in which the stage 
is essentially emptiable (depletable) instead of essentially fillable’ (Esiff, 2001: 66). 
Esiff suggests that the awareness of this emptiness as such transforms the theatrical 
stage into a ‘supra-representational’ space; that is, a space which endorses ‘the 
meta-physical, sur-real essence of emptiness, and its effect on the consciousness of 
the spectator’ (ibid). 
While I agree with Esiff’s focus on breaking with any lust for completeness, I 
argue that, in a sense, these incomplete or ‘empty’ spaces are not gaps at all. They 
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are not really empty and they are not voids. They hold no negative connotation, 
nor do they become neutral conditions of performing. Incomplete spaces (such as 
the points of contact between performance and audience, between users and 
installations, between readers and books etc.) function as open-ending variations, 
as creative encounters, as becomings of meanings that are only possible as 
relations, as productive differences between an event (with both its human and 
non-human constituents) and its participants. In other words, in suggesting that 
these incomplete spaces are becomings of meaning, I argue that they are not 
‘invitations’ for a potential completion of a story, a narrative, an artwork or an 
idea that become possible in relation to external significations, transcendental 
codifications and representation. They are instead non-representational 
becomings in as much as their function is not to unify or territorialise the 
multiplicity of experiencing a peformance; in so far as they do not normalise the 
political potential of what actually takes place in the ‘here and now’ of a 
performance, but in as much as they produce experiences that enhance the critical 
engagement of the audience with the event. 
Therefore, one of the most important points that needs to be made, in relation 
to incompleteness in theatre and performance, is the extent to which we can 
conceive an incompleteness of presence, rather than an incompleteness of 
transcendence. I argue that incomplete practices become politically forceful and 
radically subversive in as much as they are not abstractly defined as transcendental 
‘invisibilities’ that operate as absent representations of self-identical meanings, 
discourses, conflicts or truths. We need to rethink the notion of incompleteness in 
political theatre as a movement towards a non-representational approach to 
critique; in other words, to dissociate incomplete processes from static conditions 
and abstractions – i.e. states that engender transcendental and normative 
significations to critical thinking and critical practice – and to conceive them as 
mobile and ephemeral variations that function as the critical ‘force’ of 
performances. 
We could further understand the meaning of this dissociation through Husserl’s 
distinction between ‘[the] imperfection pertaining to immanent perception’ and ‘the 
incompleteness associated with transcendent perception’ as explained by Lillian 
Alweiss (Aweiss, 2003: 31). Husserl argues that, ‘this incompleteness or 
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‘imperfection’ pertaining to the essence of the perception of a lived experience, is 
radically different from the incompleteness or ‘imperfection’ pertaining to the 
essence of the perception of something ‘transcendent’’ (as cited in Alweiss, 2003: 
31). Following this account, Alweiss goes on to argue that transcendent 
incompleteness is ‘not fully given’, i.e. it is an absent abstraction, whereas 
immanent incompleteness is ‘absolutely given’, i.e. it is present and actual (ibid). 
For example, in Peter Brook’s Orghast, the feeling of ‘unfinishedness’ due to the 
audience’s incapacity to make immediate sense of Hughes’s invented language 
was politically forceful precisely because it was not expected from the audience to 
discover any missing links to a supposedly ‘hidden story’; the point was rather to 
transform the way of experiencing language, sounds and music before 
representation and signification come into play. Hughes’s language was not a 
linguistic jigsaw that had to be solved in an abstract or metaphysical sense, but 
rather an opportunity to alter the way of perceiving and experiencing a 
performance in a more physical, direct and actual manner. Also, the point of 
Punchdrunk’s fragmented narratives is never to become one single and unified 
narrative on the basis of external references and mimetic representations. Rather, 
it is the swift undoing of the audience’s capacity to connect and codify meanings 
that gives way to a ‘Lynchian’40, immersive and dream-like perception of their 
plays. 
Thus, to sum up, I argue that the political potentials of these incomplete and 
fragmentary ‘spaces’ that function in-between the human or non-human agents of 
a theatrical performance enhance the critical perception of the spectators and 
produce possibilities of performing critique on a non-representational level in as 
much as: (1) they are not normatively completed or territorialised on the basis of 
external symbolisations; (2) their incompleteness is understood, perceived and 
experienced as a movement, as a variation, as a becoming, i.e. as a mobilising 
rupture that creates the conditions of performing critique, without however being a 
static condition or a fixed quality in itself; (3) they are understood, perceived and 
experienced as actual and real elements of the ‘here and now’ of the event, 
endorsing at the same time a politics of presence in theatre and performance. 
                                                
40 See Maxie Szaalwinska’s interesting comparison between Punchdrunk and David Lynch’s films 
in her 2007 Guardian article Punchdrunk are theatre’s most accomplished poets.   
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(b) Critique: The art of not being ‘complete’ quite so much  
Let us now focus more explicitly on understanding what incomplete and non-
teleological practices can offer to the experience of critique. Without discarding 
my discussion on theatre and performance, I want to emphasise the contribution 
of ‘unfinished’ elements to our general conceptualisation of critical practice. In 
other words, in keeping my focus on the potential of performing critique as a non-
representational process, I want in particular to examine the ways in which 
critique can be thought outside teleology, determinacy and finitude.  
 
Assuming a notion of ‘completeness’ 
An important point that has to be made if one wants to look at what is 
interesting about incomplete processes of critique, is the extent to which we are 
able to disconnect the incompleteness of practices from a sense, or a concept of 
completeness. In other words, the first question we should address is whether we 
can understand incomplete or indeterminate ways of producing critique as 
entirely autonomous elements, detached from an idea of totality or finitude. 
Indeed, how can we think of a process as an unfinished one if we do not 
simultaneously define what is, or what could be, finite or total in an actual or 
metaphysical sense? For example, leaving free space and adding ‘openings’ that 
affirm and invite a critical engagement with a critical process, is in itself an 
acknowledgment, or an awareness of a ‘route’ that leads to determinate and 
complete critical outcomes. In his essay The Concept of Criticism in German 
Romanticism, Walter Benjamin compares the process of criticism to works of art, 
arguing that, ‘[e]very work is, in relation to the absolute of art, necessarily 
incomplete, or – what amounts to the same thing – it is incomplete in relation to 
its own absolute idea’ (Benjamin et al, 1996: 154). Benjamin suggests that in order 
to contribute to actual change, acts of criticism should always render their subject 
matter incomplete (in relation to the whole idea of their subject matter), in the 
same way that works of art become possible as unfinished elements in relation to a 
finite idea of art. Talking more specifically about theatre and especially about the 
ways in which scholars usually deal with the fragmented and indeterminate 
elements of Beckett’s theatre, Les Essif notes that, ‘[t]heir perception of the 
fragmented occurs with respect to the perception of the whole, the whole body 
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and the whole narrative story, the whole subject’ (Essif, 2001: 66). Benjamin’s and 
Essif’s accounts are important here, not merely because of their observations as 
such but mostly because of the different implications that accompany them. 
Whereas Benjamin identifies a radically interruptive potential in the very 
incompleteness of works of art or criticism – despite the fact that these exist in 
relation to complete or absolute ideas – Essif ‘territorialises’ the question, focusing 
on the incapacity of incomplete or fragmentary practices to be thought outside a 
sense of finitude and totality. He argues that the Artaudian, fragmented sense of 
Beckett’s plays ‘cannot free itself from the aesthetics of story or merit some degree 
of primacy with respect to it (ibid); and he continues: ‘Beckett’s unorthodox 
theatrical fiction still coalesces around the idea of story even as it elaborates a story 
‘untold’’ (ibid). 
In any case, one of the answers to the question that I posed above is that we 
could not conceptualise incompleteness outside or beyond an assumption of 
completeness. At the same time, however, what is made clear through this answer, 
as well as through the difference that I briefly identified between Benjamin’s and 
Essif’s accounts, is that incomplete performances and acts of critique are in fact 
radical responses to a wider problem of critical practice. It is true that they exist only 
in relation to a perception of a ‘whole’ so that it makes absolute sense to contend 
that they always assume a conception of the subject as unified and total. But, in a 
sense, this is the purpose of critique in the first place: to destabilise the teleology 
and the determinacy of hegemonic practices and discourses, injecting change and 
movement into our ways of thinking and doing. To put it differently, the point 
here is that while acknowledging the relation between incompleteness and 
completeness, we should think of the former not as a mere consequence of the 
latter; incomplete critical practices are not hierarchically bound to a normative 
function that is dictated by an idea of finitude. Rather, they are active and mobile 
interventions in or interruptions of a politics that is instructive, normative and 
static. What is important, therefore, is not to claim a fictional or imaginary level of 
totality or completeness for unfinished practices – not even to render them 
autonomous and singular elements or conditions of critique; but to recognise them 
as becoming-autonomous and becoming-singular events of critique and, by extension, 
to render them politically ‘justifiable’, emancipating them from the essentialism of 
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representation and signification. They are not autonomous because they assume 
the existence of teleology within discourses; however, they are becoming-
autonomous by virtue of destabilising the power implications of this relation, 
breaking with the possibility of being subjectified to them. In short, I argue that 
the point is to acknowledge incomplete practices of critique for what they do, 
(which is to continuously become-different), without subjectifying their radical 
potential and their capacity to affirm a politics of presence within critical practice 
to a hierarchical and centralised system of relations. 
From this perspective, I argue that the recognition of incomplete practices as 
politically forceful ‘events’ of critique is driven by the need to respond to the fact 
that critique is a practice, i.e. a becoming of fragments, of interruptions, of questions 
and interventions whose aim is to undo the normative ‘patternisation’ through 
which politics are embedded and normalised in discourses (whether artistic, 
academic, political and so on). The very nature of critique as a mode of 
questioning is what institutes its incomplete and mobile character in the first place. 
Having said that, I want to close this subchapter by reinforcing this argument 
following Foucault’s idea of critique. I will argue that critique becomes politically 
forceful as an always-incomplete practice, whose purpose is to decentralise and 
destratify the relations between the subjects that constitute it and engage with it. I 
suggest that Foucault’s description of critique can offer an insightful way towards a 
further conceptualisation of the relation between incompleteness and critique.  
 
Foucault’s notion of critique  
In his 1978 lecture What is Critique?, Foucault examines the function of critique-
as-a-practice. He argues that the emergence of what he calls a ‘critical attitude’ 
became possible as a response to the problematic question of governmentality 
(Foucault, 1997). He suggests that the formulation of this perpetual question, that 
emerged in Western Europe in the 16th century, can be summarised as: ‘how not 
to be governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and 
such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for 
that, not by them’ (ibid: 44; original emphasis). In this ‘bold’ question, Foucault 
identifies the conditions of possibility for what we came to understand as critical 
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thinking or critical practice. He understands critique to be a response to 
hegemonic systems of power whose function was to promote and maintain a self-
identical and determinate notion of truth-as-dogma. Thus, in attempting to give a 
general description of critique, he states that it is ‘the art of not being governed 
quite so much’ (ibid: 45). I suggest that, although vague, this characterisation of 
critique is important and revealing. Even though, at first sight, it seems to explain 
little, I argue that, on the contrary, it tells us a lot about the function of critique.  
Firstly, it is evident that Foucault does not seek a rigorous definition of critique; 
rather, he wants to map out the conditions, as well as the potentialities of critical 
attitude, in the sense of allowing ‘space’ for important points to be made. As 
Judith Butler comments in her 2002 essay What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s 
Virtue, ‘[Foucault] seeks to understand the kind of question that critique institutes, 
offering some tentative ways of circumscribing its activity’ (Butler, 2002: 213). 
According to Butler, the very nature of Foucault’s inquiry ‘enacts a certain mode 
of questioning which will prove central to the activity of critique itself’ (ibid). From 
this perspective, the very process of questioning the way in which critique becomes 
possible is an important part of the latter’s function and projection. At the same 
time, this also means that the capacity to critique involves a reflexive process of 
exposing the politics of critique itself.  
Secondly, it is interesting to observe that ‘the art of not being governed quite so 
much’ can be understood as a proposal for an almost deviant attitude towards 
governmentalisation. In discussing the lecture, Foucault clarifies: 
‘I was not referring to something that would be a fundamental anarchism, 
that would be like an originary freedom, absolutely and wholeheartedly 
resistant to any governmentalisation. I did not say it, but this does not mean 
that I absolutely exclude it’ (Foucault, 1997: 75).  
Foucault wants to make clear that what he suggests should not be interpreted as a 
construction of a static framework of critique – he does not propose a political 
manifesto of how critique should function; rather, he wants to highlight the 
fluctuating quality, the variation and the movement, immanent to the very 
practice of critique. 
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In other words, Foucault’s description of critique emphasises the fact that 
critique is indeed a practice and not a product of discourses. Butler underlines this 
argument by contextualising it through the differentiation between criticism and 
judgment as proposed by Raymond Williams and Theodor Adorno. Williams 
notes that, ‘what always needs to be understood is the specificity of the response, 
which is not a judgement, but a practice’ (as cited in Butler, 2002). He suggests an 
anti-deductive, non-teleological way of approaching our very capacity to respond 
to normative systems of social order. He wants to expose the normative ways of 
arriving at fixed and determinate judgements. Likewise, Adorno attacks the notion 
of judgement arguing that it constitutes a ‘withdrawal from praxis’, through 
separating ‘the idea from its object’ (as cited in Butler, 2002). For Adorno, critique 
should function as a dialogical process through which political subjects emerge. In 
a sense, both accounts are complementary to Foucault’s description of critique; 
they advocate a similar way of breaking with the teleology and determinacy of 
critique’s ‘productisation’, suggesting a more mobile, and in effect, incomplete 
function of critical practice. 
Indeed, I argue that ‘the art of not being governed quite so much’ is a call for a 
mobile approach to critical practice, in as much as it affirms the becoming of 
‘critical spaces’ (conceived as fragments or interruptions of normativity) that 
cannot be defined, territorialised and therefore controlled by the same hegemonic 
mechanisms that they resist to. Although Foucault, in parallel to his theory of 
power, makes clear that critique becomes possible through the nexus of power-
knowledge, through any governmentalisation (and not as an external element to 
them), he argues, however, that the practice of critique is that of ‘desubjugation’. 
In his second, more thorough, attempt to describe critique he says: 
‘And if governmentalisation is indeed this movement through which 
individuals are subjugated in the reality of a social practice through 
mechanisms of power that adhere to a truth, well, then! I will say that critique 
is the movement by which the subject gives himself the right to question truth 
on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth. Well, 
then!: critique will be the art of voluntary insubordination, that of reflected 
intractability. Critique would essentially insure the desubjugation of the 
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subject in the context of what we could call, in a word, the politics of truth’ 
(Foucault, 1997: 47). 
It is evident that this description of critique is more framed and detailed from the 
first one. What we can take from it is Foucault’s insistence on the mobile character 
of critical attitude as a tool of desubjectifying and destabilising the static notions of 
truth that are produced by the normative relation between power and knowledge.  
With Foucault’s argument in mind, I suggest that it is by virtue of conceiving 
critique as a movement that we can understand the notion of incompleteness in 
this context. I argue that critique produces, and is produced by, an essentially 
incomplete (i.e. non-hegemonic, indeterminate and non-teleological) sense of 
governmentality. Considered as such, the practice of critique (and its non-
representational potential) is itself incomplete and indeterminate, since its aim is 
not shape, to form or to unify, but rather to productively disaggregate the power 
relations and the hierarchical implications that are produced within normative 
politics. Hence, I argue that critique is a productively incomplete practice, 
experienced not as a motionless condition, but as a process of becoming-
destratified; understood as the Deleuzian rupture, or the subtraction that functions as 
a productive multiplication (as we have seen in chapter 2) in Deleuze’s One less 
Manifesto (1999 [1979]). 
 
IV. Conclusion: from de-objectification to destratification  
As I pointed out in the introduction, this chapter’s intention was to theorise the 
concepts that, in my view, enrich the analysis of critique in theatre and provide a 
mapping of the possibility of a politics of performance that is actual and non-
instructive. In the subchapters I discussed first the idea of a non-representational 
approach to performance and secondly the notion of incompleteness as a 
politically forceful element of becoming-critical. In so doing, I contextualised the 
political raison d’ être of these concepts, inquiring into the complexity of their 
potentials, and I enclosed their political resonances and ontological implications in 
a specific theoretical framework. Most importantly, in connecting the questions 
raised in my discussion, I made some critical points that I consider to be pivotal in 
understanding the conditions of possibility for a political theatre beyond 
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normative representation and ideological dogmatism. In short, these points can be 
encapsulated as follows: Theatre can be a political space within which critique 
emerges as a non-representational interruption (i.e. movement) of the normalisation 
of discourses and the teleology of normative politics. Having contextualised this 
argument as a possibility of a politics that can potentially exceed the context of 
theatre and performance, it is crucial to note that what I have considered to be the 
substantiation of such a politics is the process of dehierarchisation or 
destratification with regards to power as it emerges within spaces of critique. It is 
precisely this process that I want to briefly discuss by way of concluding this 
chapter, reinforcing the argument that interactive and political theatre needs to go 
beyond static ideas of de-objectifying audiences, endorsing a politics of continuous 
destratification. 
As discussed in many parts of this thesis, the challenge of introducing agency to 
theatre audiences has been frequently thought in conjunction with a process of de-
objectifying the spectators’ presence in performance spaces. In many cases, the 
way out of audience passivity and the creation of engaging conditions of 
performance have been thought alongside certain ‘ground rules’ that produce 
agential possibilities for the spectators, transforming them into active participants 
of a shared theatrical experience. Community art practice and interactive theatres 
that follow Boal’s theatrical techniques is a good example of this kind of approach 
to the problem of audience inaction. The grand aim of democratising theatrical 
production and reception has been widely sought by establishing a systematisation 
of methods that promote participatory ways of engaging audiences and dialogical 
narratives. For some, this is a very broad framework through which we can define 
the ‘postmodern spectator’. For example, in an auto-biographical tone, the actor 
dancer and writer Katherine Adamenko notes: 
‘I ask the postmodern spectator to enter a new kind of contract with the 
makers of new performance. I ask this new postmodern spectator for three 
things: investment, to engage in an interaction the performer is asking you to 
do; complicity, to act without self-consciousness in that activity; and 
discipline, to commit to opening yourself to new forms of audience 
interaction’ (Adamenko, 2003: 15). 
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For others, this is an approach that foregrounds a more localised way of producing 
a politicised theatre, or a community theatre with ‘its emphasis on local and/or 
personal stories (rather than pre-written scripts) that are first processed through 
improvisation and then collectively shaped into theatre under the guidance either 
of outside professional artists […] or of local amateur artists’ (Van Erven, 2001: 2). 
In any case, what seems to be the main concern of these theatre projects is finding 
the most effective way to de-objectify the spectators, enabling them to become 
agents of the performance, i.e. the subjects of theatrical production. Furthermore, 
this process of de-objectification depends upon certain sets of rules and regulations 
(either ethical, political, ideological, cultural, practical etc.) that operate as the 
facilitative means to achieve and maintain the democratic character of this 
process. On one hand, this makes sense, considering that failure to address certain 
important issues while creating conditions of interaction and participation in a 
theatrical event could lead to chaotic, repressive and even practically dangerous 
situations. 
At the same time however, what I identify as problematic in these techniques of 
de-objectification is the extent to which they are considered as ‘ends in 
themselves’, i.e. as egalitarian conditions that take the form of static ‘theorems’ 
with regards to the problems of representation and agency in theatre and 
performance. I argue that what is at stake in systematising the de-objectification of 
audiences is the very nature of revolutionary practice being penetrated by a 
certain kind of political ‘professionalism’ that functions through totalising 
concepts, unified systems of power and moral imperatives. It is the same problem 
that, in the preface of Anti-Oedipus, Foucault identifies as being the one that gives 
rise to ‘[b]ureaucrats of the revolution and civil servants of Truth’ (Foucault, 2004 
[1972]: xiv): that is, the problem of hierarchy or stratification as existent within 
certain systematised acts of resistance to hegemonic systems of power. I argue that 
the systematisation and the typification of the conditions that de-objectify and 
introduce agency to the spectator need to be rendered problematic, and by 
extension, incapable of revolutionising the theatrical process. While the 
participatory models of performance and the conventions of community-based 
theatre address and frequently challenge the problem of representation and 
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political dogmatism, they however maintain the problem of hierarchy intact by 
‘transferring’ it to a different, more dialogical level of engaging.  
What I suggest is essential in tackling this specific problem is the decomposition 
of the classic model according to which, even in contemporary performances, 
spectators are considered to be agents (or not) of a theatrical play. This model is 
thoroughly described by Marco de Marinis in his 1987 essay The Dramaturgy of the 
Spectator. Marinis argues that there are two conditions of spectatorship: a passive or 
objective one and an active or subjective one. In making this claim, Marinis 
clarifies two points which, I believe, are interesting here. The first one is that the 
relationship between the performance and the spectator is essentially ‘assymetrical 
and unbalanced’ (Marinis, 1987: 102). The second one is that ‘the balance 
between determination (constraint) and freedom […] is the essence of the 
aesthetic experience and the source of its vitality’ (ibid: 101). In a sense, this 
account captures, on one level, the complexity of audience de-objectification, 
emphasising that a total freedom of the spectator is impossible; and, on a second 
level, it describes a potentiality, which lies in the dialectic relationship between 
restriction and agency. 
Indeed, this perspective is useful and my aim is hardly to counter it. It echoes 
Foucault’s idea of resistance as an act that develops through power, and Deleuze’s 
insistence on the process of territorialisation and deterritorialisation (even though 
both theorists do not describe these processes as dialectic ones). At the same time 
though, what I think is problematic in this analogy (that has been prevailing in 
discourses of theatre and performance) is the assumption that establishes the active 
spectator as a free subject, by contrasting it with the condition of a passive 
spectator conceived as a restricted object. Again, Ranciere’s (2011 [2009]) critique 
(as discussed in the introduction) of this oppositional model between spectatorship 
and performance is very useful here. Following from Ranciere’s argument, I 
suggest that it is not the introduction of subjectivity to the spectator that 
emancipates a performance from ideological didactics and political determinacy; 
rather, it is by virtue of destabilising the entire system of power and authority, the 
hierarchical structure of theatre that we can speak of a radical challenge to these 
problems of representation. This destabilisation entails an understanding of the 
spectator-subject not as an end-in-itself, but as the beginning in the production of a 
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destratified theatre. From this perspective, I suggest that the constraints that 
Marinis identifies, the territorial limitations or the ‘ground rules’ of a performance 
need to be redefined within the subjective or active condition of the spectator; not 
in order to apply constraints per se (not even sure if constraints is the right word), 
but in order to understand and experience what is totalising, what is tyrannical or 
fascist, what is hierarchical, what is hegemonic and teleological in the very 
processes of de-objectifying the spectator. In so doing, theatre and performance 
can focus more on affirming a notion of spectator that is not becoming-subjective, 
but rather a becoming-destratified one within a becoming-destratified 
performance. 
In other words, I argue that the ‘audience-problem’ needs to be radically 
displaced; it needs to be transformed from a problem of subjectivity to a problem 
of (de)stratification. The benefits of such a transformation are two: (1) In rendering 
the subjective condition of the spectator problematic, and even restrictive, the 
notion of passive or objective spectatorship shrinks and progressively fades out. 
The conditions that introduce agency to the spectator become an object of 
critique, reinforcing more actual ways of radicalising a theatrical process. (2) The 
processes of de-objectification stop functioning as ends-in-themselves, as 
completed theorems, becoming the ‘strata’, the territorialities that enable a 
continuous destratification. The question of the spectator being free is transformed 
into the question of the performance (the event) as freed from the hierarchical ways 
of relating and engaging with the elements that comprise it; i.e. the performers, 
the audience, the space, the light, the sound and so on. 
Of course, the process of destratification in performance cannot be thought 
either as static condition, or as an idea of finitude. This would turn the 
performance into a chaotic non-space, a void, an absence. The disarticulation that 
destratification produces needs to stay creative and mobile by means of 
responding to territorial conditions; by observing what Deleuze and Guattari call 
‘concrete rules of extreme caution’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004 [1987]: 554). In 
concluding A Thousand Plateaus, they write: 
‘a too-sudden destratification may be suicidal, or turn cancerous. In other 
words, it will sometimes end in chaos, the void and destruction, and 
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sometimes lock us back into the strata, which become more rigid still, losing 
their degrees of diversity, differentiation, and mobility’ (ibid). 
Thus, following this point, I suggest that a politics of destratification in theatre and 
performance is a creative challenge to the problem of representation in so far as it 
becomes possible as a continuous response, as a positive destabilisation of any 
hierarchical or politically instructive conditions that emerge in theatrical events. In 
this sense, the ‘concrete rules’ that will animate and sustain such a politics need to 
be reinvented in the spaces between de-objectification and destratification; or else, 
between the territorialisation, the deterritorialisation and the reterritorialisation of 
the power relations in a theatrical performance.   
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My primary objective in the thesis has been to assert that theatre has the 
capacity to challenge and destabilise the problematic function of representation. 
Considering the relation of that which is ‘representational’ to what is ‘mimetic’, 
‘self-identical’, ‘hierarchical’ and ‘teleological’ as both direct and problematic, I 
understood theatre and performance as a radical space of confronting prescriptive 
and dogmatic ways of engaging politics. While the thesis examined the extent to 
which we can theorise, practice and experience a non-representational approach 
to theatre and performance, its task was not to attack or negate the act of 
representation as such. Rather, I suggested, it is the importance given to it in the 
context of political theatre that has to be questioned and challenged. In doing so, I 
argued that the act of representing politics in theatre and performance cannot be 
understood as an autonomous process. On the contrary, I suggested that it has to 
be analysed as a system or a domain of power that needs to be rendered 
problematic. Theatre, as a political site, is particularly exposed to the implications 
of this system. It is a political and artistic space that is often subjected to what 
Deleuze calls ‘the elements that constitute or represent a system of power’ 
(Deleuze, 1997 [1979]: 241). It can be ‘occupied’, territorialised and hierarchised 
through or according to a system of representation. For example, the production 
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of self-identical, fixed and teleological meanings in theatrical performances results 
from maintaining the function of representation intact. It is also largely on the 
basis of the mimetic and totalising function of representation that human relations 
in theatre become hierarchical; that is, they are organised in binaries (subject-
object, i.e. performer-spectator, director-performer), they maintain a fixed 
positioning (as a subject or an object), and, as a result, they become authoritative 
(the subject dominates the object).  
At the same time, I suggested that political theatre has the capacity to confront 
this system of power, by endorsing non-representational ways of expressing and 
engaging politics. I suggested that theatre and performance constitute a cultural 
and political space in which this capacity can be radicalised in so far as: (1) it is 
initiated as a substantial critique in Western theatre’s function, which is 
traditionally representational, mimetic and teleological; (2) it helps the shaping of 
a radical political opening in which critique and theatrical practice intertwine and 
coexist as non-representational processes; (3) it places the question of spectatorship 
at the heart of a rethinking of critical practice in social and cultural theory.  
 
Reflections on the thesis’s questions and its findings  
In making these arguments, I examined certain questions and made some 
hypotheses (both in the case studies and in the chapters of the thesis that were 
more theoretical) that I consider to be very important in discussing a non-
representational approach to theatre and performance. In what follows, I offer a 
concluding analysis of my general findings, focusing both on the theoretical 
validity of my questions and the justification, as well as the expansion, of my 
arguments. My purpose is therefore to reflect on the critical analysis of the thesis 
in a summative and descriptive way; not only in order to substantiate my 
discussion, but also to create theoretical ‘invitations’ for future questions that will 
potentially contribute to and elaborate on the research task that this thesis 
undertakes. 
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(a) Theory as theatre  
One of the first questions that the thesis considered (mainly in the second 
chapter) was the extent to which theory can relate to theatre and performance in a 
more actual and direct way than the one that notions of dramaturgy, theatricality 
and performativity have employed. In assessing the use of these ‘theatrical’ 
concepts in theoretical claims, as well as in criticising the way in which 
performance studies and the postdramatic paradigm have addressed the role of 
theory in theatre practice, I asked whether theory could become theatre in a non-
representational way. This was a rather bold initial hypothesis that, with 
hindsight, I consider it as difficult to be addressed. My intention was to inquire 
into the function of theory-as-performance and to underline the potential of 
political theatre to become a space of actualising, rather than representing, 
theoretical discourses. Through my research it became clear to me that this 
question was somewhat problematic for two reasons: First, in the second chapter I 
posed this question in an obscure way. The meaning of ‘becoming theatre’, which 
was given central importance in the formulation of the question, was not 
sufficiently explained. In other words, the clarification of what it means ‘to 
perform theory’ was very important for the pursuit of this question. Second, this 
clarification was almost impossible to make. The question implied another set of 
questions that could not be adequately addressed in the thesis: E.g. what are the 
criteria that define whether and how theory becomes theatre? How could we 
experience theory as a practice? Why should theory become theatre and not the 
other way around? Is this ‘becoming’ understood as another form of theoretical 
embodiment? I would argue that, although very interesting and significant, all 
these questions would lead the thesis to a theoretical inquiry, which I did not 
intend to address. My objective was not to focus on whether theory can become 
theatre directly, but to argue that the relation between theory and theatre could 
become itself more direct. Thus, during my research, and while reflecting on my initial 
question, I reformulated it as follows: Could we think of the relation between the 
‘theoretical’ and the ‘theatrical’ in a more direct way? As one that potentially 
endorses a challenge to the representational function of critical practice? The 
second chapter was, therefore, to a large extent, a very important space for 
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research. It was a space of experimenting with this question. It was a very 
important theoretical ‘fieldwork’ for the thesis. 
Thus, to sum up the way in which I addressed and examined the question of 
theory and theatre throughout the thesis, my argument is as follows: I suggest that 
social and cultural theory should pay more attention to theatrical performances, 
approaching them as ‘actual’ spaces of encounter with discourses on the politics of 
representation; rather than as fictional or methodological tools of cultural analysis 
that either serve as ideological metaphors or justificatory examples. In other 
words, I argue that social and cultural theory should acknowledge the potential of 
theatre and performance practice to directly inform theoretical discourses, and to 
critically intervene in their subject matter. Social and cultural theory should, 
therefore, endorse the possibility of theatre to produce theoretical interventions or 
‘lines of thought’ that function in mobile and productively incomplete ways; that 
is, in ways that ‘invite’ political engagement with the spectators while enhancing 
their critical perception.  
 Furthermore, the thesis suggests that the role of theory in relation to theatre 
should not rest on framing and describing performance practices as meaningful 
objects of research. I argue that the task of theory is not only to find terminologies 
and new vocabularies that explain or embody the cultural significance of theatrical 
performances. It is also to endorse a constant rethinking of theatre’s political 
potentials in the latter’s capacity to produce, rather than transmit, critique. It is to 
acknowledge theatre as a political space of presence, rather than as a podium of a 
political speech that is forever authored before or beyond the event.  
 
(b) A non-representational approach to theatre: from (complete) 
products to (incomplete) processes    
The question of the possibility of a non-representational theatre received 
particular attention throughout the thesis. Rather than providing a theorisation or 
a definition of a theatre that could be labelled non-representational, I addressed 
this question in a way that focuses on the non-representational potential of theatre 
and performance. I argue that the difference is both radical and decisive: As I 
frequently underlined throughout the thesis, what my research does not aim to 
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achieve is the production of a non-representational framework for theatre and 
performance practices. This would not only be an unattainable undertaking – 
considering that representation is a process that cannot be entirely eliminated or 
negated in theatre – but it would also stand in opposition to my critique of 
complete and determinate frameworks and models of critical practice as discussed 
throughout the chapters. Rather, the thesis examines non-representational approaches 
to understanding and experiencing theatre, considering the latter as a political 
space in which critique can be performed as ‘presence’. I argue for a political 
theatre that produces critique with its audience, within the event. Following from 
Deleuze and Guattari’s theoretical challenges to representation, Maaike Bleeker 
describes this non-representational potential of theatre in a useful way:  
‘the theatre as a cultural practice may illuminate what it means, or could 
mean, to ‘find one’s bearing in thought’. […] Deleuze and Guattari’s account 
of thinking suggests the possibility of conceiving theatre in terms of thinking, 
where the theatre is not understood as a representation of thoughts, or 
processes of thinking, originating from subjects expressing their ideas through 
theatrical representations, but rather as a practice of thinking in which we, as 
audience, participate’ (Bleeker, 2009: 148).     
Thus, acknowledging a theatrical event as a shared experience of a politics that is 
produced in the ‘here and now’, as an experience of a politics that does not 
essentially correspond to external significations and absent meanings, is I suggest, 
a very important rethinking of what political theatre can potentially contribute to 
social change.  
 In this sense, the thesis argues that the critical challenges to the mimetic 
function of representation, as initiated by different theatre directors and groups, 
produced and radicalised non-representational approaches to theatre practice. 
These challenges were not made on the basis of a utopian definition of theatre. 
Rather, they were instrumental in a revolutionary rethinking of representation in 
political theatre, by introducing non-representational processes to theatrical plays. It 
is by virtue of this focus on processes (which destabilised an understanding of 
‘critique-as-product’), that experimental performance practices were able to 
suggest new ways of experiencing political theatre.  
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This is the main reason why my analysis drew many theoretical elements from 
Deleuzian ontology. I understand these non-representational processes as ‘lines of 
escape’ from the organising and stratifying principles of representation in theatre 
and performance. Following Deleuze, I suggested (in chapters 3, 4 and 5) that we 
could think of Littlewood’s, Brook’s and Punchdrunk’s challenges to 
representation as ‘maps’ of a political theatre that interrupts the reproduction of 
ideological invariants and transcendental meanings; that is, I examined the non-
representational processes of these theatre projects as positive and productive 
‘openings’ in theatre’s political potential, rather than as negative elements (what 
Deleuze and Guattari call ‘tracings’) that imitate a reality that is forever external 
to the event. In their discussion of the ‘rhizome’, Deleuze and Guattari 
differentiate between ‘maps’ and ‘tracings’ in a very useful way:  
‘What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented 
toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The map does not 
reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious. 
It fosters connections between fields, the removal of blockages on bodies 
without organs, the maximum opening of bodies without organs onto a plane 
of consistency. It is itself a part of the rhizome. The map is open and 
connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to 
constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of 
mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or social formation’ (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 2004 [1987]: 13-4).   
My analysis of non-representational processes in theatre was directly informed by 
this positive and radical potential of maps, as opposed to tracings. We can 
conceive of ‘tracings’ in theatre as the elements of power that represent a fixed or 
static structure of relations (whether spatially, textually, ideologically, historically 
or politically). A tracing is something that precedes the event by surpassing the 
‘here and now’ of the latter; it is ‘something that comes ready-made’ (ibid: 13). 
Thus, the argument of the thesis was largely based on mapping a political theatre 
of the real, while challenging what imitates reality and what operates as invariant 
in theatrical performances.    
Thus, I examined the potential of a non-representational approach to theatre 
as a process or a ‘becoming’, distinguishing its function (and its relation to the 
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experience of ‘reality’ in theatre) from that of a static formula or a fixed 
positioning. It is this distinguishing line that led me to emphasise and examine 
‘incompleteness’ as a tool of critical practice in theatre and performance. As 
discussed in chapter 6, I understood incomplete practices as pivotal in making the 
spectators active in the shaping of critique within political theatre. I thereby 
considered the mobile and productive potential of incomplete practices that allows for 
critical interventions in theatrical events, suggesting that aesthetic unfinishedness 
and ideological indeterminacy play a crucial role in conceptualising a non-
representational approach to theatre and performance. At the same time, in 
contextualising and specifying my discussion on incompleteness I highlighted three 
important points: First, incomplete practices are politically radical and forceful in 
so far as they do not signify a lack, an absence or a transcendental completion of a 
story or ideology. On the contrary, I argued for the capacity of incomplete 
processes to endorse a ‘politics of presence’ in performance; that is, to act as 
inviting processes that activate a critical engagement with the ‘here and now’ of a 
theatrical event. Secondly, incomplete practice should be emancipated from a 
fictional idea of completeness, hence destabilising the power relations that subject 
the former to the latter. Considering the radical potential of incomplete practices 
to critique teleological and determinate concepts, I suggested that such practices 
need to be acknowledged as becoming-autonomous processes, released from an 
hierarchical relation to their object of critique (i.e. complete and finite outcomes as 
represented in theatre). Thirdly, understanding critique as a political practice (as 
what Foucault calls the movement that questions truth and power), is, in effect, a 
recognition of critique’s incomplete disposition. I suggested that one of the most 
radical ‘tasks’ of critical practice is to productively disaggregate and decompose 
the hierarchical relations of power that result from hegemonic and determinate 
politics. This is precisely, I argue, the non-representational potential of critique-as-
practice.  
 
(c) A popular-political theatre: decomposing ‘the people’ 
The thesis addressed the question of ‘popular theatre’ mainly in the case study 
of Joan Littlewood. As I have made clear in that particular chapter, as well as in 
the introduction of chapter 6, the thesis does not consider popular theatre as an 
 228 
art form that becomes political by simultaneously becoming exclusive and elitist. 
Rather, I argue, popular theatre becomes politically forceful and radical when 
acquiring non-representational potentials and less unifying principles with regard 
to its audience. Littlewood’s work with ensembles provided a very useful context 
through which the thesis discussed the extent to which we can understand popular 
theatre as a political process. By examining the different approaches through 
which Littlewood and MacColl conceptualised and practiced a ‘people’s theatre’, I 
was able to simultaneously argue for and criticise the political disposition of 
popular theatre. 
Bradby and McCormick note that, ‘[w]hen grouping together those who have 
worked for a people’s theatre, it is easier to identify their common enemy than 
their common aims’ (Bradby & McCormick, 1978: 11). Indeed, this is one of the 
most usual problems of popular-political theatre practices, i.e. a certain 
‘nervousness’ in relation to the question: ‘how to be political and popular at the 
same time’? In considering Littlewood’s theatre – especially the shifts in her 
experimentation with diverse forms and techniques – I argued for a popular 
theatre that becomes politically engaging by critically ‘standing’ in between:  
i) The agit-prop polemics of political theatre (i.e. the clear sociopolitical agenda 
of plays, with specific issues being addressed), and a non-didactic approach to 
the ways of engaging with audiences (i.e. the destabilisation of the opposition 
between active ‘performers-as-teachers’ and inactive ‘spectators-as-students’)  
ii) The rigorousness and rationality of political commentary, and the radical 
potentials of emotional responses (by audience and performers) to and 
interventions in a performance event.  
iii) The coherence of a strong theoretical and political framework, and its 
creative decomposition by ‘unexpected’ and impromptu happenings.  
It is by virtue of these productive contradictions that I argued for the importance 
of Littlewood’s contribution to a popular and political theatre that challenged 
mimetic representation and ideological dogmatism; a theatre that – following 
Lehmann – is interested in Brecht’s questions, but is not satisfied with his answers: 
i.e. a post-Brechtian conception of popular theatre. 
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Apart from making these three broad points, I went on to examine what I 
consider to be a very important area of debate in regards to a popular-political 
theatre. By focusing on Littlewood’s practice, I criticised the problematic way that 
popular theatre tends to address its audience as a unified and self-identical subject. 
Patrice Pavis’s incorporates this critique in his account of popular theatre in an 
interesting way:  
‘The notion of popular theatre, so often invoked today, is more a sociological 
than an aesthetic category. This is how the sociology of culture defines an art 
that is addressed to and/or proceeds from the popular classes, an ambiguous 
approach in that it does not specify whether this is theatre made by the people 
or for the people. In any case, how are we to define people; and as Brecht 
asked, are the people still popular?’ (Pavis, 1998: 278). 
Following Deleuze’s critique of popular theatre, I argued against the implicit 
consideration of audiences as cohesive units of individuals that can be addressed as 
‘the people’. Although this argument was made in the case study about 
Littlewood, its ‘line of thought’ was visible throughout the whole thesis. I argued 
that categorising and representing an audience as a collective that share an 
identical consciousness  (whether this is defined by class, culture, ethnicity, status 
or politics), is by definition a problematic limitation of political theatre’s engaging 
potentials. Addressing ‘the people’ as a unified representation of a social group 
(e.g. working-class people) engenders a positioning that shapes the power relations of 
a theatrical event in a hierarchical and oppositional way. It produces a binary 
opposition between a performance and its audience that puts boundaries to the 
engaging possibilities of political theatre. Thus, ‘the people’ is an abstract 
signification that results in compressing difference and multiplicity amongst the 
spectators, in order to classify them in a specific, and often ambiguous, category of 
consciousness. As Deleuze argues, this ‘major’ classification of an audience is a 
totalising representation that normalises, and thus renders ‘the people’ slaves of a 
political demagogy (Deleuze, 1997 [1979]).  
At the same time, I argued that this should not be understood as an inherent 
characteristic of popular theatre in general, but rather as a problematic element 
that manifests itself frequently in popular theatre practice. In this sense, the thesis 
considers the possibility of a theatre in which the ‘popular’ becomes ‘political’ not 
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by signifying totalising representations of audiences, but by creating an inclusive 
and engaging politico-theatrical space. I suggest that such a popular aspect of 
theatre is fundamental in the making of a political theatre that obtains non-
representational potentials. As Peter Brook states in The Empty Space, ‘every 
attempt to revitalise the theatre has gone back to the popular source’ (Brook, 1990 
[1968]: 76). 
 
(d) Actualising metaphysics in theatre          
The question of metaphysics in theatre was another complex issue that I mostly 
addressed in chapter 2, as well as in the case study of Peter Brook. Through my 
research, I discussed and examined certain concepts or processes whose relation to 
real practices can be considered as limited. This is not to say that these concepts 
or processes are essentially idealist or utopian. My analysis of notions such as 
‘sacred stage’, ‘glossopoeia’, ‘magic-as-presence’, or even ‘immersion’ was largely 
based on their potential to endorse a rethinking of metaphysics in theatrical 
performances, rather than providing specific ‘techniques’ of theatre that can be 
directly applied in theatrical plays. My purpose, therefore, was not to claim a 
definite level of reality for such concepts, or a detailed method of ‘applying’ them 
to theatrical practice. Rather, I wanted to highlight the need to acknowledge the 
‘real’ elements – in terms of impact, engagement and critical perception – that 
such metaphysical processes can contribute to political theatre. In other words, my 
intention was to affirm the non-representational potential of these processes to 
function in a level which is as real as the one attributed to qualities such as 
imagination, fear, affection, intimacy etc. In doing so, I suggested that we address 
a ‘politics of the real’ which bears less relation to mimesis as absence, than to 
experience as presence; we become more attentive to the ways in which a 
theatrical event is perceived, that is, to the conditions of its possibility, rather than 
to its object, its ‘hidden meaning’ or its mimetic realism. As Murray notes,  
‘the understanding of reality and realism depends on the frame, window, or 
perspective of its mise-en-scène. Reality must be categorised, that is, by 
reflecting not merely on what is represented but also, and most significantly, 
on how it is shown or re-presented and how it is seen, read, or received. What 
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is theorised or understood as ‘real’ or ‘material’ or even ‘historical’ remains 
contingent on its mise-en-scène […]’ (Murray, 1997:7; original emphasis).   
Following this argument, I suggest that acknowledging the actual impact of 
theatrical processes that function in a sacred and ritualistic – but not 
transcendental – manner is giving importance to how something becomes possible 
in, rather than to what could be signified through, a theatrical play. It is paying 
more attention to what takes place in the present of a theatrical event (how it is 
actualised and realised), than to what mimics an external reality or symbolises a 
fixed meaning.  
As seen in chapter 2, Derrida finds this potential of theatre in Artaud’s theatre 
of cruelty. The construction of a sacred, yet non-theological, space that Derrida 
observes in Artaud’s theatre is indeed a proposal of actualising metaphysics on 
stage. Derrida argues for a mise en scène that is emancipated from transcendental 
impositions (Author, Text, Speech) while maintaining its capacity to produce 
‘magical’ experiences; that is, experiences that cannot be articulated in words or 
described in cognitive ways. He contends that the theatre of cruelty is a theatre 
that reconstitutes the mise en scène as a space in which metaphysics are incarnated 
in the present; as acts of re-presenting life without imitating an image of life. It is 
in a very similar way that Peter Brook suggests a holy theatre. Giving emphasis to 
the pre-cultural possibilities of performance, Brook proposes a ‘living theatre’ in 
which performers and spectators engage in a communal experience of ‘magic’. 
For Brook, it is by virtue of immediacy and directness that one is able to 
experience theatre in a pre-cultural, affective and magical level. His distinction 
between a holy theatre and a deadly theatre is drawn on the basis of the former to 
endorse a metaphysics of presence, rather than imitating images of metaphysical 
processes on stage.  
More specifically, I considered the Orghast performance to be a very useful 
exploration of this approach to theatre’s metaphysical potentials. By taking into 
account the theoretical framework on which the performance was based, I made a 
critical distinction between pre-cultural expression and unconscious 
communication of meaning. I argued that the notion of ‘unearthing’, as 
conceptualised by Hughes, as well as the way that Smith elaborated on the 
concept (based on Levi-Strauss’s ideas on myth and music), were insufficient in 
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capturing and radicalising the non-representational potential of the performance. 
Following Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of affect, I claimed that the mythopoeic 
and musical ways in which Orghast was presented and experienced suggests a pre-
cultural mode of theatrical engagement that is neither normatively cognitive, nor 
structurally transhistorical. In other words, I suggested that the pre-cultural and 
the pre-symbolic modes of expression that myths and music can activate do not 
essentially function in a universal, culturally neutral or transhistorical manner – let 
alone in a biologically determined one – just because they are non-semantic or 
non-cognitive. On the contrary, my reading of Orghast was based on its capacity 
to acknowledge and embrace the affective potential of myths and music to operate 
as conscious becomings that are subject to constant change and reinterpretation. As 
Brook claims in a 1972 interview with Smith, the group was not interested in 
working with a ‘universal language’ that could somehow touch on a certain 
‘brotherhood of man’ (Smith, 1972: 256). It is precisely this idea of ‘brotherhood’ 
or ‘universality’ that my analysis attempted to challenge, by highlighting the non-
transcendental, non-representational possibilities of myths and music in Orghast.               
Following from these ideas, it is evident that the question of metaphysics in 
theatre is not only complicated and demanding, but also forms an open-ended 
field of analysis in theatre and cultural studies. I argue that considering the 
importance of unexplainable, inarticulate and even obscure experiences in 
performance is fundamental in discussions of the non-representational, non-
didactic potential of political theatre. I suggest that the decisive step in such an 
undertaking is a destabilisation of the normative opposition between what is 
considered as real and what is perceived as unreal in theatre practice. In other 
words, I argue that considering experiences that escape a definite linguistic 
articulation as a priori unreal and essentially artificial restricts our capacity to 
examine the non-representational possibilities of political theatre to a great extent.  
 
(e) Performance space: Empty, incomplete, immersive 
The question of performance space was also given particular focus in the thesis. 
I understood the spatial qualities of a theatrical event to be fundamental in 
challenging mimetic representation and hierarchical relations of power. Rather 
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than approaching theatrical spaces as passive sites-objects that are filled in with 
dramatic representations, I examined them as ‘entities’ active in the shaping of 
performances. I considered them as affective and tactile places in which 
performances become possible. From this perspective, my analysis was a critique 
of any understanding of theatre spaces as distant from, or external to, the 
performance itself. As David Wiles argues, the point is not 
‘finding the right play for the space, or the right space for the play, but […] to 
refuse altogether the dichotomy of ‘play’ and ‘space’, of ‘content’ and ‘form’. 
The play-as-text can be performed in a space, but the play-as-event belongs to 
the space, and makes the space perform as much as it makes actors perform’ 
(Wiles, 2003: 1; original emphasis). 
Indeed, this differentiating line that Wiles draws between play-as-text and play-as-
event is essential to rethinking space as a lively and productive element of a 
theatrical performance. It follows the postdramatic idea that space is equally 
important in experiencing a performance, as are the performers, the audience, the 
text, the sounds, the lights and the visuals. Thus, rather than understanding 
theatre as a mere representation of a dramatic text, this idea pays attention to the 
entire mise en scène, considering space itself ‘as performance’. 
In the case studies of the thesis I addressed this performative function of space 
in different contexts. For example, Littlewood and Price’s conception of the Fun 
Palace was a very interesting and revolutionary idea of space – especially in the 
1970s – to which I gave particular attention. In designing this ambitious project, 
Littlewood and Price reconceived the function of space as a mobile and 
incomplete site that would invite the participants to alter it while occupying and 
using it. This interactive ‘anti-building’, as Price called it, would actively 
‘participate’ in the artistic and educational experiences that its users would engage 
with. Thus, the Fun Palace was not designed to function merely as a receptive 
place, but also as a productive assemblage that would be involved in the activities 
of the users. Also, Peter Brook’s notion of ‘empty space’ was important in 
discussing a very influential way of relating to space in theatre. For a space to 
become theatrical, Brook suggested, one should treat it as if it were ‘empty’ of 
preconceptions and fixed qualities (whether architectural, structural, historical, 
personal or cultural). ‘Empty-ing’ the space of elements that may potentially 
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dictate and impose specific theatrical narratives is for Brook a crucial prerequisite 
of a theatre production. I argued that this idea of the ‘empty space’ resonates with 
Brook’s way of approaching theatrical forms and structures as motivations for 
creative decompositions, rather than as static and eternal modes of theatre. The 
question of space was also thoroughly addressed in the case study of Punchdrunk. 
I argued that Punchdrunk’s immersive theatre creates mobile (nomadic) and 
fragmentary spatial conditions that make the space active in their performances. I 
suggested that Punchdrunk redefine the relation between the space, the audience 
and the performers: the audience and the performers become a part of the space 
and the choreographies as much as the space becomes a part of the performance. 
The narrative fragments that Punchdrunk create destabilise hierarchical spatial 
conditions, generating ‘fluid’ spaces; that is, following Deleuze, they produce non-
metric, nomadic and ‘smooth’ spaces. I argued that the constant movement of 
spectators, and their disorientation in space, produce an immersive space, a space 
without exact mappings or points of reference.  
  I suggest that, although different in many ways, these approaches to the 
question of theatrical space have something important in common: They all share 
a desire to take away elements of (hierarchical) power and representation. They all 
suggest processes of deducting elements that stratify a space, that organise a space 
into units in which, and from which, power is exercised as subjection; they 
propose processes of taking away referential points in space that signify a Master 
and Slave dialectic or indicate an eventual catharsis. In the Fun Palace project this 
process refers to taking away the static structuration of a building while 
transforming it into an always incomplete and open space. In Brook’s theatre it is 
an attempt to deduct any prescriptive spatial conditions as a means to experiment 
with a decomposition of rigid forms and models of theatre. Finally, in 
Punchdrunk’s theatre there is a process of taking away:  
i) the traditional form of watching a performance, by negating the conventional 
relation between a stage and an auditorium.  
ii) the linear continuity of plot and narrative by introducing spatial fragments 
and interruptions in their performances.  
I argue that what is politically interesting amongst these ways of approaching the 
question of theatrical space is, most importantly, a desire to transform a space 
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from an object into a process; to deduct what confines and territorializes a space in 
order to activate its potential to ‘perform’ and to participate in the ‘here and now’ 
of the event. 
 
(f) Emancipating the audience: the spectator as nomad 
The question of spectatorship was an area of inquiry that was implicit in, and 
central to, all of the questions that my research elaborated upon. In a sense, my 
discussion of the non-representational potential of theatre and performance was 
made in conjunction with a critique of conventional modes of spectating in 
Western theatre. Throughout the chapters I argued that interactive and 
participatory techniques of theatre cannot be thought as ends in themselves. 
Rather, I suggested, they need to be understood as starting points of a more 
radical process that destratifies the power relations of theatre and destabilises the 
fixed positioning of audience and performers. It is by virtue of considering 
techniques of de-objectification and introducing agency to an audience as 
incomplete processes that political theatre acquires non-representational and non-
hegemonic potentials. I thereby argued that the problem of spectatorship in 
theatre and performance is more than a problem of subjectivity: it is a problem of 
positioning and hierarchy.  
Following from Ranciere’s argument about knowledge and ignorance – as 
discussed in The Emancipated Spectator (2011 [2009]) – I suggested that the 
opposition between an objective and a subjective notion of spectatorship should be 
abolished in favour of challenging the entire domain of representation and 
hierarchy in theatre contexts. Through my research, it became clear to me that a 
truly emancipated spectator is a spectator that is able to continuously move and 
change his/her own conditions of watching, experiencing and participating in a 
theatrical event. I proposed a spectator-as-nomad; that is a spectator that is 
creatively lost, disoriented and immersed in experiencing the event at the very 
moment it occurs. I understand this nomadic potential of the spectator as a 
radically engaging process that enables a political experience (in the sense of actual 
participation), by challenging the representation of politics as a grand narrative 
that is external to the performance. In this sense, I argued for the potential of 
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theatre and performance to create an actual and present political space (a political 
mise en scène to which spectators would relate directly), while breaking with the 
construction of theatrical podiums that impose fixed images of an abstract politics 
or dictate a ready-made dialogue between the performance and the audience. It 
was with view to the ‘becoming’ of such a political space that my critical analysis 
of theatre directors and collectives was implemented.  
For instance, in her work with the Theatre Workshop, Littlewood produced 
theatrical events in which dialogue and audience participation were not 
predefined or directed, but were rather emerging within and during performances 
– as a result of a process that was inviting the audience to intervene, interrupt and 
even alter the performances in unexpected ways. I would argue that Littlewood’s 
theatrical performances could be considered more as ephemeral political 
happenings, rather than as political dramas that were a priori interactive or 
participatory. Furthermore, in his work with The International Centre for 
Theatre Research, Brook created performances that were focused on engaging 
with spectators in non-linguistic (and by extension non-representational) ways. I 
would suggest that his experimentation with the pre-cultural possibilities of theatre 
was not only a critique of the logocentric function of Western theatre, but also a 
proposal for a political theatre in which the relation of performers and spectators 
becomes something more than merely dialogical: it becomes ‘sacred’ and 
‘magical’ in the Artaudian sense (as discussed in chapters 2 and 4). Finally, in the 
case of Punchdrunk, I identified the potential of immersive and promenade 
theatre to experiment with spectatorship in ways that endorse experience, rather 
than rational understanding. Punchdrunk explore the diverse political possibilities 
of spectatorship by inviting the audience to ‘become other’ (masked), to become 
voyeurs, to feel actual fear or joy and to constantly move within a theatrical space 
(without being directed) by becoming parts of it, or parts of the performance. I 
argue that Punchdrunk’s theatre is political not because of its content, but because 
of this approach to spectatorship. In a sense, the form of Punchdrunk’s theatre is 
utterly political. 
Of course, the question of ignorance that Ranciere poses is an important point 
that could be addressed to each one of the cases I analysed. The extent to which, 
in suggesting different approaches to the problem of spectatorship, Littlewood, 
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Brook and Punchdrunk maintain(ed) a problematic distance (with regard to 
knowledge vs ignorance) between the performance and the audience is open to 
discussion. Certainly, to assert that their theatrical projects managed to eradicate 
the boundaries that separate a spectator and a performer would be an indefensible 
claim. In a sense, one could argue that they all ‘intend[ed] to teach their spectators 
ways of ceasing to be spectators and becoming agents of a collective practice’ 
(Ranciere, 2011 [2009]; my emphasis). At the same time, I argue that what 
Littlewood, Brook and Punchdrunk have achieved through their theatre is, on one 
level, to challenge this distance and interrupt its coherency, by experimenting with 
different ways of engaging with audiences; and, on a second level, they managed 
to radically question the use of theatre as a tool of knowledge, by exploring the 
non-representational potential of theatrical experience – as a political happening, 
as a sacred event and as an immersive performance. In other words, I suggest that 
Littlewood, Brook and Punchdrunk did not want to create ignorant spectators. They 
wanted to create the conditions that would make spectators look for something 
different than knowledge in political theatre: an actual experience of a politics that they 
can actively shape and perceive – not as students or teachers, not as masters or 
slaves, not as subjects or objects, but as political ‘becomings’ of performance.                     
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